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|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|79524||2003||25 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 44, Issue 2, August 2003, Pages 286–310
Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct expectations about the other players' behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates the robustness of this interpretation when there are small costs associated with complicated forecasts. The model consists of a two-person strategic game in which each player chooses a finite machine to implement a strategy in an infinitely repeated 2×2 game with discounting. I analyze the model using a solution concept called Nash Equilibrium with Stable Forecasts (ESF). My main results concern the structure of equilibrium machine pairs. They provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the form of equilibrium strategies and plays. In contrast to the “folk theorem,” these structural properties place severe restrictions on the set of equilibrium paths and payoffs. For example, only sequences of the one-shot Nash equilibrium can be generated by any ESF of the repeated game of chicken.