رویکردهای تحلیل ریسک و مدیریت ریسک اعمال شده در صنعت نفت و کاربرد آنها در مفاهیم IO
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|795||2010||10 صفحه PDF||29 صفحه WORD|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Safety Science, Volume 50, Issue 10, December 2012, Pages 2010–2019
1. مقدمه و چشم انداز
2. رویکردهای مرور
3.1. نظر سنجی در رابطه با تحلیل ریسک و مدیریت ریسک
جدول 1. مرور روش های تحلیلی ریسک و برای ریسک تصادف (روش های آینده نگر).
3.2. مطالعات مصاحبه ای در رابطه با تولید و ایجاد دانش و اطلاعات درباره ریسک و استفاده از روشهای تحلیل ریسک
4.1. نظر سنجی با بیانیه هایی در رابطه با تحلیل ریسک و مدیریت ریسک و نقشه بندی روشها.
4.2. مطالعه مصاحبه ای روی تولید دانش و اطلاعات برای تصمیم گیری در رابطه با ریسک
4.2.1. شیوه های تحلیل ریسک اغلب در پروژه های طراحی و اصلاح استفاده شده و در عملیات روزانه کاربردی ندارند.
4.2.2 ایجاد دانش ریسک در عملیات به وسیله روش های تحلیل ریسک رسمی انجام نمی گیرد
تصویر1. مروری از بهره گیری از شیوه های تحلیل ریسک در صنعت نفت و گاز و نروژ میان مخاطبانی در شرکت های عامل (اپراتور)، مهندسی و مراکز مشاوره (شمار =98). مخفف ها در جدول 1 ارایه شده اند.
جدول 2. درصد های بدست آمده از اینکه چه کسانی نبست به بیانیه های مختلف در رابطه با تحلیل ریسک و مدیریت ریسک در یک زمینه IO موافق، مخالف یا بی طرف بوده اند. (شمار =120) (کنودسن، 2010).
جدول3. مروری بر اینکه مخاطبان تا چه اندازه ای با بیانیه هایی ها در ارتباط با احتمال بهبود مدیریت ریسک با IO (شمار=120) (کنودسن، 2010).
4.2.3. نظرات مبهم در رابطه با تاثیرات IO روی تصویر ریسک
4.3. مطالعات مصاحبه ای در رابطه با استفاده از تحلیل ریسک در صنعت نفت و گاز و نروژ
4.3.1. شیوه های تحلیل ریسک در پروژه های طراحی و اصلاح بکار گرفته شده و در قوانین و دستورالعمل ها ملزم شمرده شده اند.
4.3.2. تمرکز محدود روی فاکتورهای سازمانی و انسانی در شیوه های تحلیل ریسک به کار گرفته شده
4.3.3. هیچ تغییری ناشی IO در شیوه های بکار رفته وجود نداشته، با وجود اینکه عوامل تاثیرگذار روی ریسک تصادفات عمده شناسایی شده اند.
5.1. ایجاد دانش برای ضبط یک توصیر ریسک تغییر یافته
5.2. چالش های قدیمی موجود در فاکتورهای سازمانی و انسانی می توانند توسط IO مضاعف شوند.
5.3. رویکردهای مبتنی بر انعطاف پذیری بکار رفته در تولید دانش برای تصمیم گیری روی ریسک
5.4. فرصت هایی برای بهبود فرایند مدیریت ریسک
6. نتیجه گیری
6.1. با توجه به IO جست و جو برای ورودی های دیگر برای تحلیل ریسک ضروری می باشد.
