سیر تکاملی مدیریت عملیات
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|7888||2007||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12410 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Operations Management, Volume 25, Issue 2, March 2007, Pages 219–238
This Special Issue of the Journal of Operations Management consists of 16 articles by 26 authors covering Operations Managements (OM) topics and issues from the 16th century to the 21st with predictions for the future. While it does not pretend to be comprehensive, it is representative of the types of subjects of inquiry through out this historical period in what could be considered OM. This introduction attempts to put the papers in context, and concludes with comments about what might be considered fundamental concepts which, taken as a set, can be seen as the foundations of Operations Management today.
The spark underlying the idea for this Special Issue of the Journal of Operations Management was the 30th Anniversary Meeting of the Operations Management Division of the Academy of Management in 2002. Tom Choi, then OM Division Chair, and Ken Boyer, 2002 OM Division Program Chair, invited all past Division Chairs to attend this Meeting and participate in the Program. Fourteen of the Past Chairs came to Denver for the celebration and gave brief summaries of what was going on in the Division when they were Chairs. Most of the Chairs also participated in the Doctoral Consortium, continuing the tales of past issues, arguments, programs, enthusiasms and poker games. It became clear that many of these anecdotes, stories and even important intellectual themes – “HMMS” and the “MRP Crusade” in particular – were unknown to our Doctoral Students and junior Faculty. Even the not-so-distant past was disappearing into the mists of time. Morgan Swink, 2003 OM Division Program Chair, agreed to offer a Session in the 2003 Meeting focused on the history of the field. Chris Voss, Kate Blackmon and I gave a session at that meeting on “The Evolution of the Field of OM”, which was very well attended. Rob Handfield, then Editor of the Journal of Operations Management, was there. After the session, we talked and the result was my agreeing to serve as Guest Editor for a Special Issue of the JOM on the Evolution of the Field of OM. The following paragraphs are taken from the Call for Papers for this Special Issue: “The field of Operations Management has experienced substantial change – with the occasional identity crisis – since its establishment within manufacturing in the 19th century. Professional organizations which have helped nourish the development of our field are celebrating anniversaries of their establishment, inadvertently marking a change occasioned by retirements of well-known authors and researchers as a “next generation” assumes leadership of these organizations and begins to move on to authorship of best-selling texts. We run the risk of losing valuable lore and information about our roots without a record of people and events who laid the foundations of our field. This special issue of the Journal of Operations Management (JOM) is intended to bring together a unique combination of historical reports and analyses about important events, turning points, shifts in focus and intellectual developments which have brought us to the field as we know it today. It will also include biographical information about significant players in the evolution of Operations Management … Given the nature of the information and analyses, which are being sought, it is expected that unfamiliar methodologies will necessarily be included. The tools of the historian, even the skills of the essayist, may be more appropriate for this particular Special Issue. It is not likely that our typical methodologies – survey research, hypothesis testing, causal models, etc. – would be appropriate.” The 16 articles, which follow have been reviewed and, in most cases, revised several times with substantial help from the Reviewers. This is not a surprise given the “unfamiliar methodologies” required for this Special Issue. Colleagues who reviewed/refereed papers for this Special Issue deserve special commendation for their work which, as predicted, required the “tools of the historian, even the skills of the essayist” for the Reviewers as well as the Authors. I am deeply grateful for the help provided by: Tom Callarman, Arizona State University and China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) Tom Choi, Arizona State University Chris Craighead, Auburn University Ed Davis, The Darden School, University of Virginia Tom Hoffman, University of Minnesota Bob Jacobs, Indiana University Rob Klassen, Western Ontario University Paul Kleindorfer, University of Pennsylvania Sam Mantel, University of Cincinnati Jack Meredith, Wake Forest University Tim Smunt, Wake Forest University Marty Starr, Rollins College Tom Vollmann, IMD, Switzerland There were other Reviewers as well: many authors sent their work to colleagues for review before submitting them for the Special Issue and also did this during revisions. The organization of these papers is roughly chronologic, from the 16th century, ending with a prognosis. The Industrial Revolution, and the works of Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford are mentioned here but not emphasized: this is territory already relatively well documented, including within our own journals—see, for example, Abernathy and Corcoran (1983) in the third volume of the JOM.