



## Composite automated distribution system reliability model considering various automated substations



Hamze Hajian-Hoseinabadi<sup>a,\*</sup>, Mohamad Esmail Hamedani Golshan<sup>a</sup>, Heydar Ali Shayanfar<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan 84156-83111, Iran

<sup>b</sup> Department of Electrical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran

### ARTICLE INFO

#### Article history:

Received 17 February 2013

Received in revised form 12 June 2013

Accepted 28 June 2013

#### Keywords:

Automated substation

Composite reliability assessment model

Distribution automation

Quantitative reliability assessment

Substation automation system

### ABSTRACT

Due to the fact that automation can significantly improve reliability of substation as well as distribution system, this paper presents a composite reliability assessment model of distribution system which illustrates the impacts of substations automated by various automation configurations on the reliability of primary distribution systems equipped with a specific distribution automation (DA) scheme. First, three architectures of substation automation systems (SASs), known as ring, cascading, and star, are reviewed and their reliability block diagrams (RBDs) are developed. Reliability assessments for five types of automated substations are then done using the event tree and the concept of expectation methods. Afterwards, a particular automated distribution scheme designated as the low interruption system (LIS) is reviewed and the interaction between the SAS and the DA is then modeled using the event tree methodology. Finally, by presenting explicit formulas for reliability evaluations of the automated distribution system, the composite reliability assessment models are completed. The proposed approach is applied to the five distribution system configurations.

© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

### 1. Introduction

Significant reliability enhancement is one of the most important reasons cited for implementation of substation automation system (SAS) or distribution automation (DA) scheme. On the one hand, there are several previous works which consider reliability or availability of the substation control network topologies based on the fault tree analysis, event tree method, reliability block diagram (RBD) approach or tie sets methodology [1–10]. Moreover, the literatures [11,12] present approaches to quantitatively evaluate the reliability of various automated substation configurations in the presence of different SASs. Refs. [13–15] also present a step by step evaluation procedure to assess the impacts of a particular DA scheme on reliability indices of a typical distribution reliability test system. On the other hand, diverse investigations have been fulfilled to evaluate the reliability aspects of non-automated distribution systems [16–18]. Furthermore, the article [19] develops composite models which reflect the effect of non-automated substation on non-automated distribution system reliability indices. However, the impacts of automated substation on reliability indices of automated distribution system have not been comprehensively covered in the literature so far.

With this motivation, this paper develops a set of composite load point reliability assessment models that illustrate the impacts of automated substations, automated distribution systems and the interaction between them as shown in Fig. 1. First, the SAS reliability model including the three steps as functional modeling, hardware modeling, and function/hardware linking, is carried out. Second, the reliability model of the automated substation in the presence of a typical SAS is performed. Third, a specific automated distribution scheme designated as the Low Interruption System (LIS) is reviewed and its reliability model is investigated. The interaction between the SAS and the DA is then modeled. Finally, after modeling the interaction between automated substation and automated distribution system, the composite reliability evaluation models are developed by combining the previously mentioned reliability models.

### 2. SAS reliability model

A typical SAS usually comprises a set of components and different levels. The main components of a SAS are: human machine interface (HMI); industrial personal computer (IPC) and network control center server (NCCS); various substation IEDs; the bay control unit (BCU); power supply unit (PSU); communications facilities such as Ethernet switch (ESW), Ethernet interface (EI) and fiber optical connection (OPT). Also, a generic SAS involves three hierarchical levels (HLs) including the remote control point (HL

\* Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +98 311 391 2451.

E-mail addresses: [hamze.hajian@gmail.com](mailto:hamze.hajian@gmail.com) (H. Hajian-Hoseinabadi), [hgolshan@cc.iut.ac.ir](mailto:hgolshan@cc.iut.ac.ir) (M.E.H. Golshan), [hashayanfar@gmail.com](mailto:hashayanfar@gmail.com) (H.A. Shayanfar).

