منشور مذاکره تصحیح روش با بی صبری نامتقارن در چارچوب تئوری بازی ها: مطالعات موردی در معاملات ذغال سنگ و سنگ معدن
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|7600||2010||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, Volume 26, Issue 2, December 2010, Pages 247–261
In determining voyage charter rate, normally, the charterage is determined through the general process of negotiation with the power of the demand and supply in the market including various factors. This paper assumes that the ship-owner cannot make the contract with charterer after the end of pre-chartering, the delay cost per day from ship-owner will be incurred. This case can be applied to charterer as well. The purpose of this paper is to propose an equilibrium charterage which includes the delay loss cost per day in bargaining with asymmetric impatience both for the charterer and the ship-owner. This paper uses Nash equilibrium theory, which aims at reducing the negotiation time, The equilibrium charterage found in Rubinstein theorem, which is made with each discount factor in surplus. In summary, this paper analyzes the delay loss cost per ton and per day between the charterer and the ship-owner, by determining the equilibrium charterage in bargaining with asymmetric impatience. The result can be contributed to suggest the equilibrium charterage with surplus payoffs as the ratio of both of the charterer's and the ship-owner's delay loss cost per ton in the current market.