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Tracing the evolution of the field of Operations Management is like trying to hack a simple path with time-travel through an intriguing and complex landscape. This attempt features a set of 16 articles about specific topics and times, providing reminders and insights about who knew what when. It certainly cannot tell the whole story of the evolution. Barely alluded to or missing completely are such issues as our origins in mechanical engineering and the story of the beginnings of Industrial Engineering, Forrester's Systems Dynamics, the Quality Movement, linkages with Management Information Systems, the role of our professional associations other than APICS, relationships with Marketing particularly Industrial Marketing … the list is never-ending—enough for several Special Issues and/or books. In summarizing this Special Issue, it is possible to find consistent themes which reappear from time to time, often barely disguised. We seem to forget what we knew when something presumably new appears. It might be helpful to remind ourselves of a few principles which appear to be standing the tests of time. 8.1. Persistent themes: (a) facts as the basis of action There are a few persistent themes from history, which are worth remembering. First, here are brief descriptions of the work of some of our predecessors—most, but not all, included in this Special Issue of the JOM: 1556 Georgius Agricola—“documentation and codification”: “Agricola led the way in developing knowledge based not just on learning by doing, but by scientific and empirical research and the challenging of existing wisdom … Through careful documentation and codification of his knowledge he was able to let others, both academics and practitioners, share his research for 450 years.” (Voss, 2007) 1835 Charles Babbage—“systematic analysis”: “Where Babbage's claim is strongest however is in presenting a ‘systematic analysis’ derived from pragmatic and industrially relevant but conceptually robust insights … [he] explicitly argued that ‘efforts for the improvement of … manufactures … with the greatest probability of success, must arise from the combined exertions of all those most skilled in the theory, as well as the practice.” (Babbage, 1835, p. 379)” (Lewis, 2007) 1880s Fred Harvey and the Harvey Houses—standardized operations A precisely-specified set of activities went into full swing as soon as a Harvey House received a wire or whistle signal from an approaching train … Harvey's emphasis on consistency and standard operations predates by more than a quarter century the 1911 publication of Taylor's The Principles of Scientific Management.” (Brown and Hyer, 2007) 1890s Frederick W. Taylor and Carl Barth—experiments in work and metallurgy “… this presumably astonishing scientific truth merely added a patina of arithmetical legitimacy to common sense: people need to rest, and the harder they work the more rest they need … specifically, Barth's ‘law of heavy laboring’ proposed that … a first-class workman can only be under load 43 percent of the day … [and] must be entirely free from load during 57 percent … as the load becomes lighter, the percentage of the day under which the man can remain under load increases.” (Kanigel, 1997, p. 332) 1991 Frederick W. Taylor—Principles of Scientific Management and Shop Management “The conclusions embodied in Dr. Taylor's ‘Shop Management’ constitute in effect the foundations of a new science—‘The Science of Industrial Management’ … Taylor has demonstrated conclusively that … it is essential to segregate planning of the work from its execution; to employ for the former trained experts possessing the right mental equipment, and for the latter men having the right physical equipment for their respective tasks and being receptive of expert guidance in their performance.” (Taylor, 1911, pp. 9–10—from the Foreword by Henry R. Towne, Past President of the ASME and President of the Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company) 1926 Henry Ford—Today and Tomorrow “It is not easy to get away from tradition. That is why all our new operations are always directed by men who have had no previous knowledge of the subject and therefore have not had a chance to get on really familiar terms with the impossible … no operation is ever directed by a technician, for always he knows far too many things that can’t be done. Our invariable reply to ‘It can’t be done” is, “Go do it.” (Ford, 2003/1926, p. 48) 1930s Walter Shewhart—Statistical Process Control “The long-range contribution of statistics depends not so much upon getting a lot of highly trained statisticians into industry as it does in creating a statistically minded generation of physicists, chemists, engineers and others who will in any way have a hand in developing and directing the production processes of tomorrow.” (W.A. Shewart, edited by W.E. Deming, from “Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control”, p. 49, The Graduate School, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1939—cited in Grant, 1946, p. 3) 1940s William Gomberg—A Trade Union Analysis of Time Study “It is now eight years since the first edition of A Trade Union Analysis of Time Study appeared. Statistical methods of treating time study data had received no application up to that time. Any attempt to think of the time study problem as a statistical problem of sampling was contemptuously dismissed as numerical nonsense. Labor's right to participate in the process of rate setting remained to be finally established. Since the publication of the original edition of the manuscript, many new scholars have appeared to defend and implement the application of statistical methods to time study … the report of the Society for the Advancement of Management rating project itself is couched in statistical terms. Although many of us may take issue with its conclusions and methodology, it is nevertheless significant that the authors of the report were careful to point out that there were alternative methods of treating the data they collated statistically. This in itself is tribute enough to the new pervasive influence of statistical methodology in time study.” (Gomberg, 1955: From the Foreword to Second Edition, pp. ix–x) There is a constant theme: the