طرح های گواهی نامه سفید: تجزیه و تحلیل اقتصادی و تعامل با اتحادیه اروپا ETS

This paper examines the economic, environmental and distributional impacts of an idealised tradable white certificate (TWC) scheme and shows how the impacts are modified when the scheme operates in parallel with the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). It uses simple graphical techniques to assess whether a TWC scheme will increase, decrease or have an ambiguous effect on electricity demand, wholesale and retail electricity prices, carbon emissions and investment in energy efficiency, paying particular attention to the interpretation of ‘additionality’.Following a comparable analysis of the impact of the EU ETS, the paper examines the implications of introducing a white certificate scheme in a country that is already participating in the EU ETS. It compares the effect of this combination of instruments to that of the EU ETS operating in isolation. It concludes that there is no necessary link between the price of white certificates and marginal cost of energy efficiency investment, the price of electricity or the ability of the suppliers to eliminate free riders from their subsidy schemes. Also, a TWC scheme will make no contribution to reducing global carbon emissions unless and until it leads to a tightening of the EU ETS cap.

This paper addresses two questions. First, what does basic economic theory tell us about the economic, environmental and distributional impacts of an idealised tradable white certificate (TWC) scheme? Second, how are these impacts modified when the scheme operates in parallel with the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS)? These questions are explored through elementary graphical models of the markets for electricity and energy efficiency. The paper abstracts from the empirical details of individual schemes and makes a number of standard but radically simplifying assumptions regarding the operation of the relevant markets. In particular, much of the analysis assumes that markets operate without any significant ‘barriers’ or market failures. This approach may seem odd to readers familiar with energy efficiency policy, since the multiple and reinforcing barriers to energy efficiency form the raison d’etre for white certificate schemes and related instruments ( Sorrell et al., 2004). Nevertheless, while these barriers influence the response to market and regulatory signals and are relevant to both the design and justification of policy interventions, they do not significantly affect the economic impacts of those instruments that are the main focus of this paper (described below). We therefore consider that much insight can be gained from a simplified approach, which can then form the basis for more detailed investigation of particular schemes, including economic modelling. TWCs are attracting increasing interest within the EU as a cost-effective means of encouraging investment in energy efficiency by energy suppliers (Farinelli et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2005; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006; Oikonomou et al., 2007; Vine and Hamrin, 2008). Variations of this instrument are currently in operation in Italy and the UK, about to be introduced in France and under serious consideration in Denmark and the Netherlands.2 In this context, the interactions between such schemes and the EU ETS become a key policy concern (Sorrell, 2003). These interactions may occur through a number of routes, but most importantly through the operation of electricity markets. The paper, therefore, investigates the behaviour of an idealised national TWC scheme that is aimed solely at improving the efficiency of electricity use. To provide an organising framework, the paper focuses on a small number of price, quantity and distributional variables, which are summarised in Box 1. The impacts of the policy instruments on each variable are explored using simple graphical techniques, with distributional impacts being assessed through the standard measures of consumer and producer ‘surplus’.The paper first examines the potential effect of a TWC scheme operating in isolation and then examines the effect of the EU ETS in isolation. The TWC scheme is treated in more detail than the EU ETS, since its impacts are both less familiar and more complex. The paper then examines how these effects may be modified when both instruments operate in parallel. In each case, the paper assesses whether the variables listed in Box 1 are likely to be increased, reduced or unaffected by the instrument or instrument combination, or whether the outcome is ambiguous and therefore depends on individual circumstances. These results are summarised in tables, which provide a useful overview of the analysis. Where possible, commentary is provided on the likely magnitude of these different effects. The paper pays particular attention to the impact of a TWC scheme on national, European and global carbon emissions. 3

Compared to other market-based climate policy instruments, there has been little economic analysis of the operation of white certificate schemes. Also, there is a general tendency to analyse the impact of climate policy instruments in isolation rather than in the context of other instruments (Gunningham and Gabrosky, 1998; Sorrell et al., 2003). But if white certificate schemes are to be successfully introduced, a better understanding of both market operation and the consequences of policy interaction is required. This paper has contributed to both these aims, by developing a simple partial-equilibrium analysis of an idealised white certificate scheme and showing the consequences of introducing this alongside the EU ETS. The analysis involves a number of simplifying assumptions and provides no substitute for the detailed investigation and economic modelling of individual schemes. The assumption of undistorted markets for electricity and energy efficiency is especially limiting, since market failures pervade both. Nevertheless, simplified models can often contribute useful insights and several of the conclusions are unlikely to be changed if more realistic assumptions are made. For example, it was argued that • There is no necessary link between the marginal cost of energy efficiency investment and the price of white certificates. • Unlike tradable green certificate schemes ((Jensen and Skytte, 2002b), there is no automatic feedback between electricity prices and white certificate prices. Instead, the relationship is mediated in part by regulatory decisions on additionality. • The price of white certificates should not depend on the ability of participants to eliminate free riders when implementing subsidy schemes, although this will affect the overall costs of the scheme. • While a reduction in electricity demand is an unambiguous outcome of a TWC scheme, the final retail price may be greater or lesser than the original electricity price depending on the relative slope of the demand and supply curves. Most importantly, it was shown that, when operating in conjunction with the EU ETS, a TWC scheme focused solely on electricity efficiency will make no contribution to reducing EU or global carbon emissions unless and until it leads to a tightening of the EU ETS cap. Following the publication of the draft directive, this appears unlikely, at least in the period up to 2020. Hence, the common assertion that such schemes will reduce emissions by a certain amount is false. This point is frequently overlooked by policy makers and has important implications for the justification for such schemes.