سیاست پولی و موسسات پیشین ، در دوران بحران مالی جهانی و چه بعد از آن

This paper describes the changes that occurred in the conduct and instruments of monetary policy used by major central banks when the crisis hit; discusses the new tradeoffs and controversies engendered by those policy reactions; and speculates about additional likely future changes in monetary policy and institutions. Following a brief account of the evolution of monetary policymaking principles and institutions in the past, the paper deals with the controversial question of how and when to exit a period of large-scale monetary expansion. The paper documents the fact that, in spite of huge monetary injections and historically low interest rates, inflation in the US and in the Eurozone remained subdued, and reports that since the onset of the subprime crisis, there has been a dramatic deceleration in the growth of banking credit in the US. The paper also discusses the tradeoff between the lender-of-last-resort function of the central bank and moral hazard; the consequences of bailout uncertainty for central bank policy; and the particular problems faced by the ECB in the face of a major financial crisis.

Economic history suggests that conventional wisdom about monetary policy undergoes substantial changes following major events such as financial panics, depressions and wars. Following long periods of stability, a monetary policy consensus builds up and solidifies, only to be shaken when the next major event materializes. The global financial crisis (GFC) is no exception. It has already shaken some of the conventional wisdom about what constitutes good monetary policy, and is likely to lead to further revisions of the consensus that evolved after the great inflation (GI) of the seventies and, more recently, during the great moderation (GM). This paper describes the changes that occurred in the conduct and instruments of monetary policy by major central banks when the crisis hit; discusses the new tradeoffs and controversies engendered by those policy reactions; and speculates about additional likely future changes in monetary policy and institutions induced by the crisis. Although the bulk of the paper is descriptive in nature, some of the discussion is prescriptive. The paper is organized as follows: to provide a broader perspective, Section 2 presents a brief, long-term history of the evolution of monetary policymaking principles and institutions. Section 3 describes the changes in the conduct and instruments of monetary policy during the crisis. Section 4 addresses the controversial question of how and when to exit a period of large-scale monetary expansion deployed to avert an imminent crisis. It documents the fact that, in spite of huge monetary injections and historically low interest rates, inflation in the US and the Eurozone areas remained subdued. This is followed, in Section 5, by a discussion of how the GFC is likely to change monetary policy objectives and instruments, as well as related economic research, in the future. Section 6 reflects on how the crisis might affect future monetary policymaking institutions. The long simmering subprime crisis in the US degenerated into a full-blown panic in September 2008, when the US government decided not to bail out Lehman Brothers. Similarly, credit default swaps (CDS) on Greek and other weak sovereign European debts shot through the roof whenever political uncertainty concerning governmental bailouts rose. Section 7 discusses the reasons for bailout uncertainty and its consequences for central bank (CB) policy. Section 8 focuses on the particular problems of the ECB in the face of a major financial crisis.

Monetary policy principles and monetary policymaking institutions change substantially following major economic upheavals. Thus, the great depression led inter alia to deposit insurance and to the Glass–Steagall Act. The great inflation of the seventies was followed by Volcker's stabilization, and the ascendency of central bank independence. The great moderation spurred inflation targeting, Taylor's rule and the New-Keynesian framework, along with a relative neglect for financial stability issues. The global financial crisis resurrected concerns about financial stability, and underlined the importance of the central bank's lender-of-last-resort function. It also led to a more intensive use of unconventional monetary policy instruments. The crisis also demonstrated that during financial crises, highly expansionary monetary policies do not necessarily raise inflation. Section 4 of the paper presents data on total US banking credit and reserves which support the view that this seeming anomaly is due to huge increases in the demand for liquidity and safe assets by the banking system and other financial institutions over the crisis. A corollary to this view is that inflationary risks will reappear only when the rate of increase in credit to the economy picks up. This is consistent with the view that the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy and to inflation is substantially weaker during financial crises than during normal times; or, more generally, that the transmission of monetary policy to inflation depends on the state of the financial system. The preceding remarks suggest that an important open question for future research is: how does the transmission of monetary policy to private banks’ interest rates and the volume of credit they offer, differ between normal times and between periods of banking distress. A related open question concerns the possibility that the speed of price adjustments is lower during deep recession periods than during more normal times. If, as I believe, future research supports these two hypotheses, the operational policy conclusion may be that during financial crises, inflation targeting should be de-emphasized in favor of the maintenance of liquidity and confidence.