دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 9034
عنوان فارسی مقاله

ارائه راه حل های یکپارچه در بخش دولتی: تناقض غیرمتمرکز

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
9034 2012 13 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید 11950 کلمه
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عنوان انگلیسی
Delivering integrated solutions in the public sector: The unbundling paradox
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 41, Issue 6, August 2012, Pages 995–1007

کلمات کلیدی
- بسته بندی - راه حل های یکپارچه - راه حل های سفارشی - تغییر و تحول سازمانی - مطالعات موردی طولی -
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پیش نمایش مقاله ارائه راه حل های یکپارچه در بخش دولتی: تناقض غیرمتمرکز

چکیده انگلیسی

The paper analyzes changes in suppliers' organizational structures to deliver integrated solutions by examining the bundling across different project phases with a focus on realizing risk transfer and through-life innovation. A multiple, longitudinal case study method is used to examine changes in integrated solution provision in Public Private Partnerships over a 15-year period. The study deploys rich data sets by combining 108 government reports with 38 interviews. Findings examine organizational transformation and suggest that as a response to the need to be competitive the solutions provider ‘unbundles’ the bundle of integrated solutions by creating sub-units to handle distinct phases. The paper questions whether bundling the different management and procurement phases of a major project into one contract is appropriate. Managers must weigh the transactional cost savings of dealing with a prime contractor against not only the transactional costs of dealing with distinct contractors for individual phases, but also the comparative ability of the two options to deliver.

مقدمه انگلیسی

Public and private organizations are moving from selling or acquiring products to selling or acquiring complex, long-term integrated solutions consisting of bundles of interrelated goods and services (Davies et al., 2007 and Galbraith, 2002). In response to a shortage of public funding, governments around the world have increasingly deployed Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as the principal method for delivering public sector capital asset projects and associated services, aiming for the realization of performance benefits and innovation via customized integrated solutions (Zheng, Roehrich, & Lewis, 2008). This development towards integrated solution provision in the public sector, initially stimulated by market deregulations, offers unique opportunities and challenges to the capabilities of solution providers (Cova & Salle, 2007). One of these challenges being the solutions provider working with its customer to co-create value though customized solutions (Davies, 2004). Central to the PPP concept is that the private sector will trade high ex ante capital investments costs and associated risks in return for a long-term and relatively stable income stream. The public sector benefits from facilities that would not otherwise have been created. If much of the literature takes a private sector and provider perspective on integrated solutions, the public sector is a good context for investigating the corollary of how customized solutions are managed by the customer. A starting point is suggested by Storbacka's (2011) empirical work that indicates that successful solution providers have the ability to balance between the need for customization and the need for standardization. It can be inferred that successful management of integrated solution provision by a public sector customer will also involve optimizing this balance between customization and standardization as appropriate to the resources of the project. In bundling together various needs (e.g. design, build, operate and upgrade as appropriate) the management of this dynamic has to cut across various typically distinct project phases to optimize value. In large scale PPPs normal contractual risks compound over time. To offset the risk involved in embedding a prime contractor for 30 years, the public client expects innovation and effective management of through-life costs or to apply Storbacka's approach to the customer, an interplay between customization and standardization dynamically through the life of the project. A key challenge for the public sector then is to ensure there are appropriate levers in place to transfer an appropriate level of risk and to sustain innovation over the decades of a PPP project. In turn, the embedded solutions provider faces the challenge during the multi-decade lifecycle of having to deploy distinct and phase-specific internal processes, capabilities and even business models (Caldwell and Howard, 2010 and Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). Viewed from both a customer and provider perspective, it becomes imperative that both parties possess the advanced contractual skills required by the integrated solution over the decades of PPPs and that the agreement contains the mechanisms to align and sustain that commitment such as cost and revenue sharing. While extant literature has studied the complexity inherent in Public Private Partnership projects, limited attention has been paid to the resulting complexity extended contractual periods create for the private sector delivering integrated solutions. Such issues lend themselves to a process, as opposed to a snapshot in time based methodology, as most likely to uncover insight into such issues. The other driver for long-term contracts is the scale of investment required to service these complex needs and the scale and learning necessary for a new solutions provider to begin to improve upon existing processes and practices. The paper contributes through a relatively rare longitudinal perspective on the impact of long-term contracting for innovation and risk transfer on providers. The longitudinal research approach proved to be vital to investigate changes in the supplier's organizational structures and how the customer interacts to influence solution development over time. The study also contributes to our understanding of the emerging literature on public–private organizational change (Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009) and on the nature of long-term public–private interactions in integrated solutions provision. Thus, the overarching question this paper addresses is: what transformations in suppliers' organizational structures are required to deliver integrated solutions in long-term Public Private Partnerships? In addition, the research takes advantage of the longitudinal research approach to examine the corollary issue of the customer's management of customizing the solution over time, specifically addressing to what extent the public sector client is able to maintain the value of contracting for a bundle of goods and services from one provider across project phases. In terms of assessing the achievement of this value, as the construction of the hospital is now a given the focus in paper is on achieving contract value through the risk transfer and innovation elements as proxies for value. To answer these research questions, the study investigates the bundling of product/service offerings across different project phases in complex public-private relationships. The empirical element of the paper is informed by a longitudinal, multiple case study approach investigating PPPs. This approach enables generating rich qualitative and quantitative data sets (Yin, 2003) and studying processes unfolding over time, rather than merely seeking to illustrate cross-sectional variation (Van de Ven, 2007). The paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 locates the paper in the literature on product bundling, integrated customized solutions and organizational structures. Section 3 discusses the methodological considerations for the longitudinal, multiple case study approach. Section 4 then presents the empirical findings across the investigated cases. 5 and 6 discuss the findings of the research, present and elaborate on the development of integrated solutions in PPPs, and conclude by formulating implications for managers and future research.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

