تحلیل رفتارهای اجاره یابی در نظارت مهندسی برمبنای نظریۀ بازی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|7621||2012||5 صفحه PDF||8 صفحه WORD|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Systems Engineering Procedia, Volume 4, 2012, Pages 455–459
2. نظریۀ اجاره یابی
3. روابط بین رفتارهای سه سویۀ اجاره یابی
4. تحلیل رفتارهای سه سویۀ اجاره یابی بر اساس مدل بازی
4. 1. مدل سازی
جدول1: ماتریکس نتیجۀ نهایی پرداخت واحدهای نظارت، پیمان کاران و مالکان
4. 2. تحلیل مدل
5. تحلیل مثال
جدول2: ماتریکس نتیجۀ نهایی پرداخت برای نمونۀ مثال
6. نتیجه گیری و اقدامات متقابل
Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.
Supervision industry has developed for more than twenty years in China. However, there are still many problems in the development of supervision industry, such as the insufficient number and low quality of employees, weak sense of responsibility, illegal practices and so on[1-3]. Furthermore, many factors, such as the imperfect law, regulation system, extensive industry protection, local protection, administrative intervention and regional segmentation, lead to weak standardized of supervision market and shortage of a truly fair, just and open competition environment. Therefore the rent-seeking and other immoral behaviors occurred[4-7].
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
According to game analysis, equilibrium solution and example analysis, conclusions are drawn through the tripartite subjects’ behaviors analysis in engineering construction: (1) the optimal probability of rent-seeking is inversely proportional to owner’s monitoring probability and penalty coefficient; (2) the optimal probability of rentseeking is directly proportional to owner’s monitoring cost. In order to efficiently reduce occurrence probability and increase the intendance probability of rent-seeking activities, the supervision control of construction activities should be strengthened, owners should intensify internal management with minimize costs, monitor and verify those activities more efficiently, and increase the strength of punishment. Moreover, reduction of the rent-seeking monitoring costs also depends on the improvement of owner’s monitoring efficiency. Therefore, in order to strengthen the supervision of rent-seeking activities, they should clear out the intensity of punishment by contract, and pay attention to the improvement of monitoring efficiency as well. With the development of construction industry, the situation of construction management system has changed. Requirements on the project supervision are also became higher. Under new situations and requirements of construction industry, the supervision units should improve supervision organization, pay attention to employees’ qualifications and credit management, improve supervisors’ professional quality and ethical quality, and enhance their own strength. In addition, the supervision industry should develop relevant laws and regulations at the same time, increase the management intensity of internal supervision units, and strengthen the legal system of construction market, so that project supervision can embark on the legalized road, and continue to play an important role in engineering construction.