توسعه اقتصادی بدون پیش نیاز: چگونه گی تولید دقیق بولیوی اشنایی با استانداردهای ایمنی مواد غذایی و تحت سلطه در بازار جهانی برزیل
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|15180||2014||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : World Development, Volume 54, February 2014, Pages 32–45
Brazilian firms used to dominate the brazil nut (BN) market to such an extent that the product still carries the country’s name. In a surprising twist, 77% of all BNs are now processed and exported by Bolivia, a country with far fewer resources than its neighbor. This paper analyzes the impact of EU regulations on the global BN market. It finds that Bolivian producers prevailed because they joined forces to revamp their manufacturing practices and meet EU sanitary standards despite continued mutual mistrust. In contrast, Brazilian producers have been unable to work cooperatively and lost access to the European market entirely.
Global trade can be a double-edged sword: while it creates economic opportunities, it also exposes exporters to higher levels of scrutiny concerning labor, environmental, and sanitary standards than they may be able to meet. Food safety hazards are particularly likely to trigger immediate and drastic responses. For instance, in 2008 news emerged that some brands of infant formula produced in China contained melamine, a chemical that increases protein content in milk but can be fatal when ingested (Gao, 2011). Within days, 28 countries had banned all milk imports from China and many of its trading partners. In the ensuing furor, Chinese milk producers posted multibillion dollar losses and at least one large producer went bankrupt. In 2009, Salmonella bacteria were found in peanuts sold by the Peanut Corporation of America ( Irlbeck, Akers, & Palmer, 2011. Hundreds of people got sick and nine died. Throughout the US, food manufacturers recalled products that contain peanuts, including cookies, crackers, ice cream, trail mixes and pet foods. Sales of peanut related products plunged and the US peanut industry lost an estimated three billion dollars. The public is now so sensitive to food scares that even false alarms can cause significant damage. For example, the inaccurate and temporary labeling of H1N1 influenza as “swine flu” affected the futures market of lean hogs to such an extent that the industry lost US$200 million within four months ( Attavanich, McCarl, & Bessler, 2011).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper employs a case study approach to understand how Bolivian BN producers upgraded their manufacturing practices and facilities to meet increasingly stringent EU food safety standards while their Brazilian competitors fell behind. Simply put, the Bolivians succeeded because they took a series of right decisions at the right time. Their upward trajectory started with Bolivian producers and government realizing early on that EU’s import restrictions would apply to all exporters in the country and not to specific firms, independent of their individual records or proven capacity. Responding to this constraint, Bolivian authorities immediately mandated that all outgoing shipments be tested for aflatoxin, lest inept exporters trigger tighter import requirements that harmed them all. As a next step, Bolivian BN producers acquired a lab so they could fulfill the testing requirement. After some back and forth, producers placed the lab under the purview of their embryonic business association. The lab entailed high fixed costs and the dilution of these costs pushed the association toward expanding its membership and becoming a politically-inclusive organization. When operating at proper scale, the lab was not only convenient but also affordable so producers used its services out of their own self-interest. The lab also generated a surplus so the association became financially autonomous and impervious to free-riding. Thanks to its political inclusiveness and financial autonomy, the association was able to disseminate the technical knowledge it acquired from foreign consultants and help producers upgrade their manufacturing practices. Taken together, these decisions allowed Bolivian BN producers to retain and even improve their access to the all-important EU market.