مدیریت ریسک مالیات و شرکت چند ملیتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|716||2009||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 14–28
The financial scandals in the United States and other countries ushered in financial reporting and corporate governance reforms that extend beyond the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). These initiatives have increased the international financial community's awareness of the importance of risk management and internal controls. Tax risk management and related internal controls have been accorded less focus than risk management generally. The purpose of this research is to describe the current state of tax risk management of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by reporting survey responses from chief financial officers (CFOs) of U.S. and non-U.S. MNEs. The research shows that significant progress has been made by large MNEs in developing and implementing both general and tax risk management policies. The results provide guidance in identifying the loci and impact of organizational tax risk and indicate that respondents do not perceive alarming degrees of tax risk in their organizations. The study reveals a remarkable degree of similarity in U.S. and foreign firm responses and demonstrates, unexpectedly, that existing reporting structures enable CFOs to shift a significant degree of tax risk management to heads of tax.
As a result of financial scandals such as the Enron and Worldcom scandals in the United States, the Parmalat implosion in Italy, the Maxwell pension debacle in the United Kingdom, and the HIH Insurance failure in Australia, a new era of financial reporting and corporate governance reforms was ushered in that extend beyond the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). For example, in early 2006, the European Union (EU) approved expansion of its 8th Council Directive on Company Law, which pertains to the approval of auditors in EU member states. Member states have 2 years from its formal adoption (summer 2006) to incorporate its requirements into their national laws (Wyman, 2006). The most significant result of these laws is the increased awareness by the international financial community of the importance of risk management and internal controls. Risk management and other principles of corporate governance are being addressed around the world. According to the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), a total of 66 countries and geographical areas, including the United States, have published new or updated existing codes of corporate governance to include and adequately address risk management principles. Additionally, in July 2005, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) updated its 1999 ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles, to charge corporate boards with ensuring that appropriate systems of control are in place, including systems for risk management. Tax risk management and related internal controls have been accorded less focus than risk management generally. It has been common practice to subsume tax risk management under the general subject of risk management rather than addressing tax risk management as a discrete aspect of risk management. Tax risk management and related internal controls have been described historically as “a bit of black art, not necessarily understood even by those in the tax function….” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 2). Furthermore, material weakness disclosures by management frequently identify internal control problems in complex accounts, such as income tax expense (Ge & McVay, 2005). Quimby and Pearce (2006, p. 26) conclude that “[a]rguably, no one has felt the sting of SOX 404 more acutely than the tax departments.” Elgood (2006) reports that more than 20% of material weaknesses reported under section 404 of SOX pertained to how tax is controlled. Quimby and Pearce (2006, p. 26) concur and confirm that for the second year in a row, tax departments held the “dubious distinction of being one of the most common areas of internal control failure (material weakness) cited in the adverse opinions filed in 2005 (Year 2).” The impetus for the current research is the recent recognition by commercial organizations and revenue authorities that the tax function has its own unique profile, which necessitates a separate inquiry into tax risk management. Since formally classifying tax risk management as a separate element of corporate governance is a recent phenomenon, a dearth of empirical research exists as to how individual firms rate various types of tax risk and have incorporated tax risk management into their governance policies and procedures. The contribution of this research is that it fills the information and decision making guidance gap by describing the “state of tax risk management” of some of the world's largest multinational enterprises (MNEs). The research is relevant to accounting, auditing, and taxation academicians and practitioners because tax risk management is at the confluence of all three disciplines. Specifically, this research elicits information about and compares U.S. and non-U.S. MNEs to determine the current state of tax risk management and if a global view of, and strategies pertaining to, tax risk management exists among MNEs. The inquiry addresses the following aspects of tax risk management for U.S. and non-U.S. firms: (i) the structure of and the chain of reporting pertaining to the tax function, (ii) the existence and nature of a documented general and tax risk