6.2. یافتن رویکردهای ارزیابی مناسب برای مشکلات سازمانی و انسانی
6.3. توسعه رویکردهای انعطاف پذیر برای ارزیابی ریسک عملیاتی
6.4. استفاده از IO برای بهبود فرایند مدیریت ریسک
Due to changes introduced by Integrated Operations (IO) it is possible that traditional risk analysis and risk management approaches in the oil and gas industry are also challenged. In this paper we study the impact on these approaches by asking two questions: (1) what methods for risk analysis are used in the Norwegian oil and gas industry? (2) What are the risk analysis and risk management challenges in an IO context from the perspective of actors in the Norwegian oil and gas industry? An explorative approach was chosen and the empirical findings are based on three separate studies: (1) a survey of risk analysis and risk management in different business sectors in the oil and gas industry; (2) qualitative interviews about the generation of knowledge for decisions that involve risk in an operating company; and (3) qualitative interviews of people working with risk analyses in different companies exploring their use of risk analysis methods. The four main results are: due to IO it is necessary to look for other inputs to risk analyses; establish suitable assessment approaches to human and organizational issues; develop resilience-based approaches for operational risk assessment; and, utilize IO to improve the risk management process.► We investigate how IO affect traditional risk management in the oil and gas industry. ► IO makes it is necessary to look for other inputs to risk analyses. ► Suitable assessment approaches to human and organisational issues are needed. ► Resilience based approaches should be developed for the operational phase. ► It is possible to utilize IO to improve the risk management process.
While there are several definitions of Integrated Operations (IO) they all more or less explain the concept in the same terms. The IO Centre (2011) explains IO as ‘the integration of people, work processes and technology to make smarter decisions and better execution. It is enabled by the use of ubiquitous real-time data, collaborative techniques and multiple expertises across disciplines, organizations and geographical locations’. Though IO now seems to be the established and most used denotation in Norway for this development, other names have also been used, e.g. Field of the Future (BP), Smart Fields (Shell), eOperations and eField. By implementing IO the industry aims to achieve extended operational lifetime, reduced costs and improved safety, production and recovery rates. IO however implies several changes compared to traditional operations where oil and gas production was almost totally managed by the platforms with little or no interaction with external parties. The boundaries of the system were easy to understand, as were the responsibility and management systems. With IO these boundaries are challenged and platform operation is no longer only a matter for the offshore organization. New information and communication technology (ICT), digital infrastructure and real-time data are being deployed to enable new work processes and the integration of processes and people offshore and onshore and between companies. Real-time data and information from offshore processes are thus made available and are used to monitor operations independent of geographical and organizational borders. In addition, IO also makes it possible to remotely operate and control some of the offshore systems and processes. The exchange of information over large distances without significant delay and use of high-quality collaboration technology connects different actors and increases access to expert knowledge. The changes due to IO will have both positive and negative impacts on major accident risk. Major accidents are those with more extensive consequences than occupational accidents. Sundet et al. (1990) define an accident as ‘major’ if one of the following criteria is fulfilled: at least five fatalities, material damage exceeding NOK 30 million or major environmental damage. The definition is in line with PSA (2011) which explains a major accident as ‘an acute incident, such as a major discharge/emission or a fire/explosion, which immediately or subsequently causes several serious injuries and/or loss of human life, serious harm to the environment and/or loss of substantial material assets’. Based on these definitions we can say that occupational accidents are less devastating in size and usually influence fewer people. The difference between a major accident and an occupational accident is not always clear. A major accident can also be an occupational accident with personnel injuries and fatalities to one or two people. Reason’s (1997) explanation of organizational and individual accidents is another good illustration of the two types of accidents. Organizational accidents have multiple causes involving many people operating at different levels of the organization, often with devastating effects on uninvolved populations, assets and the environment. In individual accidents, a specific person or group is often both the agent and the victim and while the consequences to the people concerned may be significant their spread is limited. Perrow (1984) offered a similar explanation by distinguishing between system accidents and component failure accidents. System accidents involve the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures which may result in devastating accidents, while component failure accidents involve one or more components that are linked in anticipated sequences. According to Skjerve et al. (2009) it is not expected that there will be essential differences in the potential hazards (oil/gas leakage, fire, explosion, collision, terror, etc.) due to IO, however there are changes in the factors leading to incidents and also the consequences of the incidents. Altogether the changes create new challenges as well as opportunities for risk analysis and risk management approaches. In this paper we study the impact IO has on these approaches by asking the following two research