systematic collection and analysis of data, using “science” to inform decision-making. Or, as Drucker would put it, the application of knowledge to machines and human work. From Taylor's point of view, this would include the application of science or knowledge to management as well. It was not until 1971 that this occurred: 1971 Henry Mintzberg—“Managerial work: Analysis from observation” “The progress of management science is dependent on our understanding of the manager's working processes. A review of the literature indicates that this understanding is superficial at best … The management scientist has done little to change this. HE has been unable to understand work which has never been adequately described, and he has poor access to the manager's information, most of which is never documented. We must describe managerial work more precisely, and we must model the manager as a programmed system. Only then shall we be able to make a science of management.” (Mintzberg, 1971, p. B-97) Mintzberg's Management Science article and subsequent classic Harvard Business Review article – “The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact” – (Mintzberg, 1975) were based on his doctoral dissertation at the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T. His thesis committee was chaired by Professor Donald C. Carroll, then Chair of the School's Production Management Department. Our history is characterized by a bias towards data collection and analysis, and by experimentation or – to borrow a phrase from China's Supreme Leader Deng Xiaoping – a tendency to Seek Truth from Facts. The focus of our efforts has traditionally been applications of science to improve our understanding of humans and their machines—preferably in realistic organizational settings. Examination of our current journals, however, would find little evidence of new insights of the caliber and impact of these earlier contributions. 8.2. Persistent themes: (b) systems and their peculiarities A more recent theme has involved attempts to understand systems. Again some examples, this time from an engineer, an operations researcher and a “management type”. 1961 Jay W. Forrester—Industrial Dynamics “Industrial dynamics is a way of studying the behavior of industrial systems to show how policies, decisions, structure, and delays are interrelated to influence growth and stability. It integrates the separate functional areas of management—marketing, investment, research, personnel, production, and accounting. Each of these functions is reduced to a common basis by recognizing that any economic or corporate activity consists of flows of money, orders, materials, personnel, and capital equipment. These five flows are integrated by an information network. Industrial dynamics recognizes the critical importance of this information network in giving the system its own dynamic characteristics …” (Forrester, 1961, p. vii) “evidence of the bias of much of today's management science toward the mathematical rather than the managerial motivation is seen in a preoccupation with ‘optimum” solutions. For most of the great management problems, mathematical models fall far short of being able to find the ‘best’ solution …” (Forrester, 1961, p. 3) Until now much of management education and practice has dealt only with components. Accounting, production, marketing, finance, human relations, and economics have been taught and practiced as if they were separate, unrelated subjects … In management as in engineering, we can expect that the interconnections and interactions between the components of the system will often be more important than the separate components themselves.” (Forrester, 1961, p. 6) “The experimental approach should take the place of observation alone. Mathematical models should incorporate all the factors that our judgment tells us are essential to the solution of the problem at hand. No longer should we limit our attention to oversimplified analysis simply to achieve analytical solutions. We should abandon the question for optimum solutions in the interest of attacking significant problems. More is to be gained by improving areas or major opportunity than by optimizing areas of minor importance.” (Forrester, 1961, p. 361) 1963 Martin K. Starr—Systems and optimum “Before the Ming Dynasty I was writing things about systems’ optimum's prevailing over clusters of local optimums. I did a thing with NASA for my Product Design book with Prentice Hall's Engineering Series in 1963 that explained why early USA efforts to match Sputnik were failing. Every part was being optimized and the bird would not fly. But when we agreed to optimums the whole system, U.S. shuttles began to fly. This appeared in my first production book: This equation means that the optimum of the system taken as a whole is equal to or greater than the sum of the optimums of the individual subsystems that comprise the whole system.” (Starr, 2006 and Starr, 1963) 1969 Wickham Skinner—Manufacturing Strategy “… the cases were mostly Fortune magazine articles—authentic and in the national view. The [students] were fascinated: how could such great companies get into such trouble? … suddenly it all began to come together. I saw that the companies had gotten into trouble because experienced production executives had applied their hard-earned wisdom and conventional premises of their profession to reach fundamental manufacturing policy decisions that were just plain wrong. They did not work …” (Skinner, 2007) “How could manufacturing managers go wrong by applying conventional premises of industrial management developed and improved over a century? … The equipment may have been chosen for high-volume production, the plant capacity set for low investment, the production control system to handle small lot-sizes, the wage system to minimize turnover, etc. Every system pulled its own way and the plants, run by separate conventional