



Sustainable development consequences of European Union participation in Senegal's Marine Fishery[☆]

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ABSTRACT

The article evaluates the impact of EU fishing activities for the sustainable development of Senegal's maritime fishery. An evaluation of Senegalese fisheries' policy discourse introduces the idea that Senegalese fisheries' policies have not been fully compatible with the sustainable development of the country's fishery sector. A comparative analysis of the sustainable development impacts associated with the activities of different fishery user groups shows that managed activities of heterogeneous user groups can benefit the sustainable development of the sector. Conclusions suggest that the heterogeneity of the user groups frequenting Senegal's marine fishery system can be capitalised upon through allocating fishery access in accord with each group's ability to generate sustainable development benefits. On the basis of these findings the article suggests that the presence of an EU fleet in Senegalese waters could play a meaningful role in ensuring the sustainable development of Senegal's marine fishery.

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1. Introduction

The most recent protocol of the fisheries' agreement between Senegal and the EU expired at the end of June 2006, and has not been renewed for the first time since 1979. Fieldwork observations in Dakar suggested strong sentiment among Senegalese fisheries' stake holders that the non-renewal of the four year agreement was a victory for local fishing groups. Authors such as Oli Brown [1] and Beatrice Goréz [2] have supported this view, arguing that EU fishing agreements have a negative impact upon the livelihoods of local fisheries' groups, and by implication those of the populations affected by fisheries' activities.

The extent to which the non-renewal of the fisheries' agreement with the EU can be viewed as a victory for local Senegalese fisheries' groups is however, questionable. This article evaluates the validity of claims that bilateral fisheries' agreements between Senegal and the EU do more harm than good for the

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sustainable development of the West African maritime fishery. The evaluation takes a two pronged approach. First a description of Senegalese fisheries' discourse is provided, which is followed by an examination of Senegalese fisheries' policy dynamics and their impact on fisheries' policy outcomes. The evaluation is underpinned by an assumption that fisheries' stake holders have a common long-term interest in ensuring the sustainable development of the fishery. This common interest provides a policy community perspective which is juxtaposed with the conflicting private interests motivating stake holders to maximise immediate social and economic returns from their fishing effort.

From an institutional perspective, the extent to which the Senegalese fisheries' administration authorities balance the conflicting micro and macro interests within the policy community is evaluated. A comparative analysis of the sustainable development implications arising from the activities of Senegalese fishing groups provides empirical meaning to the evaluation.

The three main fishing groups evaluated are the local artisanal sector, the local industrial sector, and the foreign EU industrial sector.¹ A simple methodology is used to describe the impact of each group on the economic capital, natural capital, human

¹ The evaluation does not deal with the implications of non-EU foreign fishing fleets. This is because the activities of these fleets are not sufficiently transparent to warrant application of the empirical analysis employed in this study.

capital and public institutional capital underpinning the sustainable development of the fishery system. The evaluation finds that EU activities make a positive contribution towards the sustainable development of the fishery. The local artisanal sector holds potential to make a positive contribution to the sustainable development of the fishery, but this would require more effective management of fishing effort expended by the sector. It is suggested that the local industrial sector has a negative impact on the sustainable development of the fishery, not least because of the prominence of joint venture agreements with third country enterprises and the strong tendency towards exporting fisheries' rents gained through joint venture activities.

From a political perspective it is noted that the rationale behind making EU activities accountable for diminishing returns to fishing effort of local fishing groups is motivated by the political need for a scapegoat rather than by empirical evidence. This paper shows that Senegal's fisheries' policy community is characterised by individual policy forces placing conflicting pressures on the policy process. The observed outcome is that fisheries' policy does not accord with the sustainable development of the fishery sector.

The evaluation ends with a recommendation that the heterogeneous impacts associated with the activities of local artisanal and foreign EU user groups can be capitalised upon for the benefit of the sustainable development of the fishery.

Examples are given of micro rationality leading to macro irrationality, where the simultaneous political relevance of micro rational objectives leads policy makers to pursue macro-irrational objectives through simultaneously aiming to please all stake holders.

