میزان افشای اداره شرکت و عوامل مؤثر بر آن در یک بازار در حال توسعه: مطالعه موردی کشور مصر
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|81||2012||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9470 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Advances in Accounting, Volume 28, Issue 1, June 2012, Pages 168–178
This paper assesses the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance (CG) attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director ownership, blockholder ownership and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. The findings indicate that that—ceteris paribus—the extent of CG disclosure is (1) lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm size. The results of the study support theoretical arguments that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information. The empirical evidence from this study enhances the understanding of the corporate governance disclosure environment in Egypt as one of the emerging markets in the Middle East.
This paper focuses on one part of the reform process in Egypt—the development of the regulatory framework commencing in the late 1990s to improve corporate governance (CG) practices. Specifically, it is argued, if such practices follow international norms they can mitigate the financial problems of developing nations that include: weak and illiquid stock markets, economic uncertainties, weak investor protection, and frequent government intervention, (Ahunwan, 2002, Gugler et al., 2003, Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002, Reed, 2002 and Tsamenyi et al., 2007); poor performance, and high levels of ownership concentration (Ahunwan, 2002, Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002 and Tsamenyi et al., 2007); and state ownership of companies, weak legal and judiciary systems, weak institutions, and limited human resources capabilities (Mensah, 2002 and Young et al., 2008). However, de jure reform does not necessarily translate into reform of actual practice, and although many researchers have examined corporate governance in developed nations, much less academic study has been made of developing and emerging nations. This is an important omission for a number of reasons. Firstly, globalization, international trade, and international investment practices are creating significant pressures towards the development of corporate governance in these nations (Reed, 2002). Secondly, developing and emerging countries have tended to mimic the practices of developed nations, despite evidence, for example from Rabelo and Vasconcelos (2002), of the presence of differences between the factors giving rise to the need for corporate governance in developing nations and those in developed nations. Thirdly, there are structural variations, such as the dominance of government ownership and/or family/close held companies that render the implementation of Western style corporate governance both of questionable value and troublesome (Mensah, 2002). Fourthly, developing and emerging nations are not homogeneous. Specifically, there are major differences between the emerging countries of Eastern European and China, as there are between countries in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (Euromoney, 2007 and Fawzy, 2004). Finally, while there may be increasing convergence among national and international corporate governance codes, there is also significant deviation in terms of disclosure practices and content of disclosure between countries (Bhuiyan & Biswas, 2007). The paper investigates the determinants of corporate governance voluntary disclosures in Egypt. It contributes to disclosure and governance literature by studying corporate governance disclosure practice in a developing country, which is distinguished from most developed nations by four important characteristics (Fawzy, 2004). Firstly, most companies are closely held, secondly there is considerable state ownership of privatized companies, thirdly that board independence is weak and finally disclosure is not a common practice. While Bremer and Ellias (2007) note that Egyptian businesses are starting to appreciate the need for corporate governance mechanisms, they argue that together with Fawzy's four characteristics, weakness in the economic structure, and lack of awareness of corporate governance concepts and benefits, hinder the development of corporate governance in Egypt. Thus the results of this research may be useful for regulators in developing and emerging nations with similar characteristics as they continue to deliberate appropriate corporate governance requirements in their own nations. In an Egyptian context, Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 2011) found that corporate governance mechanisms affect the Egyptian companies’ general print-based annual reports voluntary disclosures. They found lower directors ownership, lower blockholder ownership, higher independent directors, and audit committee existence are more properly to monitor the manager's decision to report more voluntary information. Investigating the determinants of corporate governance disclosures in the 2005 annual reports of the top thirty Egyptian-listed companies’ (EGX 30), Samaha (2010) found that board independence is positively associated with corporate governance disclosures. This paper extends the work done by Samaha (2010) as follows: firstly, it provides a more recent investigation (year 2009) to help assess developments in corporate governance disclosure. Secondly, it offers a comparative analysis with two international reports on corporate governance disclosure scores conducted by the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Thirdly, the sample companies involve the EGX 70 constitutes along with the EGX 30 constitutes and thus enhancing the generalizability