industrial management concepts were not outstanding at anything, so were not able to compete … Put this all together and the bad results were so bad that they became strategic, setting the company back competitively—in markets, in financial results, in the stock market. And the causes were poor manufacturing policies—those expensive, long-term structural decisions with massive and pervasive on-going consequences … Top management should manage manufacturing by making sure that those manufacturing policies were tight. ‘Right’ would be when the manufacturing function worked. And what made it ‘work’? It worked when the whole thing fit and supported or created corporate strategy.” (Skinner, 2007) We have three authors with varied backgrounds and different vocabularies with the same insight into the workings of systems—all in the same decade. There is also a mythic tale from the early days of World War I, which makes the same point: Early fighter aircraft pilots shot handguns at one another, leaning out of an open cockpit. This evolved quickly into a two-seater with a gunner sitting behind the pilot who manned a machine gun aimed at the enemy. The design objective became a machine gun mounted on the front of the plane, which could be fired by the solo pilot as he flew at his enemy. The problem was the propeller: a gun mounted conveniently for firing shot off the propeller. An engine/propeller manufacturer and a machine gun manufacturer were commissioned separately to solve the problem. Each arrived at the aerodrome, installed each set of gear onto the waiting aircraft and turned everything on. The machine guns neatly cut off the propeller. The Air Marshal in charge is reported to have shouted at the two teams, “You get in that hangar and do not come out until the damned thing works!” Many days later, the bedraggled teams pushed a working model onto the runway. Neither the gun nor the engine was “optimal” but the system worked. Work in the field of supply chain management must grapple with this fundamental truth on a regular basis. “Optimizing the supply chain” means convincing elements within that system to accept local suboptimums for the good of the whole, while too often being measured as if they were not so constrained. As Skinner explains, a corporate strategy cobbled together from “optimal” subsystems (the brightest ideas from finance, marketing and operations) does not work. The mathematics may be there but the resulting behavior may not be as expected. Without question, systems issues are with us for the long haul: remembering some basics might help. 8.3. Our legacy and our future We know what our predecessors accomplished. What is the current state of the art in the arenas with which Operations Management is identified? In 2006, Pfeffer and Sutton introduced evidence-based management, which is derived from work in Canada called evidence-based medicine: “A bold new way of thinking has taken the medical establishment by storm in the past decade: the idea that decisions in medical care should be based on the latest and best knowledge of what actually works … [This is defined] as ‘the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.’ If all this sounds laughable to you – after all, what else besides evidence would guide medical decisions – then you are woefully naïve about how doctors have traditionally plied their trade. Yes, the research is out there … Unfortunately, physicians don’t use much of it. Recent studies show that only about 15% of their decisions are evidence based … The same behavior holds true for managers looking to cure their organizational ills. Indeed, we would argue, managers are actually much more ignorant than doctors about which prescriptions are reliable—and they’re less eager to find out.“ (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006, pp. 63–64) “Evidence-based management” has a familiar ring to it, bringing back an objective, which would be familiar to Babbage, Taylor, Barth, and the Gilbreths, for example, and probably also to those members of Harvard's Production Area like Elton May who conducted the famous Hawthorne experiments in the mid-1920s. Applications of science would not help if the results are not then used to guide action. Why is the evidence not heeded? Pfeffer and Sutton's Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths, and Total Nonsense (2006) was developed as a result of experiences following the publication of their earlier (1999) The Knowing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into Action. The research question behind the 1999 work was “Why do so much education and training, management consulting, and business research and so many books and articles produce so little change in what managers and organizations actually do?” (p. 1) A brief summary of their conclusions then: “We found no simple answers to the knowing-doing dilemma. Given the importance of the knowing-doing problem, if such simple answers existed, they would already have been implemented. And the rare firms that are able to consistently translate knowledge into action would not enjoy the substantial competitive advantages that they now do … one of the most important insights from our research is that knowledge that is actually implemented is much more likely to be acquired from learning by doing than from learning by reading, listening, or even thinking … One of our main recommendations is to engage more frequently in thoughtful action. Spend less time just contemplating and talking about organizational problems. Taking action will generate experience from which you can learn.” (Pfeffer and Sutton, 1999, pp. 5–6) Meanwhile, there is evidence that the responses of business schools to the 1959 Carnegie and Ford Foundations’ reports may have gone overboard—perhaps contributing to the problems Pfeffer and Sutton describe. Writing in the Harvard Business Review in 2005, Professors