تحقیقات کسب و کار بین المللی و نظریه بازی: به دنبال فراتر از معضل زندانی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|7640||2013||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9030 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Business Review, Volume 22, Issue 2, April 2013, Pages 480–491
This article outlines the un-mined potential of Game Theory for International Business (IB) research. Game Theory has been only rarely used in International Business – particularly, in comparison to transaction cost economics and the resource based view. Although its applications to International Business problems do exist, there is considerably more potential for its refinements to be related to topics of uncertainty and dynamics in strategic interactions in International Business. There is more to Game Theory than the Prisoner's Dilemma.
For a long time International Business (IB) topics of absolute, relative and competitive advantage have triggered political scientists, economists and social scientists to explore theories to understand the what, how and why questions of international trade, multinational enterprises and globalization. The field of International Business has always combined theoretical concepts from many disciplines. Phenomena and problems in International Business ask for tools to explain and solve them. Within the tension between different legal, political, cultural, organizational, economic and managerial systems, decision-making between individuals, groups, companies and countries plays a crucial role in International Business. This means that in a complex decision-making scenario, International Business research needs to draw upon tools which explain, analyze and solve these strategic interactions. In this article, we make the case for such a theoretical tool to analyze cooperation and conflict in International Business – Game Theory. Game Theory cannot simply be viewed as a matter of abstract mathematics, but as fundamentally concerning the real world (Rubinstein, 1991). Rubinstein's statement indicates that Game Theory is an abstract inquiry into the function and logic of social institutions and patterns of behavior. Game Theory offers a strategic tool to look forwards by reasoning backwards which can be very useful for decision-makers in multi-person decision-making situations like those in International Business. Schelling (1960) showed as much in the Strategy of Conflict a rational analysis of international political conflict – as did Axelrod (1984) in the Evolution of Co-operation, which showed how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-interested egoists (superpowers, businesses and individuals) without central authority to police action. Both conflict and co-operation are crucial parts of Game Theory and the strategic treatment of decision-making situations has contributed to a better understanding of behavior in social, political and economic settings. Though Game Theory is mostly equated to the Prisoner's Dilemma, this paper shows the potential of the solution concepts to analyze dynamics and uncertainty as well. The analysis of International Business problems and challenges, such as multinational enterprises (MNEs) in emerging markets, can usefully import knowledge from other disciplines and then export the new insights gained from the applications to IB problems. This paper shows the strength of Game Theory for considering International Business problems. It starts with the chronology, explanations, notations and reasoning of Game Theory and reviews the applications of Game Theory to International Business. To understand the use of Game Theory for International Business, strength and weaknesses are presented in the framework of analysis to deal with the criticism often put forward against Game Theory. The contribution of this paper is that it connects the future IB research agenda suggested by IB scholars with the strength of a game theoretical approach as a mode of analysis. In the mathematical Appendix A the reader will find a formal example to support the argument for IB and Game Theory.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper has shown that referring only to the Prisoner's Dilemma when talking about Game Theory and International Business is not enough. Besides the Nash Equilibrium which shows co-operation and conflict in a static and complete information setting, there are three more game theoretical equilibrium concepts which contribute to the strength of game theoretical research in many disciplines and fields: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (dynamic complete information games), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (static incomplete information games) and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concepts (dynamic incomplete information games). This paper has used the four equilibrium concepts to position the seminal work in Game Theory, to revisit the game theoretical work in International Business and to suggest a future research agenda for Game Theory in International Business. The paper dealt with the criticism often put forward when Game Theory is concerned. It rebutted the general misconceptions and criticism by showing the advantages and strengths from renowned scholars in the field of Game Theory, industrial organization, evolutionary economics, strategic management and International Business itself. IB scholars have used Game Theory to show strategic and cultural interactions in MNEs, IJVs, between MNEs and governments which emphasized the applicability to IB problems. Game Theory has not found its support in a wider circle due to some misconceptions which this paper has hoped to dispel. A future research agenda put forward by IB scholars was combined with a game theoretical treatment of a signaling game of MNE–subsidiary relationships in which signaling is an important factor to achieve an optimal solution. The propositions of the models are analyzed in pooling and separating equilibria which have as an important finding that the international experience of the players is a relevant signal for the stability in an MNE. The analysis focused on a factor which has been so far not very much theoretically explored. There would be a lot of potential for empirical investigations into the strategic HQ–subsidiary relationships when it comes to self-interest and cooperation. The propositions show that the signals of the subsidiary sent to the HQ can lead to either a pooling or separating equilibrium when the host player has an interest to pretend to be either a different (lying) type or the true type. The HQ can develop incentive schemes which are a response to the signal. The design of incentive schemes in IB is here considered as dependent on international experience which is important for an MNE. One limitation of the paper is that we have based our model on a hypothetical problem derived from the IB research agendas. An empirical test, however, would be outside of the scope of the paper. Future research could actually use data and analyze it on an abstract game theoretical level, but also apply the game theoretical and contractual insights of an abstract model to data collected in International Business settings. Game Theory offers many useful concepts to apply to the wealth of empirical data in the laboratory of International Business. Our contribution is to point to future research which combines a game theoretical analysis with empirical investigations to benefit from a mixed methods approach and to come up with a rigorous treatment of problems in International Business. International Business would clearly benefit from a game theoretical perspective on issues of pressing current relevance. Problems of strategic interactions, co-operation and conflict between countries, MNEs, HQs and subsidiaries as well as individuals of different cultural backgrounds, are all multi-person decision-making scenarios ideally suited for the application of Game Theory. The uncertainties in International Business can be dealt with via incomplete information games and evolutionary issues can be dealt with via dynamic games. In order to fully benefit from the strong theoretical tool that is Game Theory, the field of International Business would need to accept Game Theory's approach towards the role of reasoning and to modeling interaction between multiple parties, cultures, organizational and knowledge levels. To return to Camerer (1991) and his call, two decades ago, for an engagement by Strategic Management scholars with Game Theory, it is worth noting that Game Theory has now become well-established in Strategic Management. This field of management is now much stronger for this development. It might therefore be that International Business would similarly benefit from a more consistent treatment of strategic interactions between the global players in International Business.