اثرات مشوق های پولی بر عملکرد کار و تلاش : نظریه ها، شواهد، و چارچوبی برای پژوهش

The purpose of this paper is to review theories and evidence regarding the effects of (performance-contingent) monetary incentives on individual effort and task performance. We provide a framework for understanding these effects in numerous contexts of interest to accounting researchers and focus particularly on how salient features of accounting settings may affect the incentives-effort and effort-performance relations. Our compilation and integration of theories and evidence across a wide variety of disciplines reveals significant implications for accounting research and practice. Based on the framework, theories, and prior evidence, we develop and discuss numerous directions for future research in accounting that could provide important insights into the efficacy of monetary reward systems.

Monetary incentives frequently are suggested as a method for motivating and improving the performance of persons who use and are affected by accounting information (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2001, Horngren et al., 2000 and Zimmerman, 2000), and their use in organizations is increasing (Wall Street Journal, 1999). Further, researchers have been encouraged to employ incentives in experimental studies so that subjects are sufficiently motivated and participate in a meaningful fashion (e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993, Friedman and Sunder, 1994, Roth, 1995 and Smith, 1991). Anecdotal and empirical evidence, however, indicates that monetary incentives have widely varying effects on effort and, consequently, oftentimes do not improve performance (Bonner et al., 2000, Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992, Jenkins, 1986, Jenkins et al., 1998, Kohn, 1993 and Young and Lewis, 1995). Consistent with this, accounting studies examining the effects of incentives on individual performance find mixed results with regard to their effectiveness (e.g. Ashton, 1990, Awasthi and Pratt, 1990, Libby and Lipe, 1992, Tuttle and Burton, 1999 and Sprinkle, 2000). If monetary incentives have disparate effects on effort and performance, then suggestions for their use in either the field or the laboratory should be informed by an understanding of the factors that moderate their effectiveness. We have four objectives in this paper. Our first objective is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the effects of (performance-contingent) monetary incentives on individual effort and performance and also to discuss theories that suggest mediators of the incentives-effort relation. Here, our focus is on explicating the motivational and cognitive mechanisms by which monetary incentives are presumed to increase performance; understanding these mechanisms is critical for determining how to maximize the effectiveness of monetary incentives. Theoretically, monetary incentives work by increasing effort which, in turn, leads to increases in performance. Given these relations, we first provide a detailed discussion of the various components of the effort construct: direction, duration, intensity, and strategy development. We then describe theories that detail the mechanisms through which monetary incentives are presumed to lead to increases in effort. These theories are expectancy theory, agency theory (via expected utility theory), goal-setting theory, and social-cognitive (self-efficacy) theory. Our second objective is to enumerate and categorize important accounting-related variables that may combine with monetary incentives in affecting task performance. To do this, we express the monetary incentives-effort and effort-performance relations as a function of person variables, task variables, environmental variables, and incentive scheme variables. This conceptualization allows for a full, yet parsimonious, categorization of the numerous accounting-related variables that may affect these relations, thereby facilitating an understanding of the effects of monetary incentives in numerous contexts of interest to accounting researchers. Our third objective is to review evidence regarding the effects of the combination of these important accounting-related variables and monetary incentives on individual effort and performance. Here, we choose one specific variable from each of the person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme categories within our framework and discuss its effects on the incentives–effort and effort–performance relations. We also discuss the importance of each variable in accounting settings as well as the theoretical and practical importance of examining the variable in conjunction with monetary incentives. We then review studies from a wide variety of disciplines to discuss the empirical effects of these variables on the incentives–effort and effort–performance relations. Next, we provide insights regarding how the results from our compilation of studies may have significant implications for accounting research and practice. Finally, we briefly discuss the theoretical and empirical relations between monetary incentives and many other important accounting-related person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme variables. Our final objective is to identify and discuss numerous directions for future research in accounting that would help fill gaps in our knowledge regarding the efficacy of monetary reward systems. Thus, for each of the person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme categories within our framework, we enumerate many important questions about the effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance. We believe it is essential to address these questions given the important role that accountants and accounting information play in compensation practice and the design of performance-measurement and reward systems. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our conceptual framework and discuss two important elements of the framework. First, we discuss the general effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance and explicate the effort construct. Second, we discuss theories that suggest mediators of the incentives-effort relation. In Section 3, we complete our discussion of the conceptual framework; in particular, we discuss important accounting-related variables that may moderate the effects of monetary incentives on effort and the effects of effort on task performance. In discussing these moderators, Section 3 also provides detailed evidence regarding the effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance under various situations, the implications of this evidence for accounting research and practice, and numerous directions for future accounting research. In Section 4, we summarize our main points and offer concluding comments.

