|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|84069||2018||38 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11544 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 55, May 2018, Pages 98-110
This paper contributes to the recently growing literature by examining the effects of different labour unionisation structures on innovation. Using a Cournot duopoly setup, we investigate the effects of centralised and decentralised labour unions on product innovation. We show that if the products are symmetrically differentiated, the incentive for innovation is higher under decentralised labour unions, whereas the innovation incentive can be higher under a centralised labour union if the products are asymmetrically differentiated. Our results show that social welfare is strictly higher under decentralised unions compared to a centralised union.