Warren G. Bennis and James O’Toole detail their judgments on “How Business Schools Lost Their Way”: “The actual cause of today's crisis in management education … can be traced to a dramatic shift in the culture of business schools. During the past several decades, many leading B schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate – and ultimately self-defeating – model of academic excellence. Instead of measuring themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their faculties understand important drivers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research … Some of the research produced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actually business practices, the focus of graduate business education has become increasingly circumscribed—and less and less relevant to practitioners. This scientific model, as we call it, is predicated on the faulty assumption that business is an academic discipline like chemistry or geology. In fact, business is a profession, akin to medicine and the law, and business schools are professional schools—or should be … In our view, no curricular reforms will work until the scientific model is replaced by a more appropriate model rooted in the special requirements of a profession.” (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005, pp. 97–98). “The problem is not that business schools have embraced scientific rigor but that they have forsaken other forms of knowledge … As the late Sumantra Ghoshal wrote in a shrewd analysis of the problems with management education today, ‘The task is not one of delegitimizing existing approaches, but one of relegitimizing pluralism.”’ (Bennis and O’Toole, 2005, p. 104) The impact of these criticisms and recommendations should be of concern to us. Our legacy should place us in prime position for participation in reforms towards increased professionalism for business schools. Our early days were devoted to the development of scientific approaches to the problems of work and its management—the application of knowledge to humans and their machines. Too often today, scientific methods are increasingly applied to narrow sets of problems, many technical in nature. The prospect of real experimentation – implementation in organizations – is unlikely to be considered, much less attempted. Are we walking away from our roots in the messy domain of the management of people and the technologies with which they now interact? Consider the evolution of the name of our field: Scientific Management: in Taylor's days Factory Management: overlapping and extending from Taylor's days Industrial Management: common in the 1930s Production Management: from World War II and beyond Operations Management: our most recent reincarnation. The constant seems to be Management. In many business schools, we may be the only remnant of this professional domain. Perhaps it is time to shift gears and move closer to the problems and issues surrounding the effective management of operations. This is a much messier domain but it looks like opportunity beckoning. 8.4. A personal note In 1959, I took a course in Work Simplification taught by Prof. Herb Goodwin in what was then MIT's Course XV—“The School of Industrial Management founded under a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Inc.” – its official title at the time. The course was “inspired by Lillian M. Gilbreth” who taught two of the classes. I still have my notes from this course. When “Business Process Reengineering” (BPR) first came along in the early 1990s, there was little detail available on exactly what one might do in the name of this enthusiasm. Under pressure from an ExecMBA class desperate to engage in this state of the art exercise, I handed out general instructions for BPR projects they could undertake within their own companies. Roaring success would be a gentle phrase: all projects resulted in savings ranging from modest to dramatic. At the end of the course, I had to confess: my handout was taken from my 1959 Work Simplification class notes. This included Lillian Gilbreth's famous motto, “The mind is like a parachute: it only works when it's open, and you can’t go back and get another one.” The ExecMBAs promised not to tell a soul about our secret source. Several have had occasion to use these “old” notes again. In the 1960s, I worked with my husband, Chris Sprague, on several projects in Physical Distribution Systems (PDS). Given the era, the clients never saw me—girls did not do stuff like that. Since then I have managed to slide from PDS to Logistics to, of course, Supply Chain Management (SCM). It seems that warehouses are still in common use, inventory clerks are still at work (doing what is not always clear), transportation is not as trouble-free as one might wish (particularly in less developed parts of the world), software does not always solve everything, and inventory accuracies are not as high as one might prefer. I still have my copy of Readings in Physical Distribution Management edited by Bowersox, Smykay and La Londe (1968). Not all of the current SCM texts provide such gritty detail, too often viewing the problem as amenable to solution at the strategic level through optimization. My experience suggests that new Operations Management concepts are more likely than not to be built on earlier work (which it helps to know about), or may in fact be straightforward repackaging of previous ideas and models. Teaching and learning only the most current enthusiasm without providing background and references does not necessarily guarantee success. Understanding some of the history of our business is well worth the effort. This Special Issue of the JOM has been prepared with the hope that those familiar with much of this material will enjoy seeing it again and that those not familiar with the materials will benefit from knowing the back stories behind some of today's problems and issues.