توسعه تخصیص هزینه انتقال بر اساس تئوری بازی تعاونی برای تسکین ازدحام
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|7123||2005||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, Volume 27, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 61–67
In conventional power systems, upstream and downstream of power were distinct. However, due to the competition, power injection and sink can appear at unexpected locations, and cost sharing for such a new power system configuration must be considered. This paper proposes a scheme for transmission expansion cost allocation among electric market participants by using Core and Nucleolus concepts of game theory, which are developed particularly for the transmission users. A solution of the n-person cooperative game is adopted to distribute the line transmission expansion cost among the players. Congestion is assumed to be the transmission constraint, and expansion of transmission line is expected to relieve transmission congestion. A case study is illustrated to demonstrate the proposed method.
All over the world, there is a trend toward competitive markets in the electric power industry. After competition mechanism is introduced further into the retail level of the electricity market, the electricity transmission system is strongly required to be used efficiently and fair competition in the electricity market is also demanded to be strictly maintained among all participants. Because of the emergence of independent power producers (IPPs) as well as the changing structure of the electricity supply industry, it becomes more realistic to improve economics and reliability of power systems by enlisting market forces. For example, to maximize his payoffs, a player (e.g. eligible customer) seeks to displace expensive generation by importing power from neighboring players with lower cost energy. Likewise, a player (an IPPs or a Utility) with excess generation capacity can choose to export power and receive an immediate return on its investment. So far there have been many research works published in the literature for the cost allocation methods but mainly on the generation side or price analysis ,  and . In contrast, this paper aims to propose a cost allocation of transmission expansion among electric market participants by using Core and Nucleolus concepts of game theory , , ,  and . Core and Nucleolus value concepts are used for cost allocation among the transmission users. In particular, congestion is assumed to be the transmission constraint, and expansion of transmission line is mainly to relieve transmission congestion. Besides critical index of economics, clearly reliability is also a important factor in equitable cost allocation, which is incorporated in our model. The cost allocation of transmission line expansion planning is based on the benefit of each participant. In this paper, we adopt a simple model with one Utility, several IPPs and eligible customers to analyze the effects of each related factor. Calculation of joint benefits for all possible coalitions to relieve transmission line congestion accrues from the expansion of the transmission line. Cooperative game theory (Core and Nucleolus) is applied to this model, providing a clear and simple explanation for expansion cost allocation. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we formulate a transmission expansion cost allocation problem as a cooperative game. In Section 3, basic requirements of the transmission expansion are described. The concept of the benefit allocation based on cooperative game theory is derived in Section 4. Section 5 provides cost allocation of the IPPs, Utility and eligible customers. Illustrative applications are numerically explained in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 7.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Based on cooperative game theory, we proposed a scheme for cost allocation of transmission line expansion to tackle with congestion problem in the network. The cooperative games (Core and Nucleolus) concept is adopted to decisions with the consideration of all coalitions of the participants in the equitable manner. To examine the proposed approach, a case study with a market model is used as a demonstrated example. As a further research topic, it is necessary to take into account detailed information as well as regulation policy in electric power market  and  with large-scale systems  for transmission expansion cost allocation.