شکست دولت، سرمایه اجتماعی و تناسب مدل نیوزیلند برای اصلاحات در بخش عمومی در کشورهای در حال توسعه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|8190||2001||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12646 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : World Development, Volume 29, Issue 2, February 2001, Pages 245–263
The policy problems posed by a lack of state capacity in developing societies now attract the attention of a growing number of scholars. Both the government failure paradigm, with its “top-down” emphasis, and the social capital theory, with its stress on “bottom-up” approaches, provide analytical frameworks that can be used to comprehend the symptoms of state incapacity reported by the much broader literature on policy implementation. This paper seeks to determine the implications of the government failure and social capital models for policy implementation. More specifically, the paper considers the contractualist approach to public management reform in New Zealand as the epitome of a top-down solution to government failure. It will also evaluate this model from a social capital perspective and suggest ways in which a balanced approach to public sector reform can take into account elements of both paradigms.
The burgeoning literature that deals with the political economy of policy reform has been recently surveyed by Rodrik (1996). The point of departure for this survey is the observation that what is remarkable about current fashions in economic development policy (as applied to both developing and transitional economies) is the extent of convergence that has developed on the broad outlines of what constitutes an appropriate economic strategy (p. 9). This strategy includes the now familiar components of (a) “liberalization”—microeconomic reforms designed to open and free up markets and reduce and rationalize the role of the state in the economy; and (b) “stabilization”—macroeconomic policies designed to reduce debt and control inflation. Rodrik's claim that the so-called Washington consensus (Williamson, 1994) on the appropriateness of this strategy now enjoys general acceptance may, of course, be disputed. It does, however, indicate that the focus of the policy reform literature has shifted from an almost exclusive concern with the technical aspects of this strategy to an increasing interest in exploring the reasons for the observed unevenness in its implementation. The question of state capacity in developing and transitional societies now enjoys significant scrutiny in the literature (Migdal, 1988). Grindle has summarized the evolution of thought on state capacity as follows: In recent years, considerable scholarly attention focused on the state as political scientists, economists, and political economists debated its definition, assessed its strength and relative autonomy from groups and interests in national and international arenas, and discussed the role it should play in development. Inevitably, these discussions, along with heightened concern about the causes and consequences of economic and political crisis, fostered questions about state capacity; considerable evidence accumulated during the 1980s to suggest that states varied widely in their ability to set the terms for economic and political interactions and to carry out the functions assigned to them. The notion of state capacity, long assumed to be an inherent characteristic of “state-ness,” became more frequently a matter of theoretical concern and empirical assessment (Grindle, 1996, p. 4). Several interesting avenues of inquiry have emerged. For example, some scholars have created useful taxonomies for the analysis of state incapacity (Grindle, 1996). By contrast, others have sought to develop indexes of public sector capacity (Polidano, 2000). Various commentators have advanced strategies for the enhancement of state capacity (Betancourt, 1997). Rather more pessimistically, alternatives to state capacity, such as international intervention or even “trusteeship,” have been advocated (Langford, 1999). The present paper focuses on the policy problems posed by the lack of state capacity for policy implementation and examines two important analytical frameworks which can guide reform initiatives. The 1997 World Bank Development Report identifies two generic approaches. First, policy-makers can attempt to “match the state's role to its existing capability, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public resource use ” (World Bank, 1997, p. 25). A useful way of conceptualizing the degree to which the state should intervene in any given society is to view the potential functions government can fullfil in terms of Figure 1, which is outlined in the Report. Figure 1 delineates three basic levels at which the state can intervene, depending on its institutional capacity. “Minimal functions,” such as the provision of law and order and disaster relief, must be provided by all states, even those with very low state capacity. The alternative is the total disintegration of the nation state, with all its attendant misery. Chhibber (1997, p. 17) has forcefully underscored this point: It is true that state-sponsored development has failed. But the agonies of collapsed states such as Liberia and Somalia demonstrate all too clearly the consequences of statelessness. Good government is not a luxury but a vital necessity, without which there can be no development, economic or social.“Intermediate functions” such as public education and the provision of social welfare services, must also be provided by governments. In contrast to its minimal function role, however, the methods used to provide intermediate functions can vary, depending on the level of state capacity. That is, in the case of these intermediate functions, government provision can be separated from government production. The World Bank Development Report (World Bank, 1997, p. 27) has described the role of government in the provision of intermediate functions as follows: “Here, too, the government cannot choose whether, but only how best to intervene, and government can work in partnership with markets and civil society to ensure that these public goods are provided.” Finally, “activist functions,” such as intervention to stimulate new markets and generate increased coordination between existing markets, should only be undertaken by countries with a highly sophisticated state capacity, usually OECD countries. It seems clear that in many developing countries state incapacity is so endemic as to preclude even the adequate delivery of “minimal functions,” let alone any more complex operations. Indeed, even some transitional middle-income developing countries, such as South Africa, may lack these capacities. See, for instance, the Ncholo Report (1997) and Maphai Report (1998). Serious consideration therefore needs to be given to the second recommendation of the World Bank Development Report, which is that policy-makers should seek ways of enhancing “state capacity by reinvigorating public institutions” (p. 3). This requires an underlying conceptual framework that can be used to formulate public management reforms “from a broad, systemwide perspective that focuses on the causes, not the symptoms, of dysfunctionality” (Bale & Dale, 1998, p. 113). Recent developments in economic theory suggest two frameworks that can be used for this purpose. First, many of the symptoms of state incapacity can be attributed to the various types of “government