مکانیسم های رسمی حکومت، رابطه مکانیسم های حکومت، و سرمایه گذاری معامله خاص در روابط عرضه کننده تولید کننده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|9089||2006||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8415 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Industrial Marketing Management, Volume 35, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 128–139
This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.
Manufacturing firms making foreign direct investments cannot simply enter a foreign country and commence the effortless exercise of their proprietary advantages (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Rather, to enhance their ability to compete, they must work at the complex and sometimes delicate task of establishing cooperative relationships with suppliers in host countries (Dyer, 1996). When local suppliers make transaction-specific investments in manufacturing firms—showing their willingness to cooperate with these firms—the overall efficiency of production is improved. Transaction-specific investments are those investments intended to support a specific manufacturer—supplier relationship. For example, a supplier might invest in specialized tools or equipment to produce customized or idiosyncratic components for a manufacturing firm. However, transaction-specific investments are not without cost for suppliers; that is, transforming these investments into other relationships of similar value can be tricky. If a manufacturing firm chose to terminate such a cooperative relationship, a supplier could very well incur an irrevocable loss, owing to the difficulty of recouping the loss of its investments. The purpose of this study is to explore the factors which induce a supplier to make transaction-specific investments, thus satisfying the needs of the relevant manufacturing firm. In most transaction cost economics (TCE) research (i.e. Williamson, 1985), the characteristics of transaction-specific investments have been examined in light of their impact on governance mechanisms; that is, transaction-specific investments are treated as an exogenous variable (e.g., Heide & John, 1990 and Joskow, 1987). The major proposition, along this line, is that manufacturing firms are asked to offer contracts to safeguard suppliers' specialized investments. When contracts cannot provide the necessary safeguards, manufacturing firms are forced to engage in vertical integration to mitigate suppliers' lock-in hazards. In practice, however, given that transaction-specific investments are necessary, many transactions exist outside the realm of vertical integration or contracts (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999). Bensaou and Anderson (1999) postulated that one possible reason for this is that relationships based on trust lessen the chance that vertical integration will be used to protect transaction-specific investments. An ongoing relationship generally fosters trust and enables partners to adopt more flexible models of cooperation (such as alliances), create value together (that is, mutual benefits or reciprocity), and, eventually, induce suppliers to make transaction-specific investments. Over the last decade, researchers have begun to examine the impact of governance mechanisms on the value-creation initiatives of exchange partners (Claro et al., 2003 and Zajac & Olsen, 1993). However, the conditions that enable transaction-specific investments have received less attention. Recently, Bensaou and Anderson (1999) argued that architectural interdependence, complexity, the thinness of the supplier market, and the scope of a relationship all influence automakers to make specialized investments in suppliers. Following this line of research, this study took suppliers as the sample body from which to further explore whether formal or relational governance mechanisms induce suppliers to make transaction-specific investments. According to the TCE perspective, the numerous hazards to suppliers require the drawing up of explicit legal contracts or an agreement upon specific financial recourse (Williamson, 1985). As a demonstration of goodwill, as well as to reduce the exchange hazards faced by suppliers, manufacturing firms may, as a matter of course, need to provide contracts or financial commitments to suppliers. However, the TCE seems to overemphasize the use of explicit contractual safeguards in potentially hazardous exchange settings (Dyer & Singh, 1998 and Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The relational perspective offers a different, less explicit set of governance mechanisms, such as trust, to persuade suppliers to more willingly make transaction-specific investments. Relational governance in this study refers to interfirm exchanges that include significant relationship-specific assets, combined with a high level of interorganizational trust (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Indeed, the presence of trust has been described as an important antecedent to interfirm cooperation (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). It remains unclear, however, what sort of a trade-off exists between relational governance mechanisms (such as trust) and formal governance mechanisms (such as contracts and financial commitments). Some researchers have examined whether relational governance functions as a substitute for complex, explicit contracts (Bradach & Eccles, 1989 and Dyer & Singh, 1998). To our knowledge, few researchers have explored the relationship between relational governance mechanisms and formal governance mechanisms by examining the specialized investments made by suppliers in their foreign-manufacturer clients. We hope to shed some light on the subject. A particular institutional environment may encourage or impede the building of relational ties between trading partners (North, 1990). Chinese society has functioned as a highly relational network of clans since the sixth century BC, and therefore provides a context appropriate for the examination of the impact of trust on transactions (Park & Luo, 2001). Because China is currently the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), we have chosen to examine the impact of formal and relational governance mechanisms on Chinese suppliers' making specialized investments in foreign (i.e. Taiwanese) manufacturing firms. In any part of the world, however, we believe it is critical to understand how to construct governance mechanisms that will improve cooperation between foreign and local firms. The purpose of this study is to provide insight into how suppliers might be induced to make specialized investments in manufacturing firms. In this vein, we offer several contributions to the governance-mechanism literature. First, we take the transaction-specific investment as an endogenous variable and then examine whether formal governance mechanisms and relational governance mechanisms induce a supplier's transaction-specific investment. Second, we evaluate the substitutive relationship between formal governance mechanisms and relational governance mechanisms on transaction-specific investments made by manufacturing firms. Third, we adopt a specific measurement for specialized investments [i.e., “molds,” as defined by Random House's Webster's College Dictionary (2000) as a hollow form for giving a particular shape to something in a molten or plastic state], thereby reducing ambiguity related to the question of whether or not specialized investments may have alternative uses. Fourth, this study focuses in particular on firms operating in China, allowing the observation of the special institutional context effect. Finally, we provide some suggestions for foreign manufacturing firms to help them create cooperative relationships with local suppliers in China.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The issue of crafting governance mechanisms capable of inducing suppliers to make specialized investments in manufacturing firms is one that can create competitive advantages for manufacturing firms. This study's major findings demonstrate that both the relational perspective and the transaction cost economics perspective explain the behaviors of suppliers in making transaction-specific investments. The interaction of these two perspectives, as a phenomenon unto itself, also serves to provide some explanation. Our findings indicate that formal governance mechanisms, calculative trust, and assistance-giving routines drive transaction-specific investments made by local suppliers in foreign manufacturing firms. Calculative trust also moderates the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments. As manufacturing firms build up more calculative trust, local suppliers reduce their dependence on formal governance mechanisms. However, the length of a relationship has no (positively) significant effect on transaction-specific investments, and drives no moderating effect on the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments. It may be that the mere existence of a long-term relationship does not facilitate qualified inter-organizational attitudes (Pillai & Sharma, 2003). For example, these manufacturers may reduce the number of their suppliers during the mature phase of their product-cycle, leaning toward market transactions (Pillai & Sharma, 2003). Therefore, the length of a relationship does not guarantee that manufacturing firms will treat suppliers better. While assistance-giving routine has a directly positive effect on transaction-specific investments, it does not have a negative moderation effect on the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and specialized investments. Due to the liabilities of foreignness, the assistance-giving routines may not be powerful enough to act as a full substitute for formal governance mechanisms. These findings provide two insights which might induce a supplier to make transaction-specific investments on behalf of manufacturing firms. First, not only are formal governance mechanisms critical to the protection of suppliers’ specialized investments, but calculative trust and assistance-giving routines can induce suppliers to make transaction-specific investments. The formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contract and financial commitments) dominate supplier–manufacturer relationships. However, foreign manufacturing firms can also build up benevolent trust through assistance-giving routines, so as to shape the context of reciprocal exchange and facilitate a supplier's specialized investments. When cooperative partners are not familiar with one another, they will incur additional governance set-up costs in the form of a legal contract. Both parties may monitor the other's opportunistic behaviors, and may not be willing to work to create value (Dyer, 1997). However, once trust and reciprocal commitments have been established, they will put more effort toward facilitating exchange efficiency. Second, calculative trust may act as a substitute for formal governance mechanisms. This implies that when a Taiwanese manufacturing firm (or any foreign firm) can provide some positive signals to show “forward-looking expectations”, it may reduce the necessity of formal governance mechanisms and, correspondingly, reduce transaction costs. Especially in China, due to the ambiguity of property right, the higher cost of implementing formal governance mechanism facilitates manufacturing firms to adopt relational governance mechanisms. The information provided by the business network, indicated by “whether a supplier agreed that the manufacturing firm can introduce other customers to the supplier,” appears to support the relational governance arguments as they apply to the suppliers (Claro et al., 2003). The results are, in large part, consistent with our interviews with executives. Executives at the suppliers in question expressed that Taiwanese manufacturing firms tend to be more reliable in their exchange behaviors. These Taiwanese manufacturing firms were more willing to introduce them to other Taiwanese manufacturing firms, and thus, local suppliers were more willing to make specialized investments on behalf of these Taiwanese firms. Given these conditions, Chinese suppliers may prefer to do business with Taiwanese manufacturing firms.