Abstract: The 2016 presidential election demonstrated the rise of a “restraint constituency” in American politics that openly questions Washington’s bipartisan post-Cold War pursuit of a grand strategy of primacy or liberal hegemony. This constituency has been animated by the return of the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy, most notably in the candidacy of Donald Trump, which directly questions the benefits of alliance relationships as well as U.S. underwriting of an open global economic system. It also stresses the need for the United States to act unilaterally in defense of its core foreign policy interests. The resurgence of the Jacksonian tradition will make it difficult for the next President to reestablish a foreign policy consensus and combat perceptions of American decline.

The next President of the United States faces several fundamental foreign policy challenges. A rising China and an assertive Russia are demonstrating their willingness to use (or threaten to use) military means to achieve their political ends in the Ukraine and the South China Sea, directly challenging existing security/strategic orders which are largely underwritten by the United States. The Middle East has, since the Arab Spring of 2011, lurched from crisis to crisis in core regional states—from the overthrow of long-standing rulers in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt to the conflagrations in Syria and Yemen—creating conditions for the rise of new forms of radical Islamism (the Islamic State) and extra-regional state intervention and proxy conflicts.

The United States, of course, has faced and often surmounted numerous foreign policy crises and challenges in the past. The ability of the incoming President to grapple successfully with today’s foreign policy challenges, however, will be constrained fundamentally by the rise of a dynamic in domestic politics not seen since World War II: an overt questioning of the U.S. role in international affairs. As the 2016 presidential election campaign has demonstrated amply, much of this
questioning has focused on: 1) whether the costs of the U.S. underwriting of the post-World War II liberal international order have been commensurate with its benefits; and 2) whether that order can, or indeed should, be maintained.

These pressures perhaps have been all the more jolting for Washington policymakers as they come after more than 60 years of a largely bipartisan foreign policy consensus that at its core was based on the twin assumptions that a strong United States was “essential” to the maintenance of an open global order and that the alternative to U.S. leadership would not be “a harmonious, self-regulating balance of independent states but an international landscape marked by eruptions of chaos and destruction.” American hegemony, in such a reading, was good not only for the national security and prosperity of the country itself, but also for the world. Kori Schake recently wrote that the United States faces, despite the contemporary crises noted above, an unprecedentedly benign security environment:

The U.S. has the luxury of stable, law-abiding and cooperative neighbors. The strongest countries in the world are U.S. treaty allies. The only two aspiring great powers, China and Russia, have significant economic and political constraints both in maintaining domestic stability and in attracting international support—neither has a political model emulated other than by despots. Barriers to U.S. commerce in foreign markets have been reduced, and trade deals, corporate governance and publicity are slowly raising labor and other standards to American levels among U.S. trading partners. The American economy is the engine of global innovation. Yet, the often intemperate debates of this presidential election cycle have demonstrated that a significant number of Americans not only doubt that the country faces such a benign environment but also that the sustainability of the strategy variously described as primacy or liberal hegemony espoused by successive administrations since at least the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Trevor Thrall has

2 Kori Schake, “Republican Foreign Policy after Trump,” Survival, 58 (5), 2016, p. 44.
دریافت فوری
متن کامل مقاله
امکان دانلود نسخه تمام متن مقالات انگلیسی
امکان دانلود نسخه ترجمه شده مقالات
پذیرش سفارش ترجمه تخصصی
امکان جستجو در آرشیو جامعی از صدها موضوع و هزاران مقاله
امکان دانلود رایگان ۲ صفحه اول هر مقاله
امکان پرداخت اینترنتی با کلیه کارت های عضو شتاب
دانلود فوری مقاله پس از پرداخت آنلاین
پشتیبانی کامل خرید با بهره مندی از سیستم هوشمند رهگیری سفارشات