failure” identified in that stream of economic theory which, since the early 1970s, has made great strides in developing a “private interest” perspective on policy-making. While these theories did not predict the global wave of so-called New Public Management (NPM) reforms that have been implemented in the last decade or so, they certainly influenced their design (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991 and Hood, 1994). Nowhere has this been more evident than in New Zealand where economic theories of government failure have been packaged together to produce “an analytically driven NPM movement of unusual coherence” (Hood, 1991, p. 6). International interest in the contractual solutions the New Zealand reformers have devised to correct problems of government failure has been considerable.1 There is, however, a growing concern among its officials that the logic of contractualism may have been pushed beyond the point at which it starts to damage the “social capital” its public agencies need to draw on, if they are to forge collaborative links with other agencies and community groups in ameliorating the range of interrelated social problems that have been exacerbated by more than a decade of structural change and economic reform (Robinson, 1997; Boston & Dalziel, 1998). Second, the relationship between social capital and the effectiveness of government was highlighted in a 20-year study of regional governments in Italy by Putnam (1993). This study has spawned an impressive volume of literature in economics and political science that moved beyond the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of social capital toward a framework that analyses how it can be produced and reproduced as an important institutional factor accounting for variations, not just in the quality of government, but also in economic growth performance (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997). Both government failure and social capital theories provide analytical frameworks that can be used to comprehend the symptoms of state incapacity reported in the much broader literature on policy implementation. Since the seminal work by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), there has been a voluminous literature that has sought to determine the factors that explain variations across programs and governmental units in the extent to which the objectives of public policies have been achieved. Sabatier's (1986) distinction between the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research is particularly relevant in the present context, since a top-down perspective would seem to lead to a focus on government failure while a bottom-up approach would highlight many of the concerns that have been raised in the social capital literature. This paper accordingly relates the central themes of government failure and social capital theory to these perspectives on policy implementation. The paper goes on to consider the contractualist approach to public management reform in New Zealand as the epitome of a top-down solution to government failure. It will then also evaluate this model from a social capital perspective and suggest ways in which a balanced approach to public management reform that takes into account both perspectives can be undertaken in developing countries. The paper is comprised of six main sections. Section 2 examines the top-down perspective on policy implementation offered by the government failure literature. By contrast, Section 3 focuses on the bottom-up approach derived from the social capital paradigm. Both perspectives are then related to the institutional, technical, administrative and political dimensions of state capacity in Section 4. A critical evaluation of the New Zealand model of contractualist governance that takes into account its impact on administrative and institutional capacity is provided in Section 5. A social capital perspective on the effect New Zealand-style reforms might have on technical and political capacity is discussed in Section 6. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in Section 7.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper has essentially argued that while the New Zealand model may offer a coherent and comprehensive package of contractual solutions to pervasive problems of government failure, the logic of its hard-edged contractualism may hinder the development of the social capital required to enhance the state's capacity in areas where a bottom-up approach to policy implementation is required. What other models, then, can reformers draw on to enhance administrative capacity in developing countries? Peters (1996) suggests that in addition to the “market model for reforming government” which has been followed in New Zealand, there are, at least, four other distinct visions of governance: the “old time religion” of PPA; and newer models of the “participatory state”; “flexible government” and “deregulated government.” We would suggest that an appropriate strategy of administrative reform in developing countries should combine a mix of “old” and “new.” We would endorse Schick's view that “significant progress can be made through a logical sequence of steps that diminish the scope of informality while building managerial capacity, confidence and experience” (1998, p. 129). There would still seem to be considerable scope in developing countries to fill in the gaps of the type of rule-based system of external controls that is associated with PPA. As Schick has observed: Politicians and officials must concentrate on the basic process of public management. They must be able to control inputs before they are called upon to control outputs; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account for cost; they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to make their own rules; they must operate in integrated, centralized departments before being authorized to go it alone in autonomous agencies (Schick, 1996, p. 130). In those areas where these basics have been mastered, there may be scope to shift from systems of external to internal control so that managers can be given broader discretion as the focus shifts from “ex ante control to ex post audit, from control of individual actions to control within a broad band, from reviewing specific actions to reviewing systems” (Schick, 1998, p. 131). Within a system of internal control there would seem to be scope for both New Zealand style contractualism and a social capital-based style of catalytic, participatory governance. The relative appropriateness of the two models would depend on whether conditions favor the application of a top-down or bottom-up approach to enhancing implementation capacity. In those policy areas where policy formation, funding and service delivery can be undertaken by separate agencies operating within a vertical line of accountability, a top-down, contractualist approach may strengthen accountability and reduce the scope for agency failure. But in those areas where multiple agencies, community groups and nongovernment organizations need to work together to solve common problems, the development of networks of civil engagement bound together by trust and reciprocity should be a priority. To play a catalytic role in forming these networks, government officials do not just need to have a reputation for financial probity. They also need to exercise democratic leadership skills to bring isolated, conflicting groups together in a way that fosters social cohesion.