2. Background to EU fisheries' agreements

In 1979 a fisheries' agreement was concluded between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Senegal as part of the first EEC fisheries' agreement with an African state. Then the director of the Senegalese *Direction de l'Océanographie et des Pêches Maritimes* (DOPM) (Directorate for Oceanography and Maritime Fishing), Dr Sogui Diouf, [3] explained that the deal was negotiated on the basis of financial compensation and reciprocal access to the fishery resources found in Senegalese and EEC waters, respectively. This, Diouf notes, was not an altogether desirable situation for the Senegalese fleet which lacked the capacity and interest to fish the already heavily fished EEC waters.

Subsequently, cash for access agreements were seen as a means of providing a larger share of direct financial compensation to the Senegalese state in return for access to fishery resources. The agreements were criticised, not only for their lack of clarity of catch quotas, but also for directing license fees to ineffectual governance and stewardship of the resource. Cash for access or reciprocity agreements were replaced with 'second generation' agreements which were later replaced by 'third generation' agreements. Ultimately 'partnership agreements' took their place. Each of these evolutions sought a more effective enforcement of access rights and a more transparent distribution of funds.

The main difference between these agreements was the move away from reciprocal access granted in the early bilateral agreements to the principle of cash for access adopted under first generation agreements. Second generation agreements aimed to apportion financial payments to specific programmes for supporting the sustainable development of the fishery and required national observers onboard EEC vessels and a certain number of crew to be Senegalese nationals. Third generation agreements provided simple technical revisions to the approach

adopted under second generation agreements. Partnership agreements can be seen as a refinement of the provisions of third generation agreements.

In respect of the 2002–2006 EU–Senegal fisheries' agreement, Oli Brown [1] has argued that the agreement reached between the EU and Senegal was very much a "business as usual agreement", rather than a more highly evolved partnership agreement. The agreement, providing access for about 125 EU vessels, covered the period from 1 July 2002 until the 30 June 2006. The total cost of the agreement to the EU budget was €64 million, with 19% of this sum destined for monitoring and surveillance, safety measures and some support for small scale local fisheries, with the remaining 81% being paid as direct financial compensation to the Senegalese government.

Despite certain improvements on the former agreement, the 2002–2006 agreement stated that reduced fishing opportunities would be accompanied by reduced payment, thus inhibiting Senegalese decision makers from enforcing catch restrictions [1]. Under these agreements catch levels were still not based upon catch quotas but rather vessel size, measured in gross rate tonnage (GRT), which does not prescribe clearly defined catch limits [1]. Additionally, the poor performance of EU vessels when it comes to reporting catches has been seen as an impediment to effective management of fishing effort. This point is supported by Kaczynski and Fulharty [4] in respect of the 2002–2006 agreement:

...to protect commercial interests of the EU fleets, all information related to the execution of the West African agreements (actual volume or composition of catches, data on effort and other vital information) were not reported to the coastal countries despite the contractual obligation to do so, nor are the data made public in Europe.

Beatrice Goréz [2] of the Coalition for Fair Fisheries' Arrangements (CFFA) has argued:

The *raison d'être* of FPAs is to maintain the presence of the European long distance water fleets (LDWF) in the EEZs of third countries, to protect its interests and to maintain employment and other social and economic benefits linked to its activities. Thus, the driving force behind the conclusion of fisheries' partnerships will continue to be the commercial and related interests of the EU fishing sector. Likewise, the financial contribution paid to ACP countries, in the framework of fisheries' partnerships, will continue to be mainly determined by the fishing opportunities accessible to the EU fishing fleet.

Although published material addressing this question has not been found, anecdotal evidence uncovered during fieldwork in Senegal and within the EU suggests that the EU is disinclined to renew the protocol with Senegal because certain target fish stocks are too heavily depleted to make the access payments worthwhile.

However, on the other hand the Senegalese argue that EU activities are largely responsible for the diminishing returns to effort facing the country's fishing industry. They believe that it is on this basis that EU fleets, specifically trawlers, should be excluded from the fishery in order to allow local users greater access to the resources.

At face value these views imply that EU fishing fleet activities have contributed to the devastation of Senegalese fish stocks to the extent that the EU is no longer interested in fishing in Senegalese waters. However, the political reality behind the non-renewal of the EU–Senegal fisheries' agreement is more subtle.

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