کنترل مدیریت در فعالیت های اقتصادی مشترک بخش دولتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|9020||2011||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||16940 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Management Accounting Research, Volume 22, Issue 4, December 2011, Pages 330–348
Cooperation among public sector organizations (PSOs) is increasingly important in the management of resources in welfare systems. A Joint Venture (JV) is an organization form that enables PSOs to cooperate with each other in order to achieve economies of scale. However, JVs contain interrelated horizontal and vertical control relationships (between the owners and between the owners and the JV Company) that complicate their control. The first aim of this paper is to map the dynamics in vertical and horizontal control packages in municipal JVs and to describe the relational factors that affect them. Based on three case studies we conclude that vertical control packages are affected by: goodwill trust and competence trust; parent differences in management style and size in combination with control competence; parent diversification (low relatedness between the JV's activity and the parents’ other activities); and the horizontal control package (e.g., rules for parent interaction and distribution of work). Horizontal control packages are affected by: goodwill trust, system trust and calculative trust; parent differences in size; and efforts to achieve equality. The second aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on the relationship between trust and control. We observed that trust is potentially unaffected by the introduction of formal controls. We also found that trust has an inverted “crowding out” effect on control. A high ambition to maintain trust leads to underdeveloped formal controls. In addition, we found that the ambition to preserve trust may inhibit the realisation of economies of scale.
Recently there has been increased interest in research on control across organization boundaries. This interest is a consequence of closer relationships between organizations – for example, Joint Ventures (JV), long-term outsourcing relationships, licensing agreements and franchising arrangements (Håkansson and Lind, 2004) – and of influential researchers’ calls for investigation into the governance of these new relationships (Hopwood, 1996 and Otley, 1994). In this paper we focus on municipal JVs. A JV is an organization form used by two or more organizations (parents or owners) to gain access to new capabilities, customers and resources, to reduce risk and to exploit economies of scale (Groot and Merchant, 2000 and Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Here our interest is municipal JV Companies (joint-stock) that are created to achieve economies of scale. Even though inter-organizational relationships in the public sector setting are as common as those in the private sector, there is less research on them (Samuel et al., 2009). Increasingly, in many countries public and private organizations, in collaboration with two or more public authorities, provide welfare services, not least at the municipal level (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). In this environment, a new management control problem arises when municipalities have to develop ways to control the behaviour of other organizations. At present, public administration and public accounting researchers generally focus on inter-organization relationships such as outsourcing and Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Moll and Humphrey, 2007). The lack of interest in JVs is somewhat surprising since JVs, with their interrelated horizontal and vertical control relationships, increase the complexity in the inter-organizational setting. Both these relationships may create problems as a consequence of cooperation/appropriation and coordination challenges (Caglio and Ditillo, 2008 and Dekker, 2004). For instance, parents must develop safeguards against exploitation by other parents (horizontal appropriation concerns), align the JV Company's behaviour with their own interests (vertical appropriation and coordination concerns), and coordinate the JV control process among the parents (horizontal coordination concerns) (Groot and Merchant, 2000 and Chalos and O’Connor, 2004). One way to deal with these challenges is to develop control packages – one for the horizontal, flat relationship between the parents and one for the vertical, hierarchical relationship between the parents and the JV Company (cf. Groot and Merchant, 2000 and Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). While other researchers have studied the transactional, relational and institutional factors that influence the design of these JV control packages, they have not conceptually and empirically separated the vertical controls from the horizontal controls. Consequently, there is insufficient knowledge on how the design of horizontal and vertical control packages fulfils the ambitions associated with JVs. Furthermore, few studies explicitly focus on relational factors or provide adequate information about control package design in municipal JVs where the aim is to exploit economies of scale. These aspects are developed in our study of control packages used in municipal JVs. In addition, this paper increases our understanding of the dynamic and multifaceted interaction between control and trust. There are studies on control in inter-organizational settings that note the various relationships between control and trust. Yet, because the results of these studies conflict, and therefore are somewhat inconclusive, there have been many calls for further research (Dekker, 2004, Emsley and Kidon, 2007, Free, 2008, Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007, Langfield-Smith, 2008, van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008, van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2006 and Vélez et al., 2008). Some studies on trust and control suggest there is an inverted relationship between them (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) while other studies argue that the relationship may be more complex. For instance, Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) argue that while exaggerated control may have a “crowding out” effect on trust, control may also be a trust-enhancing device – through information sharing (Dekker, 2004 and Tomkins, 2001) and through monitoring (Vélez et al., 2008). Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) call for increased emphasis on the interaction between trust and control and for less focus on an either/or relationship. In the spirit of Tomkins (2001), van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006) foresee interesting theorizing on the dynamic interaction between trust and control over time (see also Dekker, 2004). Our aim in this paper is to map the dynamics in vertical and horizontal control packages in municipal JVs and to investigate the relational factors that affect them. In so doing, we also contribute to the discussion on the relationship between trust and control in inter-organizational relationships. The paper is structured as follows. We next develop a theoretical framework for our research by explaining the core concepts used, the factors expected to influence JV controls, and the relationship between trust and control. Thereafter we present the paper's method and empirical material, followed by a discussion of our findings. In the final section we draw conclusions and offer suggestions for future research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Our first aim in this paper is to map the dynamics in vertical and horizontal control packages in municipal JVs and to investigate the relational factors that affect them. Based on our three case studies of municipal JVs in the waste disposal business, all of which were founded to exploit economies of scale, we conclude that four relational factors affect vertical control packages. A higher degree of vertical goodwill and competence trust reduces the need for broad and tight action controls, and (inversely) a reduction in vertical goodwill trust may result in broader and tighter action control and results control. Broader results control and action control (although not necessarily more tightly used) may be caused by parent differences in size (in combination with control competence) and in management style. Parent diversification, that is, a limited relationship between the JV's activity and the parents’ other activities, leads to narrow and loose control since it increases information asymmetry, reduces the need for coordination, and dilutes parents’ attention (especially if the activity is politically uninteresting). Also, a well-designed horizontal control package (e.g., rules for parent interaction and the distribution of work) leads to proactive controls and a readiness to impose new formal controls in the vertical dimension. Regarding the horizontal control packages, we conclude that the existence of goodwill trust, system trust and calculative trust limit control to fairly narrow and loose action control. We also conclude that parent differences in size make it easier to develop structures for parent interaction and social control, and that equality of treatment among the parents may drive horizontal action control. Our second aim in this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the relationship between trust and control in inter-organizational relationships. In our case studies, we observed that over time goodwill trust and competence trust made action control narrower and looser and that diminished trust was followed by broader and tighter action control and results control. We found many instances where new, formal control did not destroy trust. This conclusion supports the theoretical view that new, formal controls may be implemented without damage to established trust, that is, without signalling distrust. Furthermore, we observed an inverted “crowding out” effect of trust on control (i.e., the high ambition to maintain trust may lead to underdeveloped formal controls). Trust appears to lead to loose and narrow control that perhaps is suitable for the present situation but insufficient for future contingencies. This may be because trust inhibits consideration of the need for control and because control is thought to endanger goodwill trust. Well-designed horizontal controls make it easier to deal with emerging control gaps in vertical relationships. In addition, we found that the ambition to preserve trust may inhibit the realisation of economies of scale. JV Companies that value autonomy and manage their activities to preserve vertical and horizontal trust may not take advantage of economically justified opportunities. This strategy contradicts the very reason for the creation of municipal JVs. An important generalization of this study is that the relationship between control and trust is multifaceted. However, this generalization (as well as the interrelations presented above) should be regarded as tentative due to the nature of case study research. While we offer some insights about how control processes create or impair trust, we call for additional studies in this area. We conclude that formal control is not a homogenous factor that influences trust. We need to pay attention to the different processes and techniques of control. In general, research needs to acknowledge the potential of control as a positive force in coordination and as an indication of trust. Furthermore, our choice of case studies narrows our findings to the situation of fairly homogeneous parents. Future research may determine if vertical and horizontal control packages for heterogeneous parents are broader and tighter