اثرات تغییر در اداره امور شرکت ها و تجدید ساختارها بر عملکرد عملیاتی: شواهد از خصوصی سازی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|13846||2007||28 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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|شرح||تعرفه ترجمه||زمان تحویل||جمع هزینه|
|ترجمه تخصصی - سرعت عادی||هر کلمه 90 تومان||18 روز بعد از پرداخت||1,141,380 تومان|
|ترجمه تخصصی - سرعت فوری||هر کلمه 180 تومان||9 روز بعد از پرداخت||2,282,760 تومان|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Global Finance Journal, , Volume 18, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 157-184
Using a sample of 161 firms (privatized from 1961 to 1999), our study offers evidence of how restructurings and corporate governance changes affect the firm's post-privatization performance. Prior to privatization, governments may choose to restructure firms through governance changes (i.e., establish relation with strategic foreign investors, implement employee share ownership plans) and/or restructurings (i.e., acquisitions, divestitures, re-capitalizations). We first extend existing privatization research by documenting and describing these restructurings. We then conduct preliminary tests to examine whether such restructurings/governance changes have affected post-privatization operating performance. Our results suggest that both restructuring and changes in corporate governance are important determinants of post-privatization performance.
Over the last few decades, privatization – defined as the sale of previously state-owned enterprises to private owners – has transformed the global economic landscape. The extant literature generally shows that privatization improves the financial and operating efficiency of divested firms. Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002), López-de-Silanes (2005), Nellis (2005), and Megginson (2005) all provide summaries of this research. In this paper, we empirically analyze reasons why privatization may contribute to these performance improvements. Specifically, we examine how restructurings and changes in corporate governance impact the performance of newly privatized firms. Our methods and results are similar to those of Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005), though our focus is more on developed countries. Prior to privatization, governments may choose to restructure firms through governance changes, such as establishing relationships with strategic foreign investors or implementing employee share ownership plans, and/or through restructurings such as acquisitions, divestitures, or re-capitalizations. We extend the existing privatization research by examining whether such restructurings/governance changes contribute to increased improvements in post-privatization operating performance. This question is important since some governments subject firms to significant changes before privatization while others typically do not. Accordingly, this study will further the search for potential sources of post-privatization performance improvements. Using a sample of 161 firms privatized between 1961 and 1999, our study offers preliminary evidence regarding how restructurings and governance changes affect the firm's post-privatization performance. Our results confirm that both restructuring and changes in corporate governance are important determinants of post-privatization performance. First, we find that pre-privatization restructuring leads to stronger post-privatization efficiency gains. We also find evidence of stronger profitability gains for firms with lower post-privatization employee ownership and higher state ownership. We also find stronger output gains for firms in competitive (unregulated) industries and for firms in developing nations. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the theoretical and empirical literature to identify potential sources of post-privatization performance improvements. Section 3 describes our data and defines our testable predictions. Section 4 outlines our empirical methodology, and Section 5 presents our findings. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Over the last 20 years, privatization has reduced the role of the state in many nations' economies. The empirical literature (summarized in Megginson and Netter, 2001, Djankov and Murrell, 2002, López-de-Silanes, 2005, Nellis, 2005 and Megginson, 2005) generally documents significant improvements in the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms. This study seeks to provide some preliminary evidence regarding the sources of the financial and operating improvements of newly privatized firms. We focus on the effects of restructuring and changes in corporate governance. Since governments frequently choose to restructure a firm prior to privatization through acquisitions, divestitures, and/or financial restructuring (i.e., re-capitalizations), we examine whether such restructurings contribute to increased improvements in post-privatization operating performance. Our results confirm that restructurings are important determinants of post-privatization performance. Specifically, our data provide evidence that restructuring leads to stronger efficiency improvements. Second, changes in corporate governance (especially changes in ownership) brought on by privatization may also contribute to the performance improvements. Higher amounts of foreign ownership lead to larger gains in post-privatization efficiency and lower levels of employment. Additionally, we expect that firms will become more productive as state ownership decreases. Our results confirm that real output significantly increases as state ownership declines. Finally, we test for the impact of employee ownership on the performance of the newly privatized firm. Consistent with earlier empirical studies, profitability decreases as employee ownership increases. Therefore, the proportional post-privatization ownership (by the state, by foreign investors, and by employees) is an important indicator of the firm's success following privatization.