|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|82847||2018||33 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11602 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 57, March 2018, Pages 114-146
Previous research into law and corporate social responsibility mostly assumes that the vertical structure of production is exogenous. Here, we allow a brand to choose between vertical integration and outsourcing. With outsourcing, the brand avoids some liability and responsibility, but loses direct control over the producerâs infringement of law or code of conduct. Infringement increases with production, so the brand tailors production to guide the producerâs infringement. The elasticity of demand for the product affects the degree to which, under outsourcing, the brand will increase production to induce the producer to reduce cost through infringement. If the demand is sufficiently elastic relative to the social harm caused by infringement, the optimal policy is to reduce avoidance such that the brand chooses vertical integration. However, if the demand is sufficiently inelastic relative to the social harm, then the optimal policy is to increase avoidance such that the brand chooses outsourcing.