

# Accepted Manuscript

CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: evidence from US banks

Yener Altunbaş , John Thornton , Yurtsev Uymaz

PII: S1544-6123(17)30441-5  
DOI: [10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003)  
Reference: FRL 819

To appear in: *Finance Research Letters*

Received date: 23 July 2017  
Revised date: 13 November 2017  
Accepted date: 14 November 2017

Please cite this article as: Yener Altunbaş , John Thornton , Yurtsev Uymaz , CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: evidence from US banks, *Finance Research Letters* (2017), doi: [10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



**Highlights**

- Banks are growing perpetrators of corporate misconduct
- We link misconduct of US banks to CEO tenure, a proxy for CEO power
- Banks are more likely to engage in misconduct when CEO's have a long tenure
- Misconduct is more likely when banks also have poor balance sheets
- Independent boards can sometimes mitigate the impact of CEO power

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

متن کامل مقاله

دریافت فوری ←

**ISI**Articles

مرجع مقالات تخصصی ایران

- ✓ امکان دانلود نسخه تمام متن مقالات انگلیسی
- ✓ امکان دانلود نسخه ترجمه شده مقالات
- ✓ پذیرش سفارش ترجمه تخصصی
- ✓ امکان جستجو در آرشیو جامعی از صدها موضوع و هزاران مقاله
- ✓ امکان دانلود رایگان ۲ صفحه اول هر مقاله
- ✓ امکان پرداخت اینترنتی با کلیه کارت های عضو شتاب
- ✓ دانلود فوری مقاله پس از پرداخت آنلاین
- ✓ پشتیبانی کامل خرید با بهره مندی از سیستم هوشمند رهگیری سفارشات