The paper reviewed the literature on customized integrated solutions provision and the public sector as client to develop an initial conceptual framework of public sector integrated solutions provision. Prior to solutions providers, the model had unique suppliers for each phase and created risk and innovation envelopes around each phase, thus value was mainly created by the contractor. The solutions provider model delivers though integrating functions into core activities; creating a customized solution through creating value delivery by individual teams responsible for separate project phases. The model is examined through longitudinal case studies of integrated PPP solution provisions in the UK health sector. This longitudinal perspective allows examination of how the integrated solution plays out over time, as a process (Storbacka, 2011 and Tuli et al., 2007), rather than as a discrete offering. Critically the solution provider model studied here extends over decades, during which time scale the value of the solutions bundle will change and for the customer tend to dissipate, as new practices, opportunities and innovations from early phases become part of the standard way of working. The solutions provider model has one supplier for all phases, all of the risk and innovation requirements are with that provider. This model assumes close cooperation and value co-creation between customer and provider, and for PPPs assumes that this high contact, high intensity ‘dialog’ can be sustained over decades. The bundling of services with construction and financing contributed significantly to the immaturity of the market for early UK PPP projects. Neither customer nor integrated solutions provider could draw on previous experiences. Theory suggests buyers value bundling in less mature markets where a solution simplifies choice; as a market matures buyers' premium should decline (see discussion in Spring & Araujo, 2009). This study uses a longitudinal approach to question the value of the interaction between customer and provider over time. The involvement of the operational customer in the form of the Trust and clinical staff peaks at the design phase, thereafter the customers' limited construction experience, the pressing needs of day-to-day healthcare provision and high turnover in personnel mitigate the customer's impact on subsequent phases. This research has reported on a paradox, PPP contracts call for an integrated solution which involves high customer involvement. However, in order to provide that customized integrated solution and manage the attendant risk transfer and innovation requirements, the chosen integrated solutions provider has to ‘disintegrate’ or unbundle itself to fulfill the contract. The public customer does not have the skill set and tenacity to follow this over the extended time frames of a PPP. In the investigated cases, the solutions provider unbundles the integrated solution by creating sub-units to manage distinct project phases. The paper raises major doubts over the value of bundling requirements across project phases in major infrastructure projects where the advantages of relationship management cannot be easily carried across infrastructure delivery phases. Absent such consideration, the public buyer is paying the additional price for bundling over that which could be obtained for a simpler turnkey project. It maybe that integrated solutions providers in PPP market are demonstrating competence at providing what were once uniquely public services. Recent market developments indicate that organizations offering services to UK government are diversifying into various facility and service provision activities. This diversification suggests such solutions providers have gained both credibility and capability at delivering a broad range of services. If, as many commentators suggest, governments worldwide will continue to expand the range of facilities and services that will be transferred from the public to private provision, a significant commercial opportunity exists. It may be that rather than developing operational competence as solutions providers, these leading providers are developing a meta-level solution capability through their ability to tender for, contract and deliver public services regardless of specific operational competencies. 