## Nomenclature

AI	Analogue Input	$\overline{F_{C_j,i}}$ and $P(\overline{F_{C_j,i}})$	event that the effect on load point $i$ of a fault on component $C_j$ cannot be removed by the automation system or manual switching action and its associated probability, respectively
AST	automatic switching time	$F_{m,i}$	number of main sections of a primary feeder servicing load point $i$
BCU	bay control unit	$N_{cb}$	number of feeder circuit breakers connected at the same low voltage bus
CB	circuit breaker	$NC$	number of substation components
DA	distribution automation	$N_m$	total number of main feeder sections connected at the same low voltage bus
DI	Digital Input	$P_{SAS}$	availability of the substation automation
DO	Digital Output	$P_c$	probability of a stuck condition of a breaker
EI	Ethernet interface	$P_{DA}$	availability of the distribution automation
ESW	Ethernet switch	$P_i$	probability of success of component $i$
HL	hierarchical level	$r_{C_j}$	average repair time of component $C_j$
HMI	human machine interface	$r_{cb}$	repair time for a feeder circuit breaker
IPC	industrial personal computer	$r_{li}$	repair time for the lateral servicing load point $i$
IED	intelligent electronic device	$r_m$	repair time for a main feeder section
LIS	Low Interruption System	$r_{ti}$	repair time for the distribution transformer that services load point $i$
LS	local system	$T_{MSW}$	manual switching time
MST	manual switching time	$U_{C_j,i}$	outage time of load point $i$ due to a fault of component $C_j$
MTTR	mean time to repair	$U_{S,i}$	average annual outage time of load point $i$ contributed by the substation itself
NCC	network control center	$\lambda_{cb}^a$	active failure rate of a feeder circuit breaker
NCCS	network control center server	$\lambda_{cb}^p$	passive failure rate of a feeder circuit breaker
OPT	optical connection	$\lambda_{C_j}$	average failure rate of component $C_j$
PSU	power supply unit	$\lambda_{C_j,i}$	contribution to the failure rate of load point $i$ due to a fault on component $C_j$
RBD	reliability block diagram	$\lambda_{li}$	failure rate of a lateral servicing load point $i$
RTU	remote terminal unit	$\lambda_m$	failure rate of the $m$ th main section of a primary feeder
SAS	substation automation system	$\lambda_{S,i}$	average failure rate of load point $i$ contributed by the substation itself
SCS	substation control system	$\lambda_{ti}$	failure rate of a distribution transformer that services load point $i$
SR	Synchronizing Relay		
$A_{SCS\&NCC}^{(i)}$	availability of the combined block SCS & NCC regarding SAS architecture $i$		
$C_j$	component number $j$		
$F_{C_j,i}$ and $P(F_{C_j,i})$	event that the automation system can remove the effect on load point $i$ of a fault on component $C_j$ and its associated probability		
$\overline{F_{C_j,i}}$ and $P(\overline{F_{C_j,i}})$	event that the automation system fails but the effect on load point $i$ of a fault on component $C_j$ is removed by manual switching action and its associated probability, respectively		

l), the station control point (HL 2) as well as the bay control point (HL 3). Three architectures, designated as ring, cascading, and star, are considered in this paper [8,20] as shown in Figs. 2–4. The more detailed explanations of these architectures can be found in [8].

Reliability modeling of the SAS can be done in three separate steps as follows. The first step is to create a functional model of the SAS. In this step, an event tree [12,21] is designed for automatic switching action. This event tree provides a tool to describe automatic switching action from a functional point of view. By this approach, various possible classes of switching action and their associated probabilities are identified. The following terms are used to classify the outcomes of the event tree:

- Success (S): all required functions including switchgear control, indications, synchronizing, and interlocking are fully available and the automatic switching action is completed successfully.
- Failure (F): the unavailable functions make it impossible to complete the required switching action. The reader is invited to refer [12] for more detailed explanations on how event trees are developed and interpreted. In the second step, the hardware of the SAS is modeled through RBD approach.

Also, it is assumed that the control functions are considered as available, if all bays are controllable from station level or remote. In other words, if we assume a substation with  $n$  bays, all  $n$  bays must

be controllable to provide an available system. This assumption is shown as "n-out-of-n" in Fig. 5. By using the concept of RBD, we simplify the original RBDs shown in Fig. 5 to the one in Fig. 6. This new reduced RBD consists of BCU, which is put in series with the combined block diagram of ESWs, EIs, substation control system (SCS), and NCC named as SCS & NCC. In order to construct the combined block diagram of SCS & NCC, the redundant blocks associated with NCC and SCS are first merged and then, this resulting block diagram is combined with the blocks of ESWs and EIs (as series combination). Afterwards, the combined block of SCS & NCC is put in series with the block of BCU to produce the reduced RBD of each configuration.

By using the minimal path sets method, the availability of the combined block SCS & NCC regarding each architecture can be calculated as follows:

$$A_{SCS\&NCC}^{(1)} = P_{ESW}^2 P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} + P_{ESW}^2 P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{NCCS} - P_{ESW}^3 P_{EI}^{n+2} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} P_{NCCS} \quad (1)$$

$$A_{SCS\&NCC}^{(2)} = P_{ESW}^n P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} + P_{ESW}^n P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{NCCS} - P_{ESW}^3 P_{EI}^{n+2} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} P_{NCCS} \quad (2)$$

$$A_{SCS\&NCC}^{(3)} = P_{ESW} P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} + P_{ESW} P_{EI}^{n+1} P_{PSU} P_{NCCS} - P_{ESW} P_{EI}^{n+2} P_{PSU} P_{IPC} P_{HMI} P_{NCCS} \quad (3)$$

متن کامل مقاله

دریافت فوری ←

**ISI**Articles

مرجع مقالات تخصصی ایران

- ✓ امکان دانلود نسخه تمام متن مقالات انگلیسی
- ✓ امکان دانلود نسخه ترجمه شده مقالات
- ✓ پذیرش سفارش ترجمه تخصصی
- ✓ امکان جستجو در آرشیو جامعی از صدها موضوع و هزاران مقاله
- ✓ امکان دانلود رایگان ۲ صفحه اول هر مقاله
- ✓ امکان پرداخت اینترنتی با کلیه کارت های عضو شتاب
- ✓ دانلود فوری مقاله پس از پرداخت آنلاین
- ✓ پشتیبانی کامل خرید با بهره مندی از سیستم هوشمند رهگیری سفارشات