اصلاح TSOs : استفاده از قانونگذاری " بسته سوم " به منظور ارتقاء بهره وری و سرعت بخشیدن به ادغام منطقه ای در بازار عمده فروشی برق اروپا

The EU is developing new legislation – the so-called “Third Package” – to foster competition in its electric power markets. These proposals could be improved by adding more focus on regional integration of wholesale power markets, allowing more leeway for arrangements that fit the diverse existing patterns of transmission ownership and control, and addressing upfront new regulatory concerns that arise when transmission is divested as an independent, for-profit business.

For over a decade the Europe Union (EU) has been working towards liberalizing its electric power and natural gas markets, long dominated by national incumbent monopolies. Previous rounds of EU-level legislation,1 starting in the mid-1990s, have required utilities to give open access to their transmission and distribution networks, with the aim of establishing a level playing field for owners of generation to compete in supplying energy at wholesale level, and for retailers to compete in selling energy to consumers. While the legislation focused initially on large consumers, all consumers in the EU—including households—now have the right in principle to choose their supplier. In practice, however, liberalization has met with many obstacles. While a few EU member states, such as the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, have developed effective and mature competition at both wholesale and retail markets, the general picture shows very limited progress. Most markets remain national in scope and dominated by the incumbent utilities. This pessimistic appraisal was confirmed by an extensive inquiry carried out by the EU’s competition authority, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition), in 2005-07, the so-called “Energy Sector Inquiry.”2 The Sector Inquiry’s findings focused heavily on the issue of vertical integration between transmission businesses and their generation or retail supply affiliates.3,4 It argued that vertically integrated utilities have restricted their competitors’ ability to access consumers on equal terms, both through operational means (e.g., in setting rules and prices for balancing power) and through systematic under-investment in transmission infrastructure. It singled out the problem of vertical integration as a fundamental cause of the continued high levels of market concentration, and the weak and uneven development of competition.