سود و زیان وابستگی گروه : مدارک و شواهد از شرق آسیا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|6675||2006||26 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Emerging Markets Review, Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 1–26
This paper investigates the benefits and associated agency costs of using internal capital markets through affiliating with groups using data of 2000 firms from 9 East Asian economies. We find that mature and slow-growing firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, while young and high-growth firms lose more. Agency problems are important determinants of the distribution of internal markets value gains in economies outside Japan, but less so in Japan. Consistent with the literature, financially constrained firms benefit from group affiliation. Our results are robust to different time periods and estimation techniques.
In this paper, we empirically examine the benefit and costs of group affiliation for a large sample of East Asian corporations. A group can be described as a corporate organization where a number of firms are linked through stock-pyramids and cross-ownership. Relative to independent firms, group structures are associated with greater use of internal factor markets, including financial markets. Through their internal financial markets, groups may allocate capital among firms within the group, which can lead to economic benefits especially when external financing is scarce and uncertain, such as for young and fast-growing firms or for firms which face temporary financial distress. These benefits of internal markets may in turn be reflected in higher firm valuation and better firm performance. Typically in a group, a single individual, family or coalition of families controls a number of firms. Internal markets in combination with the typically complex ownership and control structure of group-affiliated firms may, however, lead to greater agency problems. The relative importance of the benefits of internal markets, the agency costs associated with corporate groups and the relationship of these benefits and costs with specific firm characteristics are the issues investigated in this paper. Groups and the role of group affiliation have been the subject of much analytical analysis and empirical investigations. The economic benefits of internal markets compared to external markets have been discussed in Coase (1960) and Williamson (1985). They highlight the role organizations play in reducing transaction costs in various markets. In particular, when frictions in financial markets are severe, internal financial markets can provide benefits in allocating capital more efficiently (Stein, 1997). This role of internal markets can include providing funds to firms that have growth potential, but which are financially constrained or temporarily financially distressed.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper attempts to identify, for a large sample of firms from different economies, the firm characteristics that affect the relationship between group affiliation and firm valuation. It suggests that there are gains from group affiliation but that agency issues are important in shaping the benefits and costs of group affiliation. For East Asian countries other than Japan, it finds that, for a firm with the control stake of the largest owner exceeding its ownership stake, valuation gains from group affiliation arise if the firm is older and slower-growing; in contrast, value losses arise if the firm is younger and has higher growth. This suggests that group affiliation, when accompanied by ownership structures more likely subject to agency issues, can subtract value as resource allocation is worse. The paper also confirms findings for Japan that group affiliation helps in alleviating financial constraints, although not necessarily for viable firms. Our work suggests that there may be gains from group affiliation; however, these gains do not come about automatically as costs may arise as well due to agency problems. An interesting question is whether the gains and costs depend on the country's institutional context. It might be, for example, that the benefits of internal markets are the greatest in those countries in which the impact of agency problems is also the most severe. That is, in countries with the least developed external financial markets the potential beneficial role of internal markets may be the greatest, yet, the ability to mitigate agency problems associated with group structures might also the weakest in these countries. Our work does not allow us to answer these questions, but answers may have implications for the types of reforms countries can most usefully pursue. Reforms focusing on reducing agency problems may, for example, enhance the efficiency of the use of internal markets and at the same time diminish the need for internal markets when they also encourage the development of external financial markets. The exact relationships between internal markets functioning and specific features of countries' institutional framework, and resulting policy implications, however, remain to be researched.