روانشناسی تکاملی و رفتار مصرف کننده : یک نقد سازنده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|5044||2013||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Consumer Psychology, Available online 2 April 2013
We examine the theoretical basis for the evolutionary narrative common to the target papers by Saad (this issue) and by Griskevicius and Kenrick (this issue) and identify areas of controversy that have sparked debate about evolutionary psychology [EP] among biologists and behavioral ecologists. The two main areas of disagreement are over (1) the role of genetic adaptations resulting from natural selection in ancient times compared to other forces leading to current behavior; and (2) the likelihood that evolution resulted in a set of highly specialized mental modules or information-processing circuits thought to be instrumental in determining present-day behavior. We review the EP research discussed by the authors of the target papers as a means of evaluating the evidence in support of the theory and of suggesting future directions of research.
Prior to the evolutionary synthesis of the 1940s (Huxley, 2010, 1942) scant attention was paid to the evolution of human behavior, which was still a matter of some controversy. In Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to SexDarwin (1874) had made clear that his theory of natural selection was just as applicable to the evolution of human thought and human behavior as it was to the evolution of gills and lungs, wings and tails in nonhuman animals. He wrote: “A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection” (Darwin, 1874, p. 132). Resistance to these ideas continued to be strong (see Richerson & Boyd, 2001 for a review). Wilson's (1975) synthesis of prevailing views appeared to settle many issues: genes (segments of DNA that code for a protein) were understood as the primary agent of human evolution by incorporating variance produced by sexual reproduction over time as well as more abrupt mutation (primarily from DNA replication failures and exposure to environmental factors). There is, however, continuing controversy over the extent to which genetic adaptations, most dating from Pleistocene hunter-gatherer times (discussed further below), are primarily responsible for many of the heritable behaviors and predispositions studied by EP and other behavioral and social scientists. There are many examples of plasticity in pre-existing genetic and developmental capacities that allow for substantial variations in visual processing, bodily structure, language comprehension, and so forth and which argue against a gene-dominant view of such inheritance (West-Eberhard, 2003). In what has been termed a “paradigm shift,” the science of genetics now sees DNA as dynamic (rather than largely static) and “subject to a wide array of rearrangements, insertions, and deletions” (Charney, 2012, p. 331).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Students of consumer behavior have long sought to explain why people behave the way they do. Most research examines proximate explanations that are seen as immediate antecedents of the behavior (e.g., favorable beliefs and attitudes, instigating cues or circumstances) or can be conceptualized as the immediate field of forces, both internal and external, having directional significance. Some might argue that the increasing causal emphasis on momentary spikes in salience, such as through semantic and emotional priming as well as temporary shifts in perspective via framing of decisions, has led to a more general level of unhappiness within the field regarding unusually narrow levels of explanation. Perhaps this has contributed to a desire to take another look at more enduring explanatory variables. Previous efforts in consumer behavior research to provide greater explanatory power across situations have linked behavior to more fundamental motives and personality traits and various conceptions of a self-concept and self-identification as well as to “terminal” values (i.e., core beliefs about what is important and worthy of guiding one's life), an approach that was revived in the 1990s by “means-end chain” and “laddering” research (Reynolds & Olson, 2001). Because these are further removed from immediate experience and situational contexts, they will typically account for less variance in any single action but they may offer more over-time explanatory power with respect to a person's pattern of behavior. More important to some is the possibility that such explanatory variables will help in building a more complete and cohesive theory. EP (including both target papers in this issue) pushes beyond prior approaches and emphasizes a program of research to discover truly ultimate causes of behavior — that is, the “evolutionary function of a behavior” (GK). Noting the “ubiquity of conspicuous consumption across history,” for example, GK suggest that “humans may have inherited brain mechanisms wired to respond to luxurious possessions. If so, then conspicuous consumption has served some ultimate evolutionary function” (GK). Judgments about appropriate levels of explanation are necessarily subjective and often reflect the purpose of the inquiry and goals of the researcher. Accordingly, we take no position on that question in the abstract. If one's goal was to design an effective intervention, it might be reasonable to ask whether certain “deeper” levels of analysis serve that purpose aside from providing more general insights. Similarly, it is not obvious that speculating that loss aversion is “an adaptive bias that helped humans solve survival-related ancestral challenges” (Li, Kenrick, Griskevicius, & Neuberg, 2012) is either useful (in the sense of providing unique actionable insights) or testable. Furthermore, biologically grounded and less speculative explanations for directional biases are available: Physiological research has examined the importance of both approach and avoidance systems, citing a lower threshold for negative affect but also the presence of a “positivity offset” that may account for the functionality of exploratory behavior (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008, pp.326–27). Sear et al. (2007, p.21) are optimistic that “a synthesis of the human evolutionary behavioral sciences is not only possible, but underway.” What that should look like is a matter of some controversy. Some scholars who adhere to an evolutionary paradigm often recognize the importance of multiple levels of explanation. S, for example, says: “A defining feature of a culture's ethos appears to be an adaptive response to an ecological challenge. Culture and biology should not be pitted against one another. Consumers are an inextricable mix of their biological and cultural heritages.” Moreover GK say: “Proximate and ultimate reasons are not competing explanations. Rather, each one explains a behavior at a different level of analysis, with both types of explanations being useful for understanding any given behavior.” We could not agree more. Unfortunately, EP has followed an uneven course in that regard (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003), often giving lip service to variable conditions of life but focusing on ancient genetic adaptations that are largely preprogrammed. Prominent EP theorists insist that scientifically adequate explanations must deal with “ultimate” rather than “proximal” causation and must, therefore, reside in evolved mental circuits resulting from natural selection in ancient times. Moreover, this implies that behavior should not be explained in terms of desired outcomes or goals: “The teleological end that seems to exist in the future as the point toward which things tend is in reality a regulatory process or representation in the organism in the present” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p. 12). Some may find doctrinal EP writings to be unusually strident in this regard: “A genuine, detailed specification of the circuit logic of human nature is expected to become the theoretical centerpiece of a newly reconstituted set of social sciences, because each model of an evolved psychological mechanism makes predictions about the psychological, behavioral, and social phenomena the circuits generate or influence….A growing inventory of such models will catalyze the transformation of the social sciences from fields that are predominantly descriptive, soft, and particularistic into theoretically principled scientific disciplines with genuine predictive and explanatory power”. Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p. 6 Confirming an evolutionary narrative and mechanisms presents unrivaled challenges. Looking at the explanation offered for conspicuous consumption, for example, one needs to confirm that the hypothesized ultimate cause was an evolutionary adaptation in the first place and then confirm a genetically based mechanism for both inheritance and the enacted behavior. For most behavior of interest to consumer or social psychologists, that goal seems beyond the reach of today's tool chest. On the other hand, the desire to better incorporate biological and culturally-based behavioral adaptations into a more integrative behavioral science presents unparalleled opportunities for the next generation of scholars, and so it would be a mistake to predict or prejudge what form this will take. In critiquing EP, Bolhuis et al. (2011, p.6) hope for a “broader, more open, and multidisciplinary theoretical framework, drawing on, rather than being isolated from, the full repertoire of knowledge and tools available in adjacent disciplines.” A particularly optimistic view was put forward by Gangestad et al. (2006, p.76), and we can only hope that it is a harbinger of the future: “Most theorists recognize that genes and environment influence behavior only in a context partly defined by the other, such that a dichotomy between nature and nurture (the idea that influence can be understood through reference to only genes or environment, respectively) is wrongheaded. Behavior results from an underlying, often universal, evolved developmental system (itself consisting of both genetic and environmental components) in conjunction with individual environmental influences, including social experiences.”