6.1. Managerial implications This research study addresses the global trend for private sector involvement in major new public projects. When measured in decades not years, this research reports examples where the ability of the main contractor to act as an integrated solutions provider appears to be reduced leading to the unbundling paradox. The client does not have the resources and will (given pressing day-to-day concerns) to insist otherwise, becoming by default a reactive rather than proactive customer. This stands in stark contrast to the public sector's intention at a national level to receive an integrated solution rather than an ‘unbundled’ one. For managers of major projects such as PPPs, this paper addresses the decision on whether or not to bundle project phases such as bid/design, build and operate into a single contract in seeking to stimulate innovative solution delivery. In addition, in future PPP arrangements parties should install cost saving schemes that incentivize through-life issues rather than short-term behavior on both parties. These incentives in combination with revenue sharing schemes may further stimulate innovative responses from the solution provider and foster joint working initiatives. Instead of incentivizing short-term construction savings, incentives should encourage through-life issues taking into consideration the project lifecycle. Given a longitudinal perspective, solution provision can be examined in terms of how it evolves (Davies et al., 2006). The organization of the solution provider was seen to evolve through sub-division of tasks and the creation of a mobilization function. What is missing is customer understanding of how the solution bundle should evolve over time as the value of initial offerings lessens. A key finding and contribution is the need in multi-decade integrated solution contracts such as PPPs for the client to have a strategy for managing post contract the value of the solution bundle. For example, in the hospital construction cases presented here, the ongoing evolution of the clinical role and input to the solution should be spelt out in future contracts. In Hospital B, having an experienced NHS Trust project manager with previous hospital PPP experience undoubtedly improved the outcome. What is needed in addition though is institutionalizing the clinical role to ensure it remains engaged at a strategic level such as on issues like customizing the operations phase to include the option to downsize. Without some form of institutionalized clinical engagement the assumption in these cases that clinicians and nurses will be able to disengage from demanding front line roles to join a dialog about the future implications for integrated solution bundles appears naïve. The use of mobilization teams proved to be useful to counteract unbundling effects between the build and operate phase. Team consistency had also a positive effect on developing inter-personal relationships across client/contractor organizations' personnel, facilitating frequent information exchange. However, while the organization in the cases set up a mobilization team to facilitate the transition from the build to the operate phase, the study suggests that the positive effects of mobilization teams should be harnessed across all project phase transitions. A further improvement is suggested, in which managers consider deploying ‘integrated mobilization teams’ consisting of individuals from both client (including clinical input) and contractor. Such an approach would also signal shared investments in joint capabilities in the form of shared knowledge and experience across all project phases. Where the study found performance measures were fragmented across the phases and disparate teams, part of the challenge of an integrated mobilization team would be in establishing joint performance measures. Managers must weigh the transactional cost savings of dealing with a prime contractor against not just the transactional costs of dealing with distinct contractors for individual phases, but also the comparative ability of the two options to deliver. Based on our findings, transferring large amounts of risk whilst anticipating continual and non-incremental innovation may be unrealistic without robust mechanisms for ensuring customer involvement at each phase. Integrated solutions might be the optimal buyer's strategy in mature markets where risks and innovation expectations are lower and where solution providers are willing and able to deliver the customization inherent integrated solutions over time.

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