مکانیزم های کنترل در سراسر کیفیت ارتباط خریدار تامین کننده ماتریکس

This study develops a buyer–supplier RQ matrix and explores changes in the use of selected control mechanisms, including coercive power, non-coercive power, contracts, and relational norms, across this matrix. The results indicate, under four distinct contexts of RQ, that coercive power execution is relatively low and has no significant differences in different quadrants of the matrix; that contract execution is relatively high and likewise has no significant differences; and that execution of non-coercive power and relational norms increases as the level of RQ improves. These findings reveal the important roles of contracts, the limited roles of coercive power, and the changing roles of non-coercive power and relational norms, as displayed in four distinct contexts of RQ. They make new contributions to the buyer–supplier relationship management literature and provide insightful theoretical guidance for buyer–supplier relationship managerial practice.

RQ can reflect the partners' cooperation and adaptation, as well as the atmosphere present, in a buyer–supplier relationship (Ananda and Francis, 2008, Håkansson and Snehota, 1995 and Woo and Ennew, 2004). Quality is an important precondition for the success of a long-term exchange relationship (Bejou et al., 1996, Ford, 1980 and Ryu et al., 2007a), and determines the likelihood that transactions among relationship partners will continue. Since risks and uncertainties always exist in any exchange relationship no matter what its quality, control mechanisms are indispensable for reducing opportunistic behavior and for improving relationship performance (Huntley, 2006, Jap and Ganesan, 2000, Rauyruen and Miller, 2007, Williamson, 1985 and Williamson, 1993). In the realm of buyer–supplier relationship management, control mechanisms consisting of the use of coercive power, non-coercive power, contracts, and relational norms have received considerable attention because of their effective roles in governing the activities of participants in the relationship (Koza and Dant, 2007, Luo et al., forthcoming, Liu et al., 2009, Ryu et al., 2008 and Weitz and Jap, 1995). Although relevant literature about dimensions of RQ is not unanimous, scholars do agree that mutual trust and commitment between parties in an exchange relationship are two important dimensions of RQ (Bejou et al., 1996, De Cannière et al., 2009, Huntley, 2006, Leuthesser, 1997 and Rauyruen and Miller, 2007). Research investigates the antecedent and consequent variables of RQ (Anderson and Weitz, 1992, Kumar et al., 1995, Leonidou et al., 2006, Morgan and Hunt, 1994 and Ryu et al., 2007b) but neglects to investigate whether or not the use of control mechanisms changes under different contexts of RQ. Thus, until now, the kinds of control mechanisms parties in an exchange relationship tend to use under different levels of RQ remain unclear, and therefore no guidelines exist for managers already involved in a buyer–supplier relationship, or for managers looking for new partners, who want to know about their partners' preference for type of control mechanisms and who want to help firms to design a control mechanism structure in different contexts of RQ. To explore the issues above, this article develops a 2 × 2 RQ matrix based on distinct levels of mutual trust and on the commitment of both buyer and supplier in an exchange relationship, and explores the extent to which the two parties' use of these control mechanisms—coercive power, non-coercive power, contracts, and relational norms—changes across four types of RQ. This research tests the matrix and the hypotheses proposed, using cluster, ANCOVA and SEM analysis of 220 pairwise data. The contributions of the research involve developing a RQ 2 × 2 matrix, and revealing the changes resulting from employing coercive power, non-coercive power, contracts, and relational norms under four distinct contexts of RQ. The results offer new theoretical and managerial insights into connections between the use of control mechanisms and RQ, and make further contributions to buyer–supplier relationship management literature and practice.

Whereas most previous studies on RQ conventionally focus their attention on investigating its antecedent and consequent variables, the present research explores whether the execution of selected control mechanisms changes under distinct contexts of RQ. Through developing a RQ matrix and proving its reasonableness and effectiveness, this study reveals changes in the use of four kinds of control mechanisms—coercive power, non-coercive power, contract and relational norms—across four distinct context of the RQ. The findings of the research expand upon studies about differences of RQ context and its relationship with the execution of selected control mechanisms, and enrich existing literature about buyer–supplier relationship management. The result of H1 demonstrates that, whatever the level of RQ, the extent of the use of coercive power is always relatively low and shows no significant difference. This could be explained by either of two reasons. First, the use of coercive power depends on having such power, and one side's source of power is the other side's dependence resulting from an imbalance of resources, such as a unique design, a well-known brand, or a preponderant market share (Geyskens et al., 1996, Payan and McFarland, 2005 and Kumar et al., 1995). It is impossible for either party to always have coercive influence power over the other party in any relationship, and therefore governing an exchange relationship by coercive power execution simply cannot be achieved constantly. Second, even if one party has such coercive influence power, the party may not want to use such power because the use of coercion will give the exchange partner a hegemonic impression, which may lead to conflict (Johnson et al., 1990) and to dissatisfaction (Skinner et al., 1992), and will block the development of the future cooperative relationships (Skinner et al., 1992). Analysis of H2 shows that the extent of non-coercive power use will increase gradually as RQ improves. Unlike the use of coercive power, non-coercive power use can actively inspire partners to work together for their common interests (Skinner et al., 1992). Through transferring and sharing of information, special skills and so on, as well as through mutual identification between partners, the use of non-coercive power deepens the partners' mutual communication and understanding, effectively reduces conflict, and increases satisfaction and the willingness to engage in further cooperation (Skinner et al., 1992). Thus, a high level of RQ will not only supply a foundation for but will actually breed the use of non-coercive power. Analysis of H3 suggests that exchange partners use mass contracts to govern an exchange relationship no matter what the level of RQ. The reason could be explained as follows. Despite many deficiencies of contracts (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999, Buvik and Reve, 2001, Jap and Ganesan, 2000 and Poppo and Zender, 2002), as a formal control mechanism for governing an exchange relationship, contracts are widely accepted for their control effects (Weitz and Jap, 1995 and Williamson, 1985). Especially for partners involved in a buyer–supplier relationship, whatever the level of RQ is, both parties are faced with intensifying competition and increasing environment uncertainty, and they will need to adjust their corporate strategies to respond to changes in the environment (Stickel, 2001). These adjustments may influence cooperative behavior in the exchange relationship. Thus, formal contracts can provide guidelines for adaptation to changing market conditions and technological changes, and provide a means for making interfirm trade work more smoothly (Buvik and Reve, 2001). Analysis of H4 shows that control mechanism execution will be more flexible as an exchange relationship becomes closer, and that, with the RQ gradually improving, the two parties will be more inclined to use relational norm control mechanisms based on expectations, to govern their exchange relationship. In addition, this result also shows that, whether the mutual commitment is high or low, the use of relational norms increases with the increase of partners' mutual trust. That is, when both parties' commitment is similar, the use of relational norms will be higher in a high level of trust than in a low level of trust; and when the two parties' commitment is different, the use of relational norms will be higher in a high level of trust and a low level of commitment (“relier” type) than in a low level of trust and a high level of commitment (“initiative” type). This result suggests that compared with commitment, trust has a closer relationship with the use of relational norms, a finding which lends support to the conclusions of previous research that relational norms are built on the basis of partners' mutual trust (Heide and John, 1990, Zaheer et al., 1998 and Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).