تشکیل اتحاد استراتژیک در صنایع با فناوری پیشرفته: مطالعه تطبیقی نظریه مبتنی بر منابع و نظریه معامله ـ هزینه

In this paper, the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory are compared in their suitability to explain firms' formation of strategic alliances under high-technology business environments. Four forms of technology-driven strategic alliances, such as (a) technology license (b) joint R&D (c) sourcing agreement and (d) joint venture, are explained based on the above two theories. Empirical analysis is performed with cases from the semiconductor industry by evaluating the feasibility to use either the resource-based theory or the transaction-cost theory for the explanation of alliance formation. It is recognized that primary motivation of strategic alliances is the access to resources, followed by the shortening of time required for development or marketing. Because the issue of time is rephrased by the issue of resources, it is concluded that the resource-based theory prevails over the transaction-cost theory to explain alliance activities in high-technology industries.

Strategic alliances have become central to competitive success in fast changing global markets (Doz and Hamel, 1998). The dramatic increase of importance for firms to form strategic alliances in their business activities has been attributed to the strategic responses to rapid environmental changes, such as intensification of competition, acceleration of technology advancements, enlargement of required investment, and globalization of markets. This is especially true in high-technology industries, in which the pace of new technology and product development is remarkably high and its lifecycle is accordingly short (Vilkamo and Keil, 2003). Reflecting these circumstances, the number of strategic alliances has increased in the past decade, with tens of thousands of strategic alliances reported worldwide in recent years (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Firms enter into strategic alliances for various reasons, and the formation of strategic alliances is one of main research subjects in this field. Current theories provide at least two main explanations for alliances, the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001). The resource-based theory views firms as bundles of resources, and alliances arise when firms need additional resources that cannot be purchased via market transactions. On the other hand, the transaction-cost theory recommends choosing the organization model that minimizes the sum of fixed and continual transaction costs, and firms form alliances if this minimization is achieved through them. Although there are other economic theories to explain alliances, such as agency theory, relational contracting theory, political economy theory, etc. (Sorensen and Reve, 1998), the above two theories are the most influential explanations viewing alliances from two different angles. There have been many works and analysis on strategic alliances using the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory as shown in Section 2. They are related to either one of these theories, trying to construct theoretical frameworks to explain firms' alliance activities, such as, motivation, formation, structure, performance, learning, etc. Some papers also compare these two theories and identify the difference in explaining various aspects of alliances. However, most of these works discuss alliances in their generic nature, not taking account of specific business environmental factors in which alliance activities are created. This is a limitation of previous works, because firms select a strategy that best exploits their capabilities relative to external opportunities (Grant, 1991) and environmental factors constitute the key element of alliance strategies. Considering that a firm's motivation for alliances differs according to industries, business characteristics and competitive situations, the appropriate theory for alliances may also differ depending on these environmental conditions. In consideration of this, the missing element in current research is that characteristics of business environments have not been taken into consideration in comparing these alliance theories. In order to fill this research gap, the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory are compared in their suitability to explain firms' alliance formation in high technology business environments. In this study, emphasis is put on the empirical analysis with certain case studies in the semiconductor industry. This is for the purpose of providing the theoretical framework with higher confidence level, by validating the theory using actual case analysis. The semiconductor industry is selected in the case analysis because this industry is well characterized with features typical of high-technology industries. This industry is subject to extreme price and product feature competition, in which the ability to develop new technologies is central and all firms that hope to remain competitive must undertake substantial R&D efforts (West and Iansiti, 2002). Because strategic alliances play a central role for most firms in high-technology industries, it is quite important for them to have a solid theoretical base for planning and analyzing various aspects of alliance activities. If this comparative analysis clarifies the suitability of a certain theory to explain firms' formation of strategic alliances, it would be appropriate to apply such theory for evaluation of other aspects of alliance activities such as governance structure, performance, dynamic process and so on. This provides useful guidance for the selection of a specific theory, among other alternative theories proposed, in the analysis of strategic alliances in high-technology industries. Including the introduction, this paper has six sections. Section 2 reviews previous research on the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory. Section 3 describes several kinds of alliance forms and explains how each of such alliance forms is explained by the above two theories. Section 4 compares the two theories by evaluating their appropriateness to explain actual cases for each alliance form. Section 5 discusses research results and managerial implications of this study. Finally, the paper ends with some general conclusions and suggestions for future research.

In this paper, the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory are compared in their suitability to explain firms' motivation to enter into strategic alliances under high-technology business environments. Four forms of technology-driven strategic alliances such as: (a) technology license; (b) joint R&D; (c) sourcing agreement; and (d) joint venture, are explained based on the above two theories. The semiconductor industry is selected as a representation of high-technology industries in general, and evaluates the feasibility to use either the resource-based theory or the transaction-cost theory to explain actual alliance cases that are announced in this industry. Ten cases for each of four alliance forms are identified, and the primary motivation for each alliance case is extracted from the messages made by the firms' executives in charge of their alliances. Their motivation is classified into either (i) access to the partner's resources (ii) shortening of the time to market (or production) or (iii) reduction of the cost. It is recognized that the primary motivation of strategic alliances in this industry is the access to various resources owned by partners, followed by the reduction of time required for development or marketing. Because the issue of resources rephrases the issue of time, it is concluded that the resource-based theory prevails over the transaction-cost theory to explain strategic alliances in high-technology industries. This finding provides good guidance for the selection of resource-based theory to analyze strategic alliances amongst other alternative theories proposed. Although not validated yet, there is confidence that it would be appropriate to use the resource-based theory for the explanation of other aspects of alliance activities such as governance structure, performance, dynamic process, etc. This is also useful guidance for alliance managers or planning managers in the sense that they have one prevailing theoretical backbone for their practical activities, such as the creation of strategic alliances, the evaluation of alliance performance, or the analysis of competitors' alliance activities. There are some limitations of this study. It focuses on empirical analysis in the semiconductor industry and uses actual cases announced in the industry to evaluate the theories proposed. Although this industry well represents the typical characteristics of high-technology industries, it also holds certain inherent industry natures. Their steep levels of price erosion, huge capital investment, and quick technology obsoleteness are quite high, and they may exaggerate the typical characteristics of high-technology industries. In order to enhance the coverage of this study for overall high-technology industries, it is necessary to include other industries in the empirical analysis such as computer, software and communication industries. These other industries would also hold their inherent natures, and this study would be improved if some generic natures of alliance activities in high-technology industries are discussed. In this study, two main theoretical explanations, the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory, are compared. Considering that there are other economic theories to explain strategic alliances, such as agency theory, relational contracting theory, political economy theory, etc. the future theme would be to extend the analysis to these other theories as well. It should also be pointed out that, besides the motivation of alliance formation that is discussed here, there exist other aspects of alliance studies such as governance structure, performance, dynamic process, etc. This study would be enhanced if these other aspects are discussed in a similar manner. This also needs to be explored in the future research.