سیاست های پولی توسط کمیته : چرا و چگونه؟

Monetary policy committees can reach decisions either individualistically (i.e., through voting) or collegially. Committees are neither inherently more nor less transparent than individuals. Most of the advantages of group (over individual) decision-making point to the superiority of genuinely collegial or individualistic committees. One potential disadvantage of an individualistic committee, however, is that it may confuse outside observers by speaking with too many voices. The best ways of communicating with markets and the general public differ between individual central bank governors acting alone and policy committees, and across different types of committees. When it comes to transparency, one size does not fit all.

Among the most notable, but least discussed, hallmarks of what I have called the “quiet revolution” in central banking practice (Blinder, 2004) has been the movement toward making monetary policy decisions by committee. Until about a decade ago, most central banks had a single governor, who might or might not have been independent of the rest of the government. But since then, the United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil, to name just a few, have opted to establish monetary policy committees (MPCs). In addition, the committee-based ECB replaced 12 central banks, most of which had previously been run by individual governors. I am unaware of any case in which a country replaced an MPC by a single decision maker. In fact, a recent survey by Pollard (2004) found that 79 out of 88 central banks made monetary policy by committee. Thus the existence of a pronounced worldwide trend is clear. So the first question for this paper is why. Why have so many central banks switched from individual to group decision making? But simply deciding that decisions should be made by committee does not provide a how-to-do-it manual that a central bank can follow. So the rest of the paper focuses on a few selected aspects of the “how” question. Should an MPC make decisions by majority rule, with each member voting for his or her preferred policy, as is the case at the Bank of England? Or is it better to insist on something approximating unanimity — whether the unanimity is genuine or contrived? And given this decision, how should the central bank communicate with the public, the government, and the markets? A central – and heretofore ignored – point of this paper is that the most appropriate forms of communication depend on the nature of the monetary policy committee. There is no one “right way” to communicate.

The main points of this paper can be summarized easily. • When it comes to making complex decisions, committees have several presumed advantages over individuals, including a larger and more diverse knowledge base, different decision heuristics, and a built-in system of checks and balances. • Committees can reach decisions either individualistically (i.e., through voting) or collegially. In the latter case, the group decision making process can be either autocratically or genuinely collegial. • Committees are neither inherently more nor less transparent than individuals. • Most of the presumed advantages of group (versus individual) decision making point to the superiority of genuinely-collegial or individualistic committees. • One potential disadvantage of an individualistic committee, however, is that it may confuse outside observers by speaking with too many voices. • The best ways of communicating with markets and the general public differ between individual central bank governors acting alone and formal monetary policy committees, and across different types of committees. When it comes to transparency, one size does not fit all.