مبادلات بین توزیع درآمد و رفاه: مورد ادغام ترکیه در اتحادیه اروپا

The welfare and income distribution impacts of Turkey's international agricultural trade policies and integration into the EU are analyzed using Political Preference Functions together with the strategic trade setting to determine the potential for Pareto improvements. Results show that Turkey exhibits a preference to integrate with the EU from a welfare perspective, but that income distribution within the agricultural sector becomes less equal with the integration. Results also indicate that a Pareto optimal solution does not imply an equitable solution for the parties involved. Therefore, income distributional effects should be evaluated in policy analysis given that trade policies also affect the distribution of welfare within an economy as it affects the welfare of various interest groups.

The trade-off between supporting farmers and providing cheap and sufficient agricultural products for low-income consumers is a major dilemma for many countries. At the same time, the incomes of various producer groups within agriculture can vary depending on political power and lobbying. New and developing trading blocs and accompanying multilateral trade negotiations aiming at freer trade require that policy makers face new problems given dynamic domestic and international policy linkages. Turkish agricultural policies are aimed at providing a standard level of income in the agricultural sector. However, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Turkey has agreed to reduce its tariffs and other protection levels (GATT, 1994). At the same time, the European Union (EU) continues to expand and Turkey is eager to be part of this union. The EU plans to reform its agricultural policies to become more competitive and to comply with the WTOs rules (Ingersent et al., 1998). These scenarios will have considerable impact on Turkish agriculture through changes in producer and consumer welfare. These policies will also affect the income distribution within the agricultural sector. This research analyzes the welfare and distributional effects of Turkish agricultural trade policies in a post-Uruguay Round environment through the use of a Political Preference Function (PPF) and the Gini coefficient (GC). In this way, policy makers can weigh the effects of agricultural policies and the accompanying trade liberalization among agricultural producers and between producers and consumers. The outcomes of this study can contribute to policy design when policy makers face the multiple policy criteria, in this case the welfare and income distribution effects of agricultural policy. Policy makers can identify alternative policy options that allow for the simultaneous improvement of welfare and income distribution, and the set of optimal policy options can be expanded.

This study has analyzed the agricultural impacts of various international agricultural trade policies of Turkey on the welfare and distribution of income in selected agricultural sectors. Game simulations showed that Turkey's integration into the EU is independent of the political weights. The unique Nash equilibrium solution is found at the point where Turkey chooses integration while the EU chooses free trade when all weights are equal to one. However, when weights based on 1995 subsidy equivalents are used, a unique solution occurs where Turkey chooses integration while the EU chooses the Agenda 2000 scenario. Results show that although income distribution deteriorates slightly with freer trade, it becomes less equitable with integration. The reason for this deterioration is the diverse base level of protection for the selected agricultural products and corresponding different levels of liberalization, coupled with the EU's various levels of protection for these products in case of the integration. This deterioration occurs in favor of those products with high PSE values in the EU, such as dairy and animal production while it harms the products with low PSEs such as tobacco and poultry. Thus, Turkish policy makers might consider various types of income adjusting policies or compensation to those sectors that suffer losses. Such policies can include input subsidies in these sectors or low-cost investment loans. When GCs are used as decision criteria, the unique Nash equilibrium occurred at (A2KEU; SQTUR), which is different from the equilibrium solution for the PPF values. This shows that when Turkish policy makers base their decisions on income equality, the choice is to retain the status quo. When the isoquants of GCs and PPF values for Turkey are compared, a Pareto superior solution is found at (WTOEU; WTOTUR), a different solution than the Nash equilibrium point of (FTEU; INTTUR) for nonweighted PPF payoffs or the Nash equilibrium of (A2KEU; SQTUR) for the GC weights. This result highlights the fact that a Pareto optimal solution in a game using political preference functions as payoffs does not imply an equitable solution for the parties involved. As mentioned earlier, income distribution deteriorated slightly with trade liberalization. This deterioration worsens with integration. The deterioration of income equality can cause a decrease in the production of the sectors that are negatively affected by agricultural and trade policies and a decrease in self-sufficiency in those products. As shown by the PPF weights used in the analysis, Turkish consumers have less weight in the policy process relative to producer groups. Because of this, consumers are vulnerable to negative changes in consumer prices due to agricultural trade liberalization or economic integration. If agricultural policy is intended to benefit society as a whole, it must consider the needs of low-income consumers as well as influential producer groups. According to the contours shown in Fig. 3, there is an area, or a core, in which Turkey's income distribution and welfare can both improve from the (WTOEU; WTOTUR) solution. Given this initial point, policy makers have two basic alternatives to achieve a solution that is Pareto superior to this starting point. First, they can identify some point within this initial core that simultaneously improves welfare and income distribution. However, given these contours, attempts to increase welfare are at odds with increasing the equality of income distribution. As a result, the options that simultaneously increase welfare and enhance income equality are minimal. The other alternative involves the identification of alternative policy options that allow for the simultaneous improvement of welfare and income distribution. Policy alternatives that might accomplish both include tax schemes involving the redistribution of the resulting revenue, income support for groups hurt by the new policy, and the adoption of limits on per capita government payments. The use of these or other policy tools may allow for an increase in the overall societal welfare level, yet allow for a more uniform level of growth. This analysis shows that multiple policy criteria, in this case the welfare and income distribution effects of agricultural policy, can be used to identify the Pareto improving policy set. While a unique core was identified in this analysis, the framework can be extended to other policy options. As policy tools are identified that simultaneously enhance income distribution and increase welfare, the contours will shift. Policy makers can identify policies that result in contours of similar topography. This will expand the set of Pareto optimal policy options and allow multiple policy objectives to be concurrently achieved.