of the empirical results, along with. Finally, this paper introduces a more comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms including board size and duality in positions that—to the best of the authors’ knowledge—have been not tested before in an Egyptian context in relation to corporate governance disclosure. Our descriptive findings relating to the extent of corporate governance disclosure for 2009 are relatively lower than those reported by Samaha (2010) for a sample of Egyptian firms in 2005, although during this period from 2005 to 2009, many regulation changes have taken place in Egypt such as the formation of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA), and the update of the CG code. All these changes aim to enhance CG disclosure and transparency in general; however our paper suggests that CG disclosure by listed Egyptian firms is almost negligible.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The association between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure has been examined over the last few years. However, limited studies examine the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms affect firms’ decisions to voluntarily report corporate governance information in their annual reports. This paper extends and contributes to recent governance and disclosure literature (i.e. Samaha, 2010) by offering empirical evidence on the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables on corporate governance voluntary disclosure for a large sample of most and less actively traded companies in Egypt, as an example of an emerging economy. In terms of overall disclosure practice, we find that there are generally low levels of disclosure, except for the items which represent mandatory disclosure as required by Egyptian Accounting Standards. It is interesting to note that in total 41 of the 53 items in the checklist are mandatory because of EGX listing requirements (UNCTAD, 2007), but that levels of disclosure are low on many of the items which EGX requires but EAS does not. This does suggest that enforcement of EGX rules requires tightening. Our descriptive findings on the extent of CG disclosure relating to the year 2009 are relatively similar to Samaha (2010) for a sample of listed Egyptian companies in 2005. The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to the socio-economic factors in Egypt. Given the present unbalanced political situation, prevalent corruption, deteriorating law and order situation and the influence of the social elite, non-compliance to the legal requirements often go unpunished encouraging more non-compliance. Furthermore, this may imply that the learning curve is very slow in developing countries compared to developed countries. In the absence of independent verification, the credibility of CG information disclosed is questionable. To sum up, the reasons for this phenomenon may be attributed to the lack of statutory CG disclosure requirements, less CG awareness, an underdeveloped corporate culture and the relatively new stock market which was activated in the mid 1990s. In light of the above, it is expected that firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. Regarding the determinants of corporate governance disclosures, we find that—ceteris paribus—the extent of CG disclosure of Egyptian-listed companies: (1) is lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and the firm size. By disaggregating total CG disclosure into the 4 UNCTAD components, we are able to also specify the components of CG impacted by various determinants. This paper is also subject to a number of limitations. First, we are mainly testing hypotheses on the potential incentives of disclosure on corporate governance that are particularly well grounded in uses of governance in developed countries, but less so in developing environments. In particular, our hypotheses are mainly relating to agency and information asymmetry problems stemming from the relationship between the firm and its external financiers (shareholders or debtholders). A worthwhile avenue for future research could be to test additional hypotheses of the demand for corporate governance disclosure originating from other stakeholders than just shareholders or debtholders. Second, our analysis is limited to a sample of Egyptian companies. However, we believe that the same hypotheses are worth testing outside Egypt, and that it is reasonable to expect a higher level of corporate governance disclosure in other countries with better investor protection and with more developed capital markets. Despite the limitations, the results of the study support theoretical arguments that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs stemming from the separation between ownership and control, and to improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information. It is interesting to consider the costs and benefits of the reform processes that Egypt and other countries are implementing. While the ECGC recommends that actively traded companies should have an audit committee and exploit the knowledge of independent board members, the findings of this study indicate that only three of these new provisions to enhance corporate governance (blockholder ownership; independent directors; role duality) are statistically significant in explaining CG disclosure in Egyptian annual reports. However, this study shows that audit committees’ role in Egypt does not comply with the fundamentals of agency theory and that this CG supervisory tool has little role in improved financial disclosure. That is the benefit of audit committees is unclear. This would be an interesting idea for further research. In addition, it would be interesting to examine the stock market reaction to the aggregated and different types of corporate governance disclosures.