Theories that postulate cognitive inhibition are very common in psychology and cognitive neuroscience [e.g., Hasher, L., Lustig, C., & Zacks, R. T. (2007). Inhibitory mechanisms and the control of attention. In A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. Kane, A. Miyake, A. Towse, & J. Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 227–249). New York, NY: Oxford, University Press], although they have recently been severely criticized [e.g., MacLeod, C. M., Dodd, M. D., Sheard, E. D., Wilson, D. E., & Bibi, U. (2003). In opposition to inhibition. In H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 163–214). Elsevier Science]. This paper poses and attempts to answer the question whether a research program with cognitive inhibition as its main theoretical assumption is still worth pursuing. We present a set of empirical data from a modified Stroop paradigm that replicates previously reported findings. These findings refer to between-trial effects previously described in the literature on Stroop, negative priming, and inhibition-of-return. Existing theoretical accounts fail to explain all these effects in an integrated way. A repetition-suppression mechanism is proposed in order to account for these data. This mechanism is instantiated as a computational cognitive model. The theoretical implications of this model are discussed.
One of the typical functions of cognitive control is interference resolution – that is, protecting the execution of task-relevant sequences of actions against interference and distraction. It is currently under debate whether cognitive inhibition (also referred to as cognitive suppression) is one of the mechanisms of interference resolution. Some authors assert that cognitive inhibition is essential for cognitive control ( Aron, 2007, Druey and Hubner, 2008, Hasher et al., 2007 and Houghton and Tipper, 1996); others say that it is unnecessary ( Egner and Hirsch, 2005, Hommel et al., 2004, MacLeod et al., 2003 and Rothermund et al., 2005).
