پویایی تصادفی بدون رابط و تعادل نش
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|79545||2006||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 57, Issue 2, November 2006, Pages 286–303
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence of play (the period-by-period behavior as well as the long-run frequency) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot stage game, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random experimentation some recall, or memory, is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.