Exploring the relations between self-monitoring, authenticity, and well-being

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The self-monitoring literature often describes those high in the construct as social chameleons, thereby implying they lack authenticity. However, direct examination of this assumption within the literature remains scant. The current study examines this relation and further explores how these constructs relate to well-being. In a cross-sectional study (N = 629), participants completed measures of self-monitoring, authenticity, and well-being. Total self-monitoring scores were inversely related to authenticity, however the relationship was small because the public performance and other-directedness dimensions of self-monitoring related to authenticity in different directions. Public performance related moderately and positively to authenticity, whereas other-directedness related strongly and negatively to authenticity. Authenticity mediated the effects of these self-monitoring dimensions on well-being. Moreover, authenticity and public performance interacted such that public performance related positively to well-being when authenticity was high, but not when authenticity was low. Similarly, total self-monitoring scores related positively to positive relationships with others when authenticity was high, and related positively to well-being when authenticity was held constant. The results have implications for self-monitoring theory, challenging the general notion that those on the high end of self-monitoring are not authentic, and highlighting the conditions under which self-monitoring relates to well-being.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Self-monitoring

Self-monitoring reflects the degree to which individuals monitor, regulate, and control their self-presentations in social situations and interpersonal relationships (Snyder, 1974). The construct was originally designed to explain how behavior can vary as a function of an individual’s sensitivity to either situations or their dispositions (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Those sensitive to the situation were described much like actors in their ability to control their behaviors to appear appropriate for the circumstances. Though self-monitoring may involve using skills to accurately portray one’s emotional states, Snyder (1974) noted the same skill set could also be used to feign or hide emotions. This latter point feeds into the prevailing portrait of those high in self-monitoring as social chameleons, thereby implying they lack authenticity. However, there is substantial evidence to support the idea that self-monitoring is associated with constructs that arguably relate to (in)authenticity (e.g., consistency, artificiality, superficiality). For instance, self-monitoring is associated with: switching one’s attitudes to conform to group norms under beneficial conditions (Snyder & Monson, 1975); using deception in romantic pursuits (Rowatt, Cunningham, & Druen, 1998); and scoring higher on Machiavellianism (Riggio & Friedman, 1982).

As indicated by other research, however, painting those on the high end of self-monitoring as social chameleons may create a caricature that underplays their positive qualities. For instance, self-monitoring has been associated with being collaborative and accommodating (Baron, 1989), able to interpret social cues (Costanzo & Archer, 1989), providing emotional support to others (Toegel, Anand, & Kilduff, 2007), and scoring higher in emotional intelligence (Schutte et al., 2001). In short, the ability to restrain and express oneself, read and entertain others, and adapt one’s message to an audience does not necessitate abandoning one’s core values. Consistent with this reasoning, Laux and Renner (2002) found that one form of self-monitoring, what they called acquisitive self-monitoring, is positively associated with authenticity. Thus, it seems that self-monitoring should correlate negatively with authenticity, but is this the case?

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1.2. Authenticity

Kernis and Goldman (2006) define authenticity as “the unimpeded operation of one's core or true self in one's daily enterprise” (p. 294). Similarly, Wood and his colleagues refer to authenticity as a trait-like tendency to exhibit congruence between one's behavior, internal states, and deeply held values and beliefs (Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). Incongruities are more likely to occur when situational demands or external pressures do not facilitate the expression of one's values and beliefs. Authentic individuals are those who have clear values and do not acquiesce to external pressures to behave otherwise. Wood et al. (2008) developed the Authenticity Scale to incorporate this idea. This measure conceptualizes authenticity as a second-order construct comprised of three first-order factors: self-alienation, authentic living, and accepting external influences. Self-alienation denotes the experience of feeling out of touch with one's true self. Authentic living refers to the degree to which one behaves and emotes in ways consistent with one's internal states and emotions. Finally, accepting external influence reflects the degree to which one passively conforms to the influence of others' expectations.

1.3. Self-monitoring and authenticity

We expect total self-monitoring scores to relate negatively to authenticity. This prediction is supported by findings showing that self-monitoring is negatively related to a) the accessibility of personal attitudes and self-knowledge (e.g., Mellema & Bassili, 1995), b) correspondence between one's private attitudes and public actions (e.g., DeBono & Omoto, 1993), and c) susceptibility to the influence of others' expectations (e.g., Harris & Rosenthal, 1986). The outcomes described in the three findings above align well with the subscales of Wood's Authenticity measure assessing self-alienation, authentic living, and accepting external influence factors, respectively. Additionally, direct evidence of a small, negative relation ($r = -0.14$) between self-monitoring and authenticity was obtained by Laux and Renner (2002)—though this effect was not statistically significant and used different measures (e.g., a revised version of the Lenox & Wolf, 1984, scale).

