برآورد محاسبه تعادل عمومی از تاثیر بمب گذاری بالی بر اقتصاد اندونزی

This article employs a multi-regional computable general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy to estimate the short-run effect of a decline in tourism following the 2002 Bali bombings on the Indonesian economy. Our results suggest that of Indonesia's 26 provinces, GDP in Bali is worst affected by a negative shock to tourism exports followed by other popular tourist destinations, such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Within Bali we find that the tourism-related and non-tradable sectors contain the worst affected industries while export-oriented industries, such as textiles, clothing and footwear, and import-competing industries, such as machinery and electronics expand.

In October 2002 explosions in Kuta in Bali killed over 200 people, most of whom were foreign tourists. As a consequence, tourist arrivals to Bali declined. In the 12 months preceding the bombing (October 2001–September 2002) direct tourist arrivals in Bali were 1.4 million. In the 12 months following the bombing (November 2002–October 2003) direct tourist arrivals in Bali were 1.1 million (Department of Justice, 2004). In the wake of the bombings the Indonesian government spent $US200 million to promote Bali as a tourist destination. As a result, there was a distinct improvement in international tourist arrivals from June 2003. The immediate effect of the bombings on direct tourist arrivals to Bali is more stark if we compare the six months prior to the bombing with the six months following the bombing. In the six months prior to the bombing (April 2002–September 2002) tourist arrivals in Bali were 813,000, while in the six months following the bombing (November 2002–April 2003) tourist arrivals in Bali were 350,000 (Department of Justice, 2004). Following the initial pick-up in international tourist arrivals in the second half of 2003, visitor arrivals and occupancy rates continued to increase throughout 2004 and the first half of 2005. By the first six months of 2005 the hotel occupancy rate was above 60%, approaching that which existed before the bombings. However, just as the tourist industry was rebounding, in October 2005, there were further bombings in Kuta and Jimbaran that killed 23 people including the bombers. Following the second bombings, the average hotel occupancy rate fell to 30–40% (Jakarta Post, 2006). Existing studies of tourism in Bali or Indonesia more generally are primarily descriptive. Studies by economists have focused on the role of tourism as a vehicle to promote economic growth and reduce poverty (see e.g. Booth, 1990, Hitchcock, 2000, Jayasuriya and Nehen, 1989 and Shah and Gupta, 2000). Studies by anthropologists have concentrated on how to manage conflict between tourism and indigenous culture (Lietaer and De Meulenaere, 2003 and McTaggart, 1980). One related statistical study is Tan, McMahon, and Miller (2002). These authors examine the determinants of tourist flows to Malaysia and Indonesia from six major markets: namely, Australia, Germany, Japan, US, UK and Singapore over the period 1980–1999, finding that real income in the source markets and price competitiveness of the destinations are important determinants of demand. There are very few studies of the impact of the Bali bombings on the Balinese economy. Of those studies, most have argued that the Balinese economy is over reliant on tourism and that the downturn in international tourist arrivals following the bombings highlights the urgent need for the Balinese economy to become more diversified (Martana, 2003, McRae, 2005, Robinson and Meaton, 2005 and World Bank/UNDP, 2006). This perspective was questioned by Smyth, Nielsen, and Mishra (in press) who applied unit root tests to the time series of international tourist arrivals to Bali to ascertain if shocks to tourist arrivals are permanent or transitory. The results from that study suggest that the effects of the Bali bombings on the growth path of tourist arrivals from Bali's major markets are only transitory and that, therefore, Bali's tourism sector is sustainable in the long run. The purpose of this article is to simulate the short-run economic effects of the Bali bombing using the EMERALD multi-regional computable general equilibrium model of Indonesia. We use a computable general equilibrium model because it allows us to simulate the effect of a decline in tourism exports in Bali to countries outside Indonesia not only on the tourism sector in Bali, but also on other industries both in Bali and other provinces of Indonesia. We focus on the short-run effects of the bombing because in the short-run capital stock is assumed to be fixed, which means we can isolate the impact of the Bali bombing on the Indonesian economy resulting from a decrease in tourism exports to other countries rather than the combined effect of a decrease in tourism exports to other countries and investment outflow. There are very few computable general equilibrium based studies of the macroeconomic effects of tourism in developing countries, with the only published studies being for Fiji and Zimbabwe (see Magubu, 2002, Narayan, 2003 and Narayan, 2004). In addition to contributing to existing studies on the economic implications of the Bali bombing, this study contributes to this literature on computable general equilibrium modelling of tourist flows in developing countries.

The bombings in Bali resulted in a drastic decline in tourist numbers, which had an adverse effect on the livelihoods of many locals whose employment is linked to the tourism sector. In the wake of the bombings lending agencies such as the World Bank and UNDP have scrambled to direct compensation packages to those areas that are in most need and those areas which will do the most good in promoting sustainable development into the future. The results from this article provide guidance as to the regions and sectors that have been worse affected by the sharp decline in tourism exports following the bombings. The first conclusion from our analysis is that in terms of regional assistance it has been Bali and other popular tourist destinations in Indonesia such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta, which have been most affected by the bombings. Our results suggest that in Bali GDP will be 2.33% less than it would be without the bombings, while in Jakarta and Yogyakarta the corresponding amounts are 0.35% and 0.27%. In Bali employment falls by 4.93%, household consumption by 4.68%, investment by 6.79%, exports by 16.34%, and imports by 8.95%. A second conclusion that follows from our analysis is that policy-makers and lending agencies should take into account not only the regional macroeconomic implications of the bombing, but also the sectoral results in allocating compensation packages. Our results indicate that while the sectors that are most closely tied to tourism are the worst affected by the bombings, some sectors may grow even though they are in regions that lose overall. For example, while the Balinese hotel and restaurant sector shrinks by 7.7%, machinery and electronics grow by 2.13%. Thus, to have most effect, assistance should not just be allocated on a regional basis, but be sector-specific. Our simulations show the short-run effect of a 50% reduction in export demand for tourist goods. We have focused on the short-run effects because our objective was to isolate the effect of a decline in tourism exports from a decline in consumption and investment. We find that investment in Bali does fall in the short-run, but this decline is re-allocative with investment flowing to other regions. In the long run we would expect the overall effect of the bombings to be more severe because a reduction in consumer and investment confidence would lead to a fall in aggregate consumption and investment, reinforcing the short-run shock to tourism exports.