سیستم های اقتصادی بازار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|8597||2005||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 33, Issue 1, March 2005, Pages 25–46
The new comparative economics focuses on individual institutions rather than considering the economic system as an entity. In this essay we argue that economic systems should be defined in terms of clusters of complementary or covarying institutions. A cluster analysis of OECD countries, using data on forty different economic institutions, shows that four economic systems can be used to characterize these countries in 1990. These systems had no significant impact on economic growth or inflation, but they did have an important influence on the distribution of income. An analysis of systemic change suggests that, up to 1990, the differences between economic systems became greater with economic development, while the differences between countries with the same economic system became less. Journal of Comparative Economics33 (1) (2005) 25–46.
As a result of reforms initiated in the mid-1980s, there has been a sea change on how agricultural export commodities are marketed and financed in many African countries. The reforms have had profound ramifications for the roles of the government and the private sector, and hence for all the institutions related to agriculture. Generally, market reforms are intended to boost an economy’s efficiency—that is, to enhance the productivity of human talents and physical assets. In turn, these improvements in efficiency are expected to generate growth that improves the lives of many and especially the poor. In practice, reform has meant relying more heavily on markets to direct how resources are used and to direct future investments. In the context of this paper, the term market reform refers to steps taken toward opening domestic and export markets to competition and toward putting in place public and private institutions consistent with and supportive of private markets. For commodity markets, market reform has meant reducing government involvement in marketing and in production, increasing participation of the private sector in these activities and reducing distortions in commodity prices—especially producer prices. Measures implemented to achieve these goals have varied but often they included elimination or privatization of government marketing agencies, the introduction of competition in marketing, the elimination of administered prices, reduction in explicit and implicit taxes, and the privatization of government-owned assets. Events triggering commodity market reforms were not independent of broader political and economic changes in most countries and the consequences of reform are often linked as well. However, issues related to the approaches and effects of general and agricultural market reforms have been discussed elsewhere and receive minimal treatment here. Instead, our purpose is to discuss reform in the specific context of cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar markets, and to provide lessons by selectively drawing on African cross-country experiences in those markets.1 A central theme of this paper is that commodity markets warrant special attention for several reasons. First, commodities play an important role in many developing countries, especially in Africa. Reforms and the process of reform of commodity markets can affect communities and sometimes economies in significant ways. Conversely, it was the fiscal consequences of a sharp commodity price decline in the 1980s and the early 1990s that triggered economy-wide reforms in many African countries. Second, these markets illustrate well how special features—based in part on the production characteristics of the commodities and in part on historic developments—can affect the reform process and illustrate the importance of taking initial conditions into account when designing reform. Third, experience from commodity markets also illustrates how long-standing interventions like marketing boards and the public ownership of processing facilities can crowd out markets and institutions that support private initiative. Lessons on how private markets and policymakers cope with missing markets and institutions are noteworthy. Finally, close examination of reform at the commodity level illustrates the practical ways that changes in marketing systems often lead to a diffusion of political power as market participants take part in setting industry rules, standards, and policy. This is significant, since it provides commodity sector participants greater autonomy to adapt to future events. The commodities chosen for analysis in this paper are cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar. We focus on these commodities because of their importance for African countries. As for the country coverage, the paper focuses exclusively on Africa because (i) it is the region that depends most on primary commodities as sources of export revenues and employment; (ii) significant market reform for the four commodities has occurred in this region in recent years; and (iii) it is where development effort is most needed because of its low income levels and weak physical and institutional infrastructure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief and general description of the types of prevalent market interventions and the motivation for those interventions prior to recent reforms. Section 3 discusses what prompted recent reforms. Section 4 examines the consequences of reform. Section 5 points out the scope and likely success of commodity market reform and discusses important lessons for managing the reform process. Section 6 concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
During most of the 20th century, countries established development policy frameworks characterized by intervention in primary commodity markets. While the instruments of intervention varied among countries and among crops, a dominant architecture arose based on a marketing-board single channel for exports and imports; state ownership of processing centers such as cotton gins and sugar mills; administered domestic prices, normally spatially invariant and often invariant within a crop season. At the same time, international institutions took up the task of finding collective instruments to stabilize prices and reverse declining terms of trade. The interventions were encouraged by the prevailing policy recommendations of development economists and development institutions. Gradually, as the prescribed policies generated their own problems and produced limited success, economists and policymakers turned increasingly toward market-based approaches. This advice took on institutional form as the World Bank and other organizations began a series of structural adjustment loans and credits. At the same time, steady productivity gains in agriculture, transport and communications eroded the efficacy of intervention instruments International commodity agreements failed and most parastatal agencies were financially strained. A series of political and economic events triggered a rapid series of reforms. The consequences and pace of reform varied among commodities and among countries. For the most part, existing policies taxed commodity exports and reform brought producers—primarily smallholders—a greater share of traded value of their crop. In other instances, removing export obstacles simply revealed additional constraints that limited gains, including institutional weaknesses related to earlier regimes. In a few cases associated with sugar market reforms, tariffs rose rather than fell in order to promote privatization, benefiting domestic producers at the expense of domestic consumers. Country experiences indicate that the pace and sequencing of reforms is dependent on both the nature of the intervention and the expected consequences—economic and political—of reform. As a result, policymakers need to understand key initial conditions in markets and in public and private institutions as well as their potential contribution. Experiences examined in this paper suggest that the factors impeding and prompting market reform are as likely to be political as economic. Hence, one main consequence of the reforms has been a shift of financial and political power from the government to the private sector. This creates a new dependence on private sector participants. It also requires public organizations to abandon some tasks, but also to take others on board. Even where market reforms have been successful, there are continuing issues facing the agricultural commodity subsectors as well as new ones that emerge related to reform, but also arising from evolving market conditions. Market reform is an important first step because it allows markets to respond dynamically to a wide range of changing conditions, but reforms do not guarantee growth nor address related social needs. Addressing these continuing and emerging issues is a challenge for the developing community at large. These issues include those related to continued commitment of decision-makers, weak or missing factor markets—especially for credit and insurance, research and extension, price information and volatility, producers’ organizations, distortions in international markets, and weak social and physical infrastructure.