That said, there is also evidence that self-monitoring is comprised of two dimensions that may relate to authenticity in different ways. These dimensions are referred to as Public Performance (PP) and Other-Directedness (OD). Although Gangstad and Snyder (2000) construe self-monitoring as a unitary construct, others have argued that the construct is multidimensional. Early factor analytic studies found evidence for three factors: acting, extraversion, and other-directedness (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). This led Snyder and Gangstad (1986) to revise the scale to buttress the argument that self-monitoring is a unitary, latent construct; however, Briggs and Cheek (1988) continued to find evidence of the two aforementioned dimensions (PP and OD; but see Gangstad & Snyder, 2000, who argue that findings and correlates of the PP scale better reflect the total self-monitoring scale which they contend to be unidimensional). The PP dimension captures aspects of acting and extraversion, which indicate an ability to change one's behavior to function well in social situations. OD reflects attention to other's expectations and a motivated willingness to sublimate one's true-self and/or mask one's true feelings for the sake of pleasing others, which, by definition, is contraindicative of authenticity. Furthermore, given that self-monitoring is associated with being sensitive to external influences (Kukil & Taylor, 1981), one might suspect other-directedness to relate strongly and inversely to authenticity, as authenticity has a strong component reflecting the degree to which one rejects external influences.

In contrast, the dispositional abilities and extraverted tendencies of those high in PP can enable an individual to enact multiple identities with social ease regardless of whether that identity is authentic. Interestingly, however, self-perceptions of authenticity may be influenced by enjoying social experiences and extraverted behavior, irrespective of a mismatch between one's self-construals and behaviors. Evidence for this proposition comes from findings that (a) extraversion correlates positively with authenticity (Wood et al., 2008), and (b) individuals feel more authentic when behaving in an extraverted manner, regardless of whether they are actually extraverts (e.g., Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). Given these findings, we expect the PP subscale to predict authenticity positively.

Other evidence of a two dimensional structure that differentially relates to authenticity was also found by Laux and Renner (2002). Using revised scales developed by Lenox and Wolf (1984), they describe self-monitoring as involving two factors described as acquisitive and protective, finding that these differentially predicted authenticity—with the acquisitive factor relating positively and the protective factor relating negatively. The acquisitive scale assesses self-presentational skills and perceptual sensitivity, whereas the protective factor assesses changing behaviors and social comparisons for protective reasons. We expect that the acquisitive and protective factors, given their theoretical foundations, should map onto the public performance and other-directedness scales, respectively, thereby supporting our hypotheses.

1.4. Relations of self-monitoring and authenticity to well-being

Past research has indicated that total self-monitoring scores generally do not correlate with measures of well-being or neuroticism (e.g., Gohar, Leary, & Costanzo, 2016; Morrison, 1997); however, there are findings within these two studies indicating that self-monitoring is positively related to social efficacy and extraversion. These latter findings indicate that self-monitoring taps characteristics that facilitate social relationships—which should contribute to well-being. As argued previously, the OD component of self-monitoring may mitigate this positive relation. Indirect evidence of this proposition comes from a study of Lesbians and bisexual women finding that self-concealment was negatively and strongly correlated with Ryff’s (1989) measure of well-being; however, a separate measure of self-monitoring (i.e., Lenox & Wolf, 1984) correlated 0.18 with well-being (Selvidge, Matthews, & Bridges, 2008). This particular measure of self-monitoring includes factors tapping a) the ability to modify social behavior and b) sensitivity to expressive behavior, whereas they use another scale to assess constructs similar to the OD component.

On the other hand, measures of authenticity have been shown to correlate positively with aspects of well-being. For instance, those scoring high in authenticity (relative to those who score low) have higher self-esteem, life satisfaction (Kernis & Goldman, 2006), higher subjective well-being (Wood et al., 2008), and higher autonomy (White & Tracy, 2011).

1.5. Hypotheses

Consistent with the reasoning above, we hypothesized that OD would be negatively related to authenticity, and as a function of this relationship with authenticity, would be negatively related to well-being (Hypothesis 1, or H1). This hypothesis is shown in Fig. 1a with respect to paths a, b, and c, where we expect authenticity to mediate the negative relation between OD and well-being. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts that PP relates positively to authenticity and well-being, with authenticity mediating the relation between PP and well-being (see paths d, b, and e in Fig. 1a).

In addition to these hypotheses, we asked 4 questions where theoretical guidance is less clear. Research Question 1 (RQ1) asks whether self-monitoring, assessed using the total scale scores, relates to authenticity. Although we have pointed to evidence that self-monitoring should be negatively related, we have also made the case its two subscales are expected to relate differently to authenticity—potentially cancelling out one another, leaving the overall relationship unclear. Similarly, RQ2 asks whether self-monitoring is related to well-being, where again, the role of the PP and OD leave predictions unclear.
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