اثر صندوق بین المللی پول و وام بانک جهانی بر رشد اقتصادی بلندمدت: تجزیه و تحلیل تجربی

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, frequently, and often repeatedly, extend loans to developing nations. These loans have been blamed for generating adverse economic outcomes. The growth impact of Fund and Bank loan programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other determinants of growth. A unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans rather than the number of programs. The estimates indicate that Bank lending stimulates growth in some cases, primarily by increasing public investment. Fund lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth. The channel for this effect is a negative impact of Fund lending on public as well as private investment.

The two major international financial institutions (IFIs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or Bank), are important sources of capital funds for developing economies. The IMF now engages in developmental as well as “crisis” and adjustment lending, while the World Bank focuses on developmental loans. In recent years, the lending practices of the IMF and the World Bank have been subjected to ever-increasing public scrutiny, and frequent criticism. The IMF’s lending practices, in particular, are regularly criticized as “antigrowth” and “antipoor.” Indeed, IMF lending, especially in “crisis” situations, requires domestic governments to submit to a set of conditions (conditionality) that typically reduce or restrain domestic demand, thereby having, at a minimum, adverse short-run economic consequences. However, there is frequent recidivism among the borrowing nations, and the IMF-imposed conditions may be necessary to address the fundamental problems existent in recidivist nations.1 World Bank lending has been less criticized and less studied than IMF lending. As Krueger (1998) argues, the IMF frequently lends to countries in the midst of a crisis when the borrowing nations suffer from external and/or internal imbalances. This is not the case for World Bank lending, which is typically directed toward long-term development projects. Thus, while the IMF is criticized as too harsh, the World Bank is often criticized as too soft in its lending practices. The frequent, strenuous criticism of IFI lending raises questions about the efficacy of their loan programs. As discussed below, the Bank and IMF currently stress that their ultimate purpose is the promotion of sustainable economic growth. Thus, the resulting effects of their lending activities on growth can be used to evaluate the success of their programs. This paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of the growth effects of both IMF and World Bank lending, within a common framework that also includes fundamental economic and political factors affecting growth. The analysis is extended to examine the impact of IFI lending by country income level and degree of democracy, as well as an investigation of the effects of different IMF programs. The next section discusses the relevant literature. The empirical model is presented in Section 3. The data and empirical methodology are discussed in section 4. Results are presented in section 5, followed by a discussion and a concluding section.

This paper reports the results of a study of the effects of IFI lending on long-run economic growth. Unique features of this study are the use of the value of Fund and Bank credits, rather than the existence of programs, in an empirical growth model that includes other determinants of growth. The effects of IFI lending are examined using a variety of econometric techniques, consistent with standard practice in the empirical growth literature. The estimates indicate that simultaneous equation bias is not a problem. The results indicate that Fund lending has negative effects on growth, while there is evidence that Bank lending increases growth in some cases. Significantly, Bank credits are most helpful in low income and poor democracy countries. Further analysis indicates that these effects likely occur through aggregate investment. Estimates indicate that Fund lending reduces aggregate investment, especially public investment. Contrarily, Bank lending appears to increase public investment in borrowing countries. Recently, both the Bank and the Fund have emphasized that stimulating growth is an important goal for their programs. However, Fund lending involves more than promoting growth. These other roles include provision and analysis of statistical data, training, and policy advice and technical assistance. Thus, the overall evaluation of both Fund and Bank lending programs weigh the benefits of the entirety of services provided against the costs. Unfortunately, to date, stimulating economic growth is not a benefit of IMF lending, while a more favorable conclusion can be drawn regarding World Bank lending programs.