دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 80635
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

شفافیت، تکمیل و استقامت

عنوان انگلیسی
Transparency, complementarity and holdout
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
80635 2012 15 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 75, Issue 2, July 2012, Pages 598–612

ترجمه کلمات کلیدی
چانه زنی چند نفره - استقامت ؛ مکمل؛ بهره وری؛ پیشنهادات راز؛ پیشنهادات عمومی؛ قضیه کوز؛ شفافیت
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی
C78; D23; D62; L14Multi-person bargaining; Holdout; Complementarity; Efficiency; Secret offers; Public offers; Coase theorem; Transparency
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  شفافیت، تکمیل و استقامت

چکیده انگلیسی

This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout (i.e. inefficiency) is critically dependent on three issues, (a) the transparency of the bargaining protocol, (b) the outside option of the buyer, and (c) the marginal contribution of the last seller. We find that although the accepted wisdom that holdout is severe, goes through whenever either the buyer has no outside option, or the bargaining protocol is secret, the holdout problem however is largely resolved whenever either the bargaining protocol is transparent and the buyer has a positive outside option, or if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large.