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Constitutions and Groups

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
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Highlights

- We develop a theoretical framework to study the formation of overlapping group structures.
- We introduce the notion of constitution and we propose the concept of constitutional stability.
- We study the existence and the emergence of constitutionally stable group structures.
- We provide requirements on constitutions and preferences guaranteeing stability.
- We illustrate our framework and general results in many-to-many matching markets.

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