In this paper, we present theories, evidence, and a framework for understanding the effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance. We first describe the fundamental incentives–effort and effort–performance relations and the four dimensions of effort that monetary incentives theoretically are posited to affect: direction, duration, intensity, and strategy development. We then discuss psychological and economic theories that explicate the incentives-effort link. Here, we detail many of the underlying cognitive and motivational process mechanisms by which monetary incentives are presumed to lead to increases in effort and, thus, increases in performance. We also provide a conceptual framework for the effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance. This framework facilitates a comprehensive consideration of the variables that may combine with monetary incentives in affecting performance. Specifically, we formulate the incentives–effort and effort–performance relations as a function of person variables, task variables, environmental variables, and incentive scheme variables. We then use our conceptual framework to organize and integrate a large amount of evidence on the efficacy of monetary incentives. In this regard, the framework is employed to focus on how salient features of accounting settings may moderate the positive effects of monetary incentives and, thus, to understand the effects of monetary incentives in numerous contexts of interest to accounting researchers. We then choose one specific variable from each of the person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme categories within the framework and discuss its relation with monetary incentives. The four particular variables we examine in-depth are: skill, task complexity, assigned goals, and the rewarded dimension of performance. For each of these variables, we discuss its importance in accounting settings as well as the theoretical and practical importance of examining the variable in conjunction with monetary incentives. We then present theoretical predictions and review the empirical evidence regarding the combination of these accounting-related variables and monetary incentives on individual effort and performance. We pay particular attention to the significant implications that our integration and compilation of theories and evidence has for accounting research and practice. Following this, we highlight numerous directions for future research in accounting that could provide important insights into the efficacy of monetary reward systems. Finally, while we restrict our primary attention to four specific variables we also briefly discuss theories, empirical evidence, and directions for future research for several other person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme variables that are important in accounting settings. Our framework and review of the attendant evidence indicates that there are a number of accounting-related variables that can alter the effects of incentives on performance. For example, we find that, on average, explicit performance targets (assigned goals) have additive positive effects on effort and performance over monetary incentives, thereby suggesting that organizations should employ performance targets in conjunction with monetary incentives to motivate employees. However, we also find evidence of an interaction between the difficulty of the goal and the type of incentive scheme. Specifically, compared to piece-rate schemes, performance typically is better under budget-based (quota) schemes when goals are moderate, but worse when goals are difficult. This evidence has implications regarding whether assigned goals and incentives should be kept as separate motivating mechanisms or whether incentives should be linked to goal attainment. We also find that features of accounting settings can attenuate the positive effects of monetary incentives on performance by altering either the effect of incentives on effort or altering the effect of incentives-induced effort on performance. For example, we find evidence that lack of skill can attenuate the effort–performance relation because, while monetary incentives may induce higher levels of effort, the performance of individuals who lack requisite skills is not sensitive to these effort increases. Additionally, lack of skill can attenuate the incentives–effort relation. Specifically, when individuals are assigned tasks for which they do not have the necessary skills, they may not increase their effort under monetary incentives because they believe that effort increases will not lead to performance increases and consequent rewards. Alternatively, when individuals are allowed to select their own contracts for a particular task, individuals with high skill are more likely to choose contingent pay, thereby restoring a positive incentives–effort relation. Because we delve deeply into the underlying cognitive and motivational processes, we explore the multiple roles that a particular variable, such as skill, can play in affecting the incentives–performance relation. These multiple roles are not inconsequential. For example, recognizing that task complexity itself can affect self-efficacy and, in turn, whether and how incentives affect the various dimensions of effort, highlights the critical role that task characteristics may play in determining short-run and long-run performance under monetary incentives. Moreover, understanding the processes by which accounting-related variables alter the incentives–performance relation and which part of the relation they alter can be critical for suggesting solutions that might restore a positive effect of incentives on performance. For instance, understanding how incentive contracts and their dimensions (e.g. which dimension(s) of performance they reward) affect employees’ allocations and levels of effort has possible, and perhaps distinct, implications for the structure of monetary reward systems, how performance is measured, the development of responsibility accounting systems, and job design. Our paper also makes clear that there are many important research questions that need to be addressed in accounting—and other disciplines—before it is appropriate to make strong recommendations to organizations and experimenters regarding the use and form of monetary incentives. In this vein, for each category within our framework, we develop and discuss several directions for future research that we feel would help fill gaps in our knowledge regarding the effectiveness of monetary reward systems. Moreover, we identify opportunities for future accounting research that reports on how salient accounting-related person, task, environmental, and incentive scheme variables combine with monetary incentives to affect individual effort and performance. We feel such future research is vital given the important role that accountants and accounting information play in compensation practice and the design of performance-measurement and reward systems. In this way, organizations and researchers will have better information regarding the circumstances under which monetary incentives yield desired levels and types of effort and performance in either the field or the laboratory.