تجارت، منازعه، و ادغام سیاسی: توضیح ناهمگونی از موافقت نامه های تجاری منطقه ای

Many historians argue that the main goal of European trade integration was the preservation of peace. This paper investigates whether this reasoning is relevant for the EU and other regional trade agreements (RTAs). I provide empirical evidence that customs unions and common markets (deep RTAs) do reduce the probability of war between members. Partial scope and free trade agreements (shallow RTAs) however have no effect on war probabilities. Accordingly, international insecurity has a differential impact on incentives to create RTAs. Deep RTAs are signed between countries that are involved in many interstate disputes and that have low trade costs with the rest of the world, whereas the opposite is true for shallow RTAs.

The European Union (EU) is unquestionably the most integrated regional trade agreement (RTA) in the world, and a yardstick for other regions of the world. Many historians argue that the main goal of the European integration process was the preservation of peace after three increasingly destructive wars in Europe in less than a century. This view is illustrated by Robert Schuman's proposal for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner to EU: “by pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace”. 1 This paper investigates whether the reasoning linking security and regional trade integration is relevant for Europe and other regions of the world by asking two questions: do RTAs prevent the outbreak of war and is international security a motive for RTA creation?

This paper asks whether international security is a motive for creating RTAs. I provide robust empirical evidence that international security does matter, but that its impact depends on the form of trade integration. In this paper, RTAs are classified according to their level of political integration. A deep RTA (customs union or common market) involves the creation of common supranational institutions whereas a shallow agreement (partial scope or free trade agreement) requires only weak institutional integration. The empirical analysis shows that deep RTAs promote the negotiated settlement of disputes between members and prevent war. Shallow RTAs have no impact on war probabilities. I then show that security issues are an important motive for the creation of deep RTAs. A pair of countries involved in many interstate disputes and naturally more open to multilateral trade is more likely to create a deep RTA. Supranational institutions created on the basis of a deep RTA help to manage interstate conflicts and secure gains from bilateral trade. Conversely, interstate disputes reduce incentives to create shallow RTAs. Shallow RTAs are mainly driven by economic determinants.