management policies, and (iii) firms’ ratings of seven types of tax risk and six specific tax issues. For example, the research describes the significance of transfer pricing rules and their disproportionate effect on the tax risk experienced by non-U.S. multinationals firms. The study also provides demographic and organizational information as a perspective from which to draw conclusions about the aspects of tax risk management identified above. The study provides insights for identifying the loci and significance of organizational tax risk and developing and implementing tax risk management policies to adequately control risk. It is also relevant to corporate boards and senior management. Neubig and Sangha (2004) conclude that boards’ and senior managements’ lack of understanding of the complicated and technical nature of tax may expose companies to unexpected outcomes (i.e., risk). Finally, the current research updates the results of a 2005 KPMG study that looked at enterprises’ adoption of formal tax risk management policies and demonstrates that significant progress has been made since 2005. In effect, the study constitutes a benchmark against which decision makers can assess organizational tax risk efforts. The information about U.S. and foreign MNEs’ development and implementation of documented risk management policies constitutes a set of best practices. The significance of these risk management best practices is confirmed by Ernst & Young's (2007) series of 2006 risk management surveys, which demonstrate that 66% of surveyed companies plan to increase their investment in risk management in order to manage risk in a more coordinated and integrated manner.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The implications of this research are five-fold. First, the research demonstrates that significant progress has been made by large MNEs in recognizing the importance of developing and implementing not only general risk management policies, but also separate tax risk management policies. Development and implementation of those policies contributes to the development of tax risk management best practices. Second, the results provide guidance in identifying the loci and impact of organizational tax risk. The mean responses in Table 5 demonstrate that with regard to the seven types of tax risk, both U.S. and foreign respondents conclude that the most significant amount of risk is from transactional risk (e.g., acquisitions, mergers). Both populations of MNEs assess transfer pricing as the specific tax provision with the greatest degree of risk. Third, of considerable importance are respondents’ overall assessments of tax risk. The data in Table 12 demonstrate that the responding CFOs (or designees) do not perceive alarming degrees of tax risk in their organizations. Responses for the risk associated with the seven TRM classes of tax risk range from 2.13542 (U.S. mean for reputational risk) to 3.22581 (foreign mean for transaction risk). The majority of means were mid-two to mid-three, a moderate amount of perceived risk and impact. With regard to the risk associated with the six tax issues, responses range from 1.74194 (foreign mean for payroll tax) to 3.25806 (foreign mean for transfer pricing). With a rating of five denoting a “major risk factor,” none of the mean responses approaches such a rating. For example, both populations of MNEs rated transfer pricing risk highest among the six tax issues; however, only five (10%) of 48 responding U.S. firms and eight (13%) of 64 responding foreign firms rated it as a major risk factor. The respondents either do not perceive the existence of alarming degrees of tax risk or conclude that tax risk is under control in their organizations. Such optimistic ratings are probably due at least to some degree to the progress reported in systematically managing tax risk by formalizing and implementing tax risk management policies (e.g., the Australian respondent who noted that tax risk, while high, is controllable through tax policies). Fourth, the research results are significant because of the similarity in responses of U.S. and foreign MNEs. Using both parametric and nonparametric tests, the two populations’ responses differed statistically with regard to only four of 13 classifications of tax risk: operational risk, reputational risk, transfer pricing, and cultural norms’ effect on tax compliance. In all four cases, the mean rating of foreign respondents exceeded the mean of U.S. respondents, suggesting that non-U.S. MNEs perceive more risk in those tax elements than do U.S. firms. The similarity in assessments of various types of tax risk and the fact that the vast majority of respondents apply a single risk policy to their global organizations constitute strong support for the conclusion that a global view of tax risk management exists among the MNE community. Fifth, the research results demonstrate, unexpectedly, that existing reporting structures enable CFOs to shift a significant degree of tax risk management to heads of tax. This shifting of risk is the result of two factors: (1) the vast majority of U.S. and foreign heads of tax report to the CFO, and (2) 85% of respondents indicate that the head of tax is responsible for signing off on the totality of the global organization tax position. In the United States, for example, although the CFO and the CEO are ultimately responsible for internal control (i.e., risk management) assessment under section 404 of SOX, the CFO has the head-of-tax sign off on the firm's global tax position as a basis upon which to rely.