|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|98307||2017||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8898 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Utilities Policy, Volume 48, October 2017, Pages 132-140
Risk transfer in public private partnerships (PPPs) may not always be conducive to efficient management due to principal agent problems. This paper identifies three parameters: (i) competition, (ii) monitoring and (iii) incentives, for transferring risks in a principal agent relationship. These parameters are applied to three PPP wastewater projects. The findings illustrate that competition determines the private sectorsâ ability to bear risks, monitoring reduces ex-post information asymmetry and incentive ensures that risks are efficiently managed. The lessons learnt from the case studies can provide guidance for governments in transferring risks efficiently in PPP wastewater treatment projects.