زیرساخت و یا سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی: بررسی پیامدهای استراتژی MNE برای توسعه اقتصادی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|6958||2009||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of World Business, Volume 44, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 144–157
This paper explores the paradoxical relationship between MNE current strategies and economic development. There is evidence that positive developmental impacts of FDI flows are conditional on high levels of human capital and thus on the existence of ‘good’ infrastructure in recipient countries. In this paper we suggest that current MNE strategies have a negative impact on the development of infrastructure in LDCs. The justification for this argument arises from the low developmental impact of current FDI patterns and from rising costs of attracting increasingly footloose investment. The overall effect is to aggravate government financial constraints on the development of basic infrastructure. We develop propositions for future empirical research. We also consider implications for MNE strategy and argue that current MNE strategies are not only ineffective for delivering poverty reduction but that current strategies in developing countries do not necessarily serve the interest of MNEs either.
In recent years, several international business (IB) scholars have explored the issues around impact of MNE activities on economic development and poverty reduction. This is a significant development in the IB literature, and constitutes an extension of the domain of international business as a field of study. In the past, international business scholarship was not particularly concerned with the development issue, probably reflecting the notion that inquiries beyond the firm as unit of analysis are not in the domain of international business (Nehrt, Truitt, & Wright, 1970; Ricks, 1985). The more engaged stance of international business scholarship with the development issue (see e.g. Meyer, 2004 and Ramamurti, 2004) is in part a refection of the fact that the earlier optimism regarding FDI as ‘an engine of development’ (UNCTAD, 1992) has virtually evaporated and replaced with an arguably more realistic assessment. There is now a general realization that positive developmental impacts from FDI are not automatic. The realization of potential benefits from FDI is a challenging process at which relatively few countries have been successful (Dunning & Narula, 2004; Lall & Narula, 2004; Nunnenkamp, 2004; Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2004; UNCTAD, 1999). The recent interest in poverty issues by a number of scholars can be seen in a broader context which is witnessing a more nuanced and critical evaluation of the development impact of MNEs in LDCs (Ghauri and Buckley, 2002 and Ghauri and Buckley, 2006; Ghauri & Cao, 2006; Kolk & van Tulder, 2006; London & Hart, 2004; O’Brien & Beamish, 2006; Yamin & Ghauri, 2004). The present paper seeks to add to this literature by focusing on the impact of current MNE strategies on the development of basic infrastructure in LDCs. The focus on infrastructure is highly apposite from a poverty reduction perspective (Datt & Ravallion, 1998; Fay, Leipziger, Wodon, & Yepes, 2005) and yet is neglected in the discussion of the MNE impacts on poverty reduction.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Our arguments regarding the impact of MNE strategies on LDCs can be summarized in the following Fig. 1. As the figure shows, we consider that impacts on infrastructure development are generated from the interaction between MNE strategies and host-country characteristics in terms of existing infrastructure. However, both MNE strategies and LDCs are affected by fundamental environmental changes that can rather roughly be described as ‘globalization’ (Dunning & Narula, 2004).6 The key dynamics of globalization include liberalization relating to trade and investment regulation, and technological advance, particularly in information and communication (ICT) technologies enabling, inter alia, production modularization and geographical flexibility. In our paper these forces have not been in the forefront of the analysis; we have concentrated on the effects of MNE strategies on infrastructure (see also footnote 6). However, as indicated in Fig. 1, MNE-related effects constraining the development of infrastructure can be magnified, as LDCs also face pressures emanating from the globalization dynamics which effectively reduce the policy ‘space’ available to their governments (UNCTAD, 2004). Wade (2003, p. 622) has argued trade and investment liberalization measures (such as TRIMS and GATS) have resulted ‘in the ‘development space’ for diversification and upgrading policies in developing countries being shrunk behind the rhetorical commitment to universal liberalization and privatization. The rules being written into multilateral and bilateral agreements actively prevent developing countries from pursuing the kinds of industrial and technology policies adopted by the newly developed countries of East Asia, and by the older developed countries when they were developing, policies aimed at accelerating the ‘internal’ articulation of the economy’. Similarly fiscal ‘conservatism’ and the demands for macroeconomic stability imply a reduction in the scope for public