چپاول، اطلاعات نامتقارن و رفتار استراتژیک در کلاس درس: رویکرد تجربی برای آموزش سازمان صنعتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|6811||2000||21 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 18, Issue 1, January 2000, Pages 205–225
Classroom market experiments can complement the theoretical orientation of standard industrial organization courses. This paper describes various experiments designed for such courses, and presents details of a multi-market game with entry and exit. In this experiment incumbents have a cost advantage in their ‘home’ markets, and mobile firms decide which market to enter. After entry decisions are made, firms choose prices and quantities to offer for sale. Predatory pricing is possible with this setup, and the experiment can be used to motivate discussions of monopoly, competition, entry, and efficiency. Other classroom experiments with an industrial organization focus are surveyed.
In industrial organization classes, it is often difficult to bridge the gap between the tight predictions of abstract theoretical models of industry equilibrium and the broad patterns that emerge from econometric studies of industry and firm-level data. Moreover, discussions of policy issues are often clouded by disputes over purely empirical issues, e.g. whether an alleged predator priced below marginal cost or whether a pattern of uniform behavior across firms was the result of illegal conspiracy. Laboratory experiments, in contrast, can provide a source of data that is closely related to both theoretical and policy issues. They also provide a clear way to test the predictions of game theory which is at the core of most theoretical analysis in industrial organization today. Although these experiments are typically run with financially motivated subjects in a laboratory environment, many of them can be adapted for class use. As such, they can complement the standard teaching methods in this field. Classroom experiments can be harder to carry out successfully than would appear at first; sometimes seemingly minor design errors cause major problems with the data, as with an error in a computer program. The experimental economics literature, and the classroom experiments literature in particular, can be useful in avoiding common errors. Therefore, we begin this paper with a detailed description of a price–choice experiment that has a particularly interesting multi-market structure. The setup can generate seemingly predatory behavior. In particular, the traders who have been assigned the role of an incumbent firm have strong incentives to price aggressively. Although the resulting prices do not always violate standard cost-based antitrust rules, the outcomes are often consistent with predatory intent: entrants shy away from aggressive incumbents, who price below entrants' average costs and then raise prices to monopoly levels when rivals are driven out. The exercise provides a useful way to illustrate the possibility of predatory pricing, and the results illustrate the trade-off between foregoing current profit for future gains, the possibility of reputation building, and the strategic importance of asymmetric information. The class discussions that follow can focus on the potential effects of predatory behavior on consumer welfare, in the short and long run. The ex post analysis can highlight the difficulties of identifying predatory intent and the appeal of simple, cost-based antitrust rules.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Many theoretical and policy issues that arise in industrial organization classes are difficult to evaluate with data from actual markets. Despite the general agreement on using non-cooperative game theory, the predications of this theory depend on the structure of the model, and it is often difficult to say whether one model is better than another in terms of explaining data patterns from a particular industry. Moreover, many policy debates about issues like predation and the effects of collusion are difficult to evaluate without precise information about cost and demand conditions. Similarly, the effects of prohibiting a particular type of sales contract or requiring a particular kind of price announcement may be unclear if the alternative to current practice has not been observed. In each of these cases, laboratory experiments can be useful, since precise information about costs and demand is available, and alternative structures can be evaluated in a parallel manner. Laboratory methods are increasingly being used by industrial organization for these reasons. Teaching in industrial organization can be enhanced by the use of classroom exercises that have evolved from research experiments. It is often a little more difficult to set up and run a market experiment than is the case for a simple game, since most markets are typically more interactive than simple games. Asymmetries in costs or buyer/seller roles may add other complexities. By using standard instructions, however, it is possible to set up useful market situations. Moreover, the students are often much more interested in participating and discussing market experiments that have the look and feel of real markets. This willingness to participate in a well-designed classroom market makes it unnecessary to pay students for their participation, as might be the case in a repetitive and simple game like a prisoner’s dilemma. Our impression is that such participation enhances learning at a different level, i.e. at a level of doing more than memorizing the results, but rather of believing in the relevance of what is being learned. These experiments can provide students with a strong conviction about the benefits of competition, the dangers of monopolization, and an appreciation of the subtle effects of interactive strategic behavior.