مقایسه فرآیندهای شناختی و اجتماعی در طوفان مغزی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|9085||2005||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||5430 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 41, Issue 3, May 2005, Pages 313–320
This brainstorming experiment assessed the extent to which idea exposure produced cognitive stimulation and social comparison effects. One hundred and sixty participants were exposed to either a high or low number of common or unique ideas. The participants’ likelihood of engaging in social comparison processes (high or low) was also manipulated through instructional sets. The results indicated both cognitive stimulation and social comparison effects. Exposure to a high number of ideas and to common ideas enhanced the generation of additional ideas. The effects of exposure to a high number of ideas was greater under high than under low social comparison conditions. Finally, recall of exposed ideas was related to enhanced idea generation. These results are consistent with the social/cognitive influence model of group brainstorming (Paulus, Dugosh, Dzindolet, Putman, & Coskun, 2002).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The results of this experiment provided support for both components of the social/cognitive model of group brainstorming (Paulus et al., 2002). The positive effects of exposure to more ideas, on both the total number of non-redundant ideas generated and the number of unique ideas generated, replicated the findings of Dugosh et al. (2000) and provided evidence of both social and cognitive perspectives. Our results are also consistent with research by Diehl and Stroebe (1987) and Dennis et al. (1997), showing that the likelihood of generating unique ideas increases with the total number of ideas generated. Some of our findings suggest unique effects of social and cognitive factors. Specific evidence for social factors comes from several findings. For example, the number of stimulus ideas presented interacted with social comparison likelihood to determine both the total number and the number of unique ideas that were generated. The difference between individuals exposed to a high and low number of ideas was larger in the high comparison condition than in the low one. Because there was no similar interaction for the recall measure, it appears that the social comparison manipulation did not influence attention to the stimulus ideas. We did not examine in detail the reactions of participants to different sources of information, in part because such questions might have been reactive. In future research, it would be interesting to determine how much participants “identify with” or personalize different sources of ideas using various indirect measures. There was also considerable evidence for the role of cognitive factors. This evidence included the correlation between recall and idea generation, as well as findings related to recall and exposure to unique versus common stimulus ideas. Recall was significantly correlated with the number of ideas generated in both sessions when participants saw 40 ideas but not when they saw only eight ideas. This suggests that exposure to more ideas may stimulate more associations, forming the basis for new ideas. Participants who saw 40 common ideas were more likely to correctly recall them than were participants who saw 40 unique ideas, whereas participants who saw only eight ideas recalled a similar number of them whether those ideas were unique or common. The strong positive effect of 40 common ideas on idea generation may be related to their “memorability,” because the impact of stimuli often depends on their accessibility (Brown & Paulus, 2002). Common ideas may also be better category exemplars than unique ideas, because they are more similar to one another than are unique ideas. Common ideas may also seem more valid (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). The results for type of stimulus ideas were inconsistent with a simple matching perspective. Matching should lead to generating more common ideas after exposure to common ideas, and more unique ideas after exposure to unique ideas. This did not happen. Although we interpreted the recall results as consistent with our social/cognitive model, recall effects may also reflect motivational or other processes. For example, exposure to many ideas may motivate better recall and performance in part because these ideas lead people to set high goals (Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993). Though common ideas may be easier to recall, the benefits of exposure to such ideas for the generation of unique ideas may reflect the fact that exposure to unique ideas removes them from the pool of ideas that participants can generate. Obviously, it will take several experiments with various manipulations and measures to determine exactly how social and cognitive processes affect group brainstorming. In this experiment, for example, unique and common ideas came from the same categories. However, if one varied exposure to ideas from categories that differed in their overall frequency, exposure to ideas from low frequency categories might aid brainstorming more than exposure to ideas from high frequency categories (Leggett, 1997). Our ideas should also be tested in face-to-face brainstorming groups. The same social and cognitive factors highlighted here should play a role in such groups (Paulus et al., 2002). However, the blocking effects of group interaction may make it more difficult to find cognitive and social stimulation effects, unless one uses some type of “aftereffects” procedure in which the delayed effects of group-based cognitive and social stimulation on private ideation are examined. The positive effects of exposure to common ideas may be conceptually related to the finding that shared information in groups is more likely than unique information to be discussed, remembered, and repeated (Wittenbaum & Park, 2001). This may be due in part to positive evaluations of people who communicate shared information. Our experiment suggests that shared or “common” information may have a greater association value as well. Research on the information sharing bias (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003) also suggests that in a creativity context, participants often have positive affective reactions to common ideas, which may explain the impact of those ideas. In a similar vein, Brauer and Judd (1996) found that having others repeat arguments during a group discussion increases the impact of those arguments. When one hears common ideas during group brainstorming, they may seem similar to one’s own ideas. Hearing others state or “repeat” such ideas should increase their associative strength or memorability, and thus their ability to stimulate additional ideas. Our research program has provided evidence for the role of both social and cognitive factors in group ideation. Future experiments might examine the relative influence of these factors in different group contexts. Social factors may be more influential than cognitive factors, for example, in groups that have some history and cohesion. However, many of the social processes that occur in these groups, including evaluation apprehension, production blocking, and downward social comparison, can inhibit creativity. Conformity pressures and the sharing of common information may also limit the creativity of such groups. Giving these groups an informational set, or using special techniques that facilitate greater sharing of unique ideas, should thus enhance their creativity (Paulus & Brown, 2003; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). One useful strategy might be for group members to exchange information in some way (e.g., in writing or via computers) that minimizes their social presence. Alternatively, group members could generate ideas individually, before sharing these and other ideas with one another. A group’s state of development, or how long it works at a task, could also moderate the relative benefits of social and cognitive interventions. Social interventions may have more impact on groups that are older or work on tasks for longer periods (Bradley, White, & Mennecke, 2003), whereas cognitive interventions may have more impact on groups that are younger or work on tasks for shorter periods. In older groups, normative patterns may also develop that facilitate innovation (Caldwell & O’Reilly, 2003).