نظریه بازی، تعامل شبیه سازی شده، و قضاوت بدون پشتوانه برای پیش بینی تصمیمات در مناقشات: شواهد بیشتر
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|7127||2005||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||5679 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Forecasting, Volume 21, Issue 3, July–September 2005, Pages 463–472
When people in conflicts can accurately forecast how others will respond, they should be able to make better decisions. Contrary to expectations, earlier research found game theorists' forecasts were less accurate than forecasts from student role players. To assess whether game theorists had been disadvantaged by the selection of conflicts, I obtained forecasts for three new conflicts of types preferred by game theory experts. As before, role-players in simulated interactions were students, and other students forecast using their judgement. Game theorists did better than previously. However, when the three new and five earlier conflicts are combined, 101 forecasts by 23 game theorists were no more accurate (31%) than 354 forecasts by students who used unaided judgement (31%). Experienced game theorists were not more accurate. Neither were those who spent more time on the task. Of 105 simulated-interaction forecasts, 62% were accurate: an average error reduction of 47% over game-theorist forecasts and a halving of error relative to the current method. Forecasts can sometimes have value without being strictly accurate. Assessing the usefulness of forecasts led to the same conclusions about the relative merits of the methods. Finally, by combining simulated interaction forecasts, accurate forecasts were obtained for seven of the eight situations.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Despite the importance of accurately predicting people's decisions in conflicts, I was unable to identify research other than my own and Armstrong's (2001a) that compared the accuracy of forecasts from reasonable alternative approaches. Findings were initially obtained for only five situations that involved interaction and the findings were at odds with people's expectations. To test generalizability, I obtained new forecasts for three conflict situations that matched types of situations some game theorists have made predictions about. The new findings were consistent with the earlier ones. Specifically, knowledge of game theory was not useful, whereas modal forecasts from the simulated interaction method were accurate for all but one conflict. While further research is needed in order to identify whether there are situations for which game-theoretic analysis is more useful than other methods, current evidence suggests that decision makers would be wise to prefer forecasts from simulated interaction.