|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|84817||2018||57 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||13317 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Computers & Industrial Engineering, Volume 118, April 2018, Pages 291-308
This paper considers the cooperative promotion in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two competing retailers. In particular, the promotion efforts of retailers have a positive impact on their demands, but a negative impact on the manufacturerâs brand image. Meanwhile, we allow both myopic and far-sighted strategic behaviors of retailers. Three strategic models, i.e., two far-sighted retailers (FF), one far-sighted retailer and one myopic retailer (MF/FM) and two myopic retailers (MM), are analyzed by differential game and the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of three models are derived via HJB equation. The finding is that the manufacturer as well as the supply chain always prefers the retailer with same strategic behaviors, despite the fact that retailers do not always stick to the same behaviors. We further extend our model into the scenario of asymmetric retailers.