|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|97822||2018||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8298 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Fisheries Research, Volume 203, July 2018, Pages 46-54
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management cannot be overcome simply by explicitly accounting for non-consumptive values within IFAs. It is suggested that strengthening the role of IFAs and limiting the ability of non-member countries to free-ride be further investigated as measures fostering cooperation.