چه کسی ورشکستگی بانک را پرداخت می کند ؟

This paper discusses proposals for handling bank failures in a manner that is: rapid enough to allow the business to continue, respects the ranking of claims, makes none of the parties worse off than under traditional insolvency and does not require taxpayer funds, except to guarantee the new organization until recapitalization. It considers the relationship between the regime for bank exit and the rest of the framework for regulation and supervision; the role of market discipline in enabling solutions before the point of insolvency is reached; the problems in assessing the costs of different exit regimes and public intervention.

It is well known that the economic impact of the insolvency of banks poses different problems for society from the insolvency of non-financial companies and indeed from many other financial companies. These differences stem primarily from two causes: – the holding of deposits and the spill-over from a problem in one bank to others and to the rest of the economy.1 The laws relating to insolvency try to provide a balance between the various groups exposed to the loss in the case of company failure – creditors, shareholders, customers, employees etc. – and some equality of treatment of those within each group. In the latter respect this often involves measures to co-ordinate the interests of large numbers of people with individually small exposures and little power and information. Views differ across societies about the appropriate balance but it is normally only those directly involved who have a say. Courts can determine that the rules for sharing the cost are properly applied in each case. While it is only natural that those about to make losses would like to shift the burden onto others, the case for external assistance from taxpayers through the government is usually weak. The authorities are thus not normally directly involved unless they are exposed to the direct loss in the normal course of business.2 Having an efficient competitive economy involves entry, growth and exit of enterprises in a framework that gives confidence to the participants. 3 This includes the orderly exit of insolvent banks. 4

Although the focus of this paper is on bank exit, it forms part of a wider concern over how to design systems of regulation and bank resolution that provide appropriate incentives for the running of the banking system both in normal times and in the face of stress. All parties to the financial system should find that the regulatory framework encourages them to pursue their own interests in a way that is to the benefit of the good running of the financial system and the economy as a whole. The system should thus reward good risk management and penalize the bad. It should encourage the stability of the system as a whole while permitting the normal competitive adjustment within it. Key requirements for this to happen are that information should be good, both about risks and about the future actions of the authorities, particularly in times of stress, and market mechanisms should function well, not just for the banking business but also for corporate control. However, being able to act does not imply necessarily that the action takes place. As Bliss and Flannery (2001) point out, just because market signals are clear it does not mean that the bank management necessarily responds to them. ‘Disclosure is not Enough’ but it is an important step forward (Stern, 2003).