questions: (1) What methods for risk analysis are used in the Norwegian offshore oil and gas industry? (2) What are the risk analysis and risk management challenges in an IO context from the perspective of actors in the Norwegian oil and gas industry? The questions are approached by three separate studies, one survey and two interview studies. The paper starts by giving a general overview of risk analysis methods available (Section 2) as background information to the discussion. While Section 2 is general, the rest of the paper focuses on specific risk analysis and risk management approaches in the oil and gas industry and whether these are appropriate for IO. Section 3 describes the applied approach for each study and Section 4 summarizes the results from them separately. In Section 5 the results from the studies are collectively viewed and important findings discussed. The paper ends with the conclusions in Section 6. The paper is exploratory and the main scope is to present empirical data and results from the three studies. Thorough discussions of theoretical implications are not given. The paper is written within the RIO (Inter disciplinary Risk Assessment in Integrated Operations) project, sponsored by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (www.ptil.no), the IO Centre at NTNU (http://www.ntnu.no/iocenter) and the PETROMAKS programme at the Research Council of Norway (www.forskningsradet.no/petromaks).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The most used risk analysis methods in the Nowegian oil and gas industry are all found in regulations and standards, i.e. QRA, FMEA/FMECA, FTA, ETA, HAZOP, HAZID and JSA. These methods (except SJA) are mostly used in design and modification projects and focus mainly on technological conditions. IO has not changed the practice for using these methods; the same methods are chosen, they include the same input factors and are used in the same situations as before. The findings in this paper indicate that this is an inadequate situation and the following recommendations are given to meet them: 6.1. Due to IO it is necessary to look for other inputs to risk analyses There have been few changes to risk analysis methods used and factors considered in these methods following the introduction of IO. Our data material however point out important factors in IO that can impact major accident risk. While it is not certain that IO will call for changed or new risk analysis methods, the results illustrate that other input factors must be considered. The diversity in opinions about how IO will impact major accident risk indicate that sense making and the generation of new knowledge are necessary, i.e. what are the new/changed objects, incidents, hazards, causes and consequences? 6.2. Find suitable assessment approaches to human and organizational issues To be able to handle risk related to IO there is a need to strengthen current risk analysis methods regarding human and organizational aspects. While there is a strong tendency in the industry to focus on technical design issues (also after the introduction of IO) most of the IO factors identified to impact major accident risk were related human and organizational issues. It is therefore reasonable to believe that human and organizational factors are not adequately covered. Identifying such factors and finding good ways of addressing them is therefore necessary. 6.3. Develop resilience-based approaches for operational risk assessment Most risk analysis methods are performed in design and modification projects and are often not useful for people in the sharp end of daily operation. In this phase very different approaches are used to generate knowledge for decision making on risk, e.g. formal procedures, plant specific knowledge and informal processes without use of systematic risk analysis methods. The results show that risk assessments in daily work build on resilience-based approaches emphasizing monitoring, anticipating, responding and learning. Adapting risk assessment approaches to IO therefore implies building on these approaches, and not just adapting formal risk analysis methods. 6.4. Utilize IO to improve the risk management process IO gives both organizational and technological opportunities to improve the risk management process: improving follow up of risk analyses in daily work; more active use of risk assessments in daily planning; closer contact between risk analysts and installation competence; and, utilization of technological solutions in risk analyses. Some of the organizational opportunities were mentioned as already implemented. However there may still be positive effects to draw from these opportunities. In order to get more insight in the risk analysis and risk management challenges emphasized in this paper more research is recommended in a number of areas including the following. First, identify typical IO input factors to risk analyses and assess suitable methods for these factors, especially for human and organizational issues. Second, fieldwork in a few companies to investigate whether factors identified as leading to incidents match with IO factors, either generally identified IO factors or by execution a hazard analysis for the companies studied. Third, fieldwork in a few companies to see how IO has impacted the processes in the generation of knowledge of risk in the operational phase. Finally, study and identify approaches supporting resilience-based risk assessment in operational work in an IO environment. Although the paper has studied the oil and gas industry the results may also be of some relevance for other industries working with similar technologies, i.e. use of new ICT and real-time data, advanced collaboration facilities with removal of geographical boundaries and cross discipline/organizational/company working. Examples of such industries are telemedicine, traffic-actuated control, and electricity and gas supply. The results may also be of relevance for industries with limited use of risk analysis methods in daily operation and where risk analysis methods mainly consider technological conditions.