expenditure (Islam, 2005 and Ocampo, 2002). The MNE-related constraints on infrastructural development in a particular country is shaped by its macro context in terms of its ability to adapt to globalization pressures. We have not brought this into the forefront of our discussion as we believe that such country capabilities are themselves influenced by the level of infrastructure development. In our study, we have endeavored to explore how FDI flows may have negative effects on public investment on basic infrastructure. Our paper essentially attempts to examine the opportunity costs of FDI in terms of the forgone resources that are not devoted to basic infrastructure. More specifically we have argued that shifts in MNE strategy have two related consequences: weaker spillover and linkage effects and greater incentive elasticity of incoming FDI. The first implies a lower income multiplier in the economy and ceteris paribus a reduced ability to increase public revenue through taxation. The effect of the second is to increase competition between actual and potential recipients of incoming FDI and to encourage a more proactive stance with respect to attracting FDI. Thus a relatively greater portion of public revenues and public administrative and related resources are taken up in attracting incoming FDI. 6.1. Implications for MNE strategy Recent IB discussions of the MNE-development connections have implicitly and – occasionally explicitly – questioned the efficacy of the dominant MNE strategies in the LDCs (Dawar & Chattopadhyay, 2002; London & Hart, 2004; Ramamurti, 2004). The focus on poverty in some recent writings is arguably also a reflection of a critical stance vis-a-vis MNE strategies (Ghauri & Buckley, 2006; Jain & Vachani, 2006; Kolk & van Tulder, 2006). Others have observed the absence of a governance structure to manage the interdependence between LDCs and MNEs (Ghauri & Cao, 2006; Zanfei, 2005). The key point in the recent discussion is not so much that LDCs have not gained sufficiently from their engagement with MNEs but that current strategies do not serve the MNEs very well either. Dawar and Chattopadhyay (2002) chastise MNEs for being ‘trapped by their own devices in gilded cages, serving the affluent few but ignoring the potential of the billions of new consumers’. A similar criticism is developed by London and Hart (2004) who recommend a ‘reinvention’ of MNE strategies for LDCs and emerging economies and propose a departure from the current low involvement strategies and operational modalities in LDCs. This is an important observation and one that gains significant credence from the investment behavior of MNEs in developed countries where they have developed collaborative strategies to effectively tap into the created assets of countries and companies (Dunning & Narula, 2004). Recent research on spillovers (Oetzel & Doh, this issue) has suggested that, in cases where subsidiaries are effectively embedded in the host economy there maybe spillovers from the local environment to the subsidiary and hence to the MNE as whole. Nor is such ‘reverse’ spillover limited to developed economies only, as the recent research by Marin and Bell (2006) indicates. Andersson and Persson (2006) show that MNE headquarters direct more investment funds towards those subsidiaries that, through their embeddedness in their local economies, have gained capabilities which are important to the rest of the organization. Interestingly, subsidiary market performance or profitability per se did not appear to be a significant factor in attracting headquarters’ investment. These findings support the notion that the long-term investment behavior of MNEs in developed countries is focused on capability development. In fact, there is a line of analysis that suggests such capability development in the local economy of subsidiaries is an ‘advantage’ of multinationality ( Regner, 2003 and Yamin, 2002). London and Hart (2004) cite cases of companies succeeding with ‘non-traditional’ strategies in LDCs. These strategies include developing relationships with non-traditional partners, co-inventing custom solutions, and building local capacity. London and Hart (2004) conclude that, these successful strategies suggest the importance of MNEs developing a global capability in ‘social embeddedness’ – in other words policies that are not very different from those already working well in developed economies. Zanfei (2005) develops a similar point and, applying the prisoner dilemma logic, argues that the dominant MNE strategies in LDCs create a low payoff outcome for both parties. LDCs resources are focused on attracting FDI rather than investing in human capital and infrastructure so as to benefit more fully from incoming FDI. On the other hand current MNE strategies readily ignore the benefits they themselves could derive by helping to develop local capabilities (Oetzel & Doh, this issue; Zanfei, 2005, p. 12). Many LDCs have great potential of becoming strategic markets and in particular may become important sites for developing new products and services, oriented towards large markets with distinctive cultural and institutional patterns. However, as in the typical prisoner dilemma situation, mutually beneficial outcomes in the MNE–LDC relationship are difficult to obtain as these require credible and sustained cooperation between the parties.