ثابت و یا انعطاف پذیری؟ رژیم نرخ ارز جایگزین در دوران تحرک سرمایه جهانی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|9050||2000||27 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 11, Issue 2, December 2000, Pages 173–189
This paper discusses the pros and cons of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes under perfect capital mobility from a European perspective. Special attention is given to the exchange rate policy problems of Iceland and Norway and to the linkages between their dependence on natural resources and their choice of exchange rate regime. The relevance of the advent of a common currency in Europe for the Western Hemisphere is also discussed.
It is not possible, and never has been, to claim superiority for either fixed or flexible exchange rates once and for all. Sometimes fixed rates work well, sometimes flexible. This is why some nations choose to fix the exchange rates of their currencies in various ways, and others do not. This makes perfect sense: the choice depends on time and circumstance. This paper examines some pertinent considerations.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Norway and Iceland’s exchange rate policy options in the years ahead need to be viewed in the context of the importance of natural resources to both countries. It is impossible to say, however, whether the two countries must straighten out their fisheries management regimes in order to further reduce their dependence on fish before settling the exchange rate question or the other way round. Perhaps the best strategy would be for them to try to do both at once: aim quickly for maximum efficiency and fairness and commensurate contraction of the manpower and capital devoted to fishing, thereby reducing the remaining obstacles to EU and EMU membership in both countries, and also aim for EU membership as soon as possible in the hope that Norway and Iceland could together help reform the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU enough to make it palatable for them, with efficiency and growth gains for all (Gylfason, 1998). For when you have two choices, try to take them both, if possible.