قراردادهای زنجیره تامین تحت تقاضا و اختلالات هزینه ای با اطلاعات نامتقارن
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|817||2012||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9870 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Production Economics, Volume 139, Issue 1, September 2012, Pages 116–126
We study the risk management strategies in supplier chain when the disruptions of demand and cost are the private information. We use linear contract menus to analyze the supply chain under demand and cost disruptions with asymmetric information. We derive out the optimal contract for the supplier and show the impact of asymmetric disruption information on the performance of the supplier, the retailer and the supply chain. Further, we find out that the effects of demand and cost disruption may interact with each other while the production plan does not change in some cases. The optimal production quantity with asymmetric information is not greater than that with symmetric information. The information value for all members is not monotone in all parameters. Each change will induce that the supplier revises his strategy when the supply chain members trade off the cost of deviation and asymmetric information.
Today, firms are operating in a global environment. Both academicians and practitioners realize that the disruptions in supply chains become one of the most important supply chain risks (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). As the economic integration and globalization is deepening, the unexpected changes of market demands and production costs are more common as never before. Therefore, suppliers may have to adjust the production plans before selling seasons. For example, economic policies adjustment, transportation delays or natural disasters can change the demand or cost of the products to some extent, which further influences the suppliers’ original production plans. As a result, a significant negative impact on business performance may occur if disruption risk does not be managed properly. Usually, supply chains can hardly recover from these disruptions in a short period (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a and Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b). In order to attain high level performance, the companies should ensure that their supply chains are robust enough to deal with the demand and supply uncertainties. Some new models have been set up to study how to handle the disruption risk in supply chains (Qi et al., 2004 and Xu et al., 2006). The existing models assume that supply chain partners have symmetric information so that supply chains can react to disruption risk in a coordinated way. However, the disruption information is more likely to be asymmetric between supply chain members in practice. Although some powerful manufacturers such as IBM and HP can get sales data from retailers so that they can design their production plans very well in their supply chains (Lee and Whang, 2000). In most situations, however, supply chain members cannot obtain precise demand information from the retailers. That is to say, the demand information is often known by retailers but not by manufacturers or wholesalers. In addition, global outsourcing has been very popular for original equipment manufacturers (OEMS), such as Nike and Dell. They can focus more on their core operation and exploit the economies of scale and flexibility in this way (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003). In this case, designing appropriate compensation plans for outsourcing products can be very challenging for OEMS, although the intense competition can help in disclosing the production cost. An important reason is that the production cost disruption may be their contract manufacturers’ private information. This paper investigates the interaction between disruption risk management and asymmetric information in a one-supplier and one-retailer supply chain. Our primary interest in this paper is to understand how disruption information asymmetry may affect supply chain players’ behavior as well as the performance of the supply chain in this process. We try to shed light on the following three important questions: (i) How to revise the production plan when the demand and cost are disrupted simultaneously? (ii) How does the optimal production quantity change under disruption with information asymmetry? (iii) How does asymmetric disruption information influence the profit of the supply chain, the supplier and the retailer? We use the principal-agent model and the linear price contracts to address above problems. The agent has full information about disruption and the principal does not know exactly the disruption information. The principal has monopoly power over the agent. The contracts are designed by the principal and offered to the agent as a take-it or leave-it offer. The agent accepts the contracts if and only if his expected profit/utility is greater than or equal to his reservation profit/utility. In the presence of asymmetric disruption information, we show how to optimize the production plan and the corresponding change of the channel members’ profits. In our model, the asymmetric information of demand and cost happens at the same time. That is to say, the supplier does not know the market demand while the retailer does not know the production cost exactly too. However, the supplier and the retailer make decision successively as the principal-agent model stated above. With private information of demand or cost, the principal makes decision before the agent, and the agent has the only right to choose to accept one of the contract menus or reject all of them. Thus the agent makes decision based on his reservation profit/utility instead of his profit. Therefore, the agent needs not to consider the principal's private information when he makes decision. That is to say, the private information of the principal can be seen as symmetric between them. So the information asymmetry of demand and cost does not appear in our model at the same time. If the principal and the agent make decision at the same time, they play the static game or the bargaining game. Our analysis does not include these two types of games. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related the literature. In Section 3, we present the optimal contracts when the supplier is the principal. Section 4 analyzes the impact of the information asymmetry of demand disruption on the channel, the supplier and the retailer. Section 5 investigates the case that the retailer is the principal. Section 6 provides conclusions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Disruption is a very important source of supply chain risks. We present the risk management strategies including adjustment of production plan and product pricing in supply chains to manage the disruption risk effectively. We also investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the disruption management in supply chains. In particular, we try to find the optimal incentive scheme for the supply chain members to share the disruption information. Furthermore, we show how the profit of the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain can be influenced by asymmetric information. Under asymmetric disruption information, the supplier can keep the original production plan in some cases. In most cases, however, the existence of the asymmetric information distorts the supplier's production plan, which may further cause the performance loss of the supply chain. We also find that the value of information is not monotonic. Every change of the information value reflects the change of the supply chain members’ strategic decision under the asymmetric disruption information. These results are interesting for two reasons. First, they are very close to the cases we often observe in practice and provide alternatives to the results of Qi et al. (2004) and Xu et al. (2006) who showed the demand and cost disruption management in supply chains, respectively. Second, in few cases, the supply chain can avoid profit loss even though the disruption information is asymmetric. Our findings suggest that with appropriate contracts, firms can deal with the disruption risk across the real life supply chains better. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, many Chinese manufacturers went bankrupt because they did not have enough information about the big demand disruptions in US and European countries. They stuck to the original production plans which made according to the American and European customers’ orders placed before the crisis. As a result, many of the products they produced could not find buyers when the financial crisis hit the market heavily in 2008. If they could design the appropriate contracts such as presented in this paper and offered to their customers, they might get the real market demand information in advance and adjust their production plans or prices to react to the disruptions more effectively. In this paper, we focus on a linear wholesale price contract menu. Some other contract menus as mentioned in Cachon (2003) are also widely used in supply chains. It is left for future research whether our main conclusion can remain valid under these contract menus. In this paper, we assume the relationship between demand and price is linear and the marginal cost is constant. It would be meaningful to extend the study for other kinds of demand and cost functions. Another important direction for future research is to consider a supply chain with multiple